

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF RHETORIC

Biennial Conference

September 25-29, 1991

The Johns Hopkins University

ABSTRACTS

Don Paul Abbott

Rhetoric in Two Worlds:
European Humanism and Native Narrative in Colonial Peru

The Spanish conquest of the New World of the Americas occurred at the high point of the European Renaissance. One consequence of this confluence of geographical expansion and intellectual advancement was the transference of European humanism into the Spanish colonies. The introduction of humanistic learning in Spain's colonies necessarily meant the presence of rhetoric in the New World. Yet the role of rhetoric in the Spanish colonies is one aspect of Renaissance humanism which remains little studied.

Colonial Peru, in particular, presents an excellent opportunity to study the exchange of European learning and Amerindian culture. The Spaniards in Peru sought to provide a European education to the natives of their colony. By the middle of the sixteenth century the Spanish had established grammar schools to teach the children of Indian nobility Spanish, Quechua, and, of course, the Latin necessary to gain access to humanistic culture. The Jesuits College of San Pablo, with a curriculum modeled on the Ratio studiorum, educated Indian and Mestizo, as well as Spanish and Creole, students. The educational foundation laid in the sixteenth century led, in the seventeenth, to discourse which reflected the interplay of rhetorical precept and Peruvian traditions.

The most outstanding example of this interplay is to be found in the life and works of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Born in Peru to a Spanish captain and an Indian princess, Garcilaso was educated in the manner of both cultures. He spent his adult life in Spain where he wrote a number of important works which reflect his dual heritage. Garcilaso's Commentarios reales de los incas (1609) and its sequel, Historia general del Peru (1617) reveal the use of deliberate rhetorical strategies to mediate between the two cultures.

In Garcilaso's works and in the other native chronicles there is clear evidence of a deliberate interchange of European learning and Andean traditions. The experience of seventeenth-century Peru, then, illuminates the possibilities of a rhetoric which is truly the product of two worlds.

John C. Adams

Cryptic Method and Variations in English Ramism

Walter Ong's Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue is one of the most frequently cited secondary sources in studies of Ramism. Ong's overall judgment of Peter Ramus's significance is reflected in his characterization of Ramus's followers as "impatient but not too profound thinkers" (ix). Despite minor revisions in recent scholarly literature, Ong's antagonistic reading of Ramus persists as the measure of his worth. It is frequently appropriated in studies that thematize the history of the discourse arts as a struggle between competing epistemologies. In this genealogy Ramus is related to alleged anti-rhetoricians. In part, Ong derives his judgment of Ramus's hostility toward rhetorical thought from his reading of the second book of Ramus's Dialectic. Ong's reading of the second book shows how Ramus damned rhetorical patterns of dispositio to the less esteemed regions of judgment.

By far, one of the largest groups of Ong's "not too profound thinkers" who produced commentaries on the Dialectic were sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English Protestant reformers, including Puritans. The English authors produced a number of commentaries on the Dialectic that are 'soft' on cryptic method. These 'soft' Ramist texts treat the concept of cryptic method in a fairly standard way derived from faculty psychology, which is influenced to some extent by Horace's Epistles and Art of Poetry, and is not necessarily anti-rhetorical. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English commentaries, Ramus's cryptic method is recognized as a means of adjusting discourses to auditors, mimicking events, and constructing a preferred style of speech affecting the artistic merit of discourse and the perceived ethos of a given author. It is viewed as a legitimate order of appeal aligned with an interest in persuasion—in engendering belief by means of delight (and other affections), not simply transmitting so-called scientific knowledge. In sum, in the English commentaries reviewed in this essay there is no clear cut evidence of sustained hostility toward rhetorical thought. The distinction this essay makes between Ramus and Ramism—between his Dialectic and the English commentaries on it—draws attention to the complexity and multifaceted nature of the educational reform movement associated with his name. Finally, this essay raises a cautionary note. Students of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English thought who appropriate Ong's reading of Ramus should be mindful of the way his concept of Ramism affects their interpretations of primary sources.

Katherine H. Adams

The Beginnings of Advanced Instruction in Creative,
Expository, and Journalistic Writing: Barrett Wendell and English 12

In his English 12 classes from 1885 to 1889, as his lecture notes and the class papers indicate, Wendell experimented with various possibilities for advanced composition: daily themes and longer papers; lectures, class workshops, and private conferences; assigned and free topic choices; sequences of assignments involving related topics; work in many genres; graded and ungraded writing. This course influenced many creative writers: W.E.B. DuBois enrolled, believing "perhaps foolishly, but sincerely, that I have something to say to the world. . . I have taken English 12 in order to say it well"; Robert Frost bypassed freshman English and entered Wendell's course directly to work on poetic form. The course also influenced writing teachers such as Robert Herrick who introduced advanced writing courses at Chicago and Robert Lovett who taught playwriting at Princeton.

A close examination of this course will help us to understand the beginnings of advanced instruction in expository, creative, and journalistic writing--and to appreciate a still powerful model for such instruction.

Tomás Albaladejo

The theoretical nature of the addressee of the rhetorical discourse

In this paper I deal with the addressee's role in the rhetorical communication following mainly Aristotle's, Quintilian's and Perelman's theories and introducing a textual and pragmatic view of the rhetorical construction. I consider that the rhetorical addressee has a complex theoretical nature that can be explained by means of the configuration provided by the typologies of addressees and by means of the internal constitution of the category of addressee, within which different functions and constituents can be distinguished. This study of the addressee is connected with the typology of the rhetorical discourses and of the rhetorical events.

Luis Beltrán Almería

LE ROMAN SILENCIEUX

La rhétorique du silence dans le roman espagnol actuel

Résumé

L'importance de la parole silencieuse dans le roman explique que la technique du monologue se soit pleinement développée dans le roman moderne. A partir du monologue final de Molly Bloom dans Ulysses de J. Joyce, d'autres romans ont utilisé le monologue autonome -sans cadre narrative- pour donner forme à des chapitres entiers, ou encore, à des romans entiers.

Dans le roman espagnol -tant péninsulaire que latino-américaine- la rhétorique du silence a été fortement développée. La muerte de Artemio Cruz, Tiempo de silencio, Cinco horas con Mario, Reivindicación del conde don Julián, Pubis angelical, et, surtout, La vida perra de Juanita Narboní illustrent bien cette rhétorique.

Une variété casuistique de thèmes et topics -récit isochrone, tu autoréflexif, immédiateté, mémoire autobiographique, oralité, etc.- a été générée dans cette nouvelle forme de silence (les formes anciennes étant celles du journal, de la lettre). De nouveaux problèmes linguistiques comme le futur narratif, de nouvelles constructions syntaxiques, surgissent de la solitude où les personnages habitent. Le silence, la solitude, la folie, caractéristiques de la crise existentielle de notre temps dont lieu à de nouvelles formes de discours, de nouvelles formes narratives.

Colleen Anderson

Ciceronian Forensic Rhetoric in The Merchant of Venice

The greater part of the existing scholarship concerning the rhetorical tradition and Renaissance drama focuses upon style, especially the figures and the tropes. This concentration, pioneered by Sister Miriam Joseph in Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language, continues to the present day with the work of Brian Vickers. Though this approach has proven both valid and valuable, it reflects only one part of the tradition. My paper addresses the classical tradition of inventio and dispositio, whose importance to Shakespeare's plays has only been touched upon.

In this essay I will discuss Ciceronian forensic rhetoric as a means of both invention and arrangement in The Merchant of Venice. Specifically, I will analyze the trial scene in terms of stasis theory as outlined in De Inventione. Of the canonical questions--an sit, quid sit, quale sit, and translativa--the issue of quality acts as the central focusing force in this scene. T.W. Baldwin has approached this topic using the Ad Herennium as a tool of analysis. Though he believes Shakespeare could have derived sufficient legal knowledge from that text to construct the scene, Baldwin admits that the dramatist most likely made use of an additional source. Close textual analysis of the scene provides strong evidence that Shakespeare's additional source was the De Inventione, and that his use of this text helped to shape the development of the trial scene.

Bo Andersson

Eva Margaretha Frölich and the Rhetorical Authority of the Prophetess

One of the most interesting women to appear on the 17th century Swedish cultural scene was Eva Margaretha Frölich (+1692). Nowadays she is almost completely forgotten; among her contemporaries, however, she received a good deal of attention.

This attention was largely due to her politico-theological ideas. EMF, a noblewoman of German descent, developed a national Swedish eschatology, according to which the Swedish king Charles XI was chosen to become the ruler of Christianity. After his defeat of Louis XIV and other "popish" princes, Charles XI would rise - with the aid of Christ - to absolute world power, sitting on the throne of David in the Chiliasmatic Kingdom.

The king, however, was unimpressed by these ideas and EMF's political views led to a trial, where she escaped the death penalty but was banished instead.

In the Stockholm trial different arguments had been used to disqualify EMF, for example the claim that she was mentally ill, inspired by the Devil, and that her teachings might lead to social unrest. In the writings which she published in the Netherlands she had therefore to be very careful with her image and tried to construct a self-description which would be convincing and rhetorically effective.

Her rhetorical self-description is especially elaborate in the tract Mein und des Goldschmitz BEREND DORCHMANN'S Predig-Ampt (1687). In the 37 sections of this book she interprets a number of loci in the Bible as pertaining to herself (and her fellow-prophet Dorchmann). She uses for example typological interpretation and interprets herself as the second Eve, but also views sayings in the Bible as immediate descriptions of her own person. The tract also contains interesting sections of alleged autobiography. The great fire in Dresden 1685 is, for example, seen as the punishment of the city because its inhabitants had refused to accept her as a prophet and instead had exiled her. The reader is here supposed to see the parallel between her and the prophets of the Old Testament.

The aim of the tract Mein und des Goldschmitz Predig-Ampt is to convince the reader of the divine sending of the prophetess. This can be viewed in terms of theological discourse. The role of the prophetess gives EMF the possibility of claiming a subject position therein which is higher than that of any teacher or pastor. Because she can claim that position, her assertions must have a truth-value exceeding that of any other theological statement.

In my paper I will explore against the background of prevailing cultural expectations the rhetorical techniques EMF uses in building up a convincing prophetic text-role.

EMF's is an interesting example of the topic 'gender and rhetorics' in the 17th century.

Satoru Aonuma

Disciplinary Rhetoric: A Case Study in the Velikovsky Affair

The debate over Immanuel Velikovsky's catastrophic theory of the origin of solar system is one among the most convenient examples of the controversy between "serious" and "deviant" sciences. Velikovsky's thesis can be summarized in the following ways: that there were global catastrophes in historical times; that these catastrophes were caused by extraterrestrial agents; and that these agents can be identified as the planets Venus and Mars, Venus playing the dominant role. Velikovsky is not an astronomer; he was trained in psychiatry and, more importantly, parapsychology; and basis for his catastrophic theory is the biblical myths. Text of debate includes some issues of *American Behavioral Scientist*, Pensee, and proceedings of scientific conferences such as the American Association for Advancement of Science as well as books written by Velikovsky himself, and both proponents and opponents of his theory. Participants in the debate consist of Velikovsky, his sympathizers, and "serious" scientists such as C. Payne-Gaposchikin, Harlow Sharpley, and Carl Sagan.

The issue of "demarcation" and "discipline" in the "Velikovsky affair" particularly deserves much attention of rhetoricians. As in the case of "creation science," the controversiality in the affair comes primarily from the somewhat unorthodox thesis that Velikovsky held. Many "disciplined" scientists regard Velikovsky as cranky and reject his arguments as being irrational and outside the realm of any scientific "disciplines." "Discipline," in this regard, could be both a noun and a verb; disciplinary boundaries accordingly could be both the structure and function. Also, such concepts as "demarcation" and "boundary" are two dimensional: the within the "science as unity" (such as the one between biology and physics or between "natural" and "social" sciences); and the other between what is science and what is not. What makes the Velikovsky affair complex is that demarcation problems in those two dimensions are almost inextricably related. This paper, therefore, is an attempt to explicate rhetorical problems of the dual-dimensional discipline in the Velikovsky affair, and to discuss the roles that rhetoric plays in constructing, maintaining, and deconstructing the disciplinary boundaries.

Carroll Lewis Maxcy's work *The Rhetorical Principles of Narration*, published in 1911, has hitherto gone unnoticed by historians of American rhetoric. Maxcy's work appeared toward the end of a time that many scholars have characterized as a period of rhetoric's decline. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries narrowly conceived of rhetoric, scholars have argued, as a matter of conveying what is already known. I argue that Maxcy's work challenges any simple characterization we might make now of the separation of thought from expression at the turn of the century.

To posit a relation between thought and expression is to posit a relation between thinker and text. Maxcy posited such a relationship, including what he called the author's "attitude" in his rhetorical theory. Of all the component elements that Maxcy posited as underlying composition, attitude is the most problematic, however. While the author's attitude toward the subject is imperative to a text's construction, the author can also get in the way of truth. The claim that texts are flawed wherever authors show through later became a charge against rhetoric in New Critical literary theory. Maxcy's ambivalence toward the (visible) author is critical to our understanding of how the idea of authorial intention became troublesome, even within rhetorical theory itself.

Janet M. Atwill

Producing Ethos: Rhetorical Knowledge and Subjectivity
in Sophistic and Aristotelian Rhetoric

Plato's *Protagoras* opens with Socrates' questioning of his friend Hippocrates' desire to come under the tutelage of the famous sophist. Socrates' interrogation focuses on two questions: "What do you hope to become by your association with Protagoras?" and "What is this subject on which the Sophist is both an expert himself and can make his pupil expert?" These questions turn on two inextricably tied matters: representations of knowledge and subjectivity.

This paper will examine models of subjectivity and knowledge as they appear in treatments of rhetoric by both Protagoras and Aristotle. In both cases, I shall resituate their conceptions of rhetorical knowledge within the ancient tradition of *technē*, or productive knowledge. It is the argument of this paper that these two conceptions of rhetorical knowledge implicate a uniquely social and contingent model of the subject, one that allows us to see significant resemblances between sophistic and Aristotelian rhetoric.

Wolfram Ax

Die Geschichtsschreibung bei Quintilian

Quintilian weist in seiner *institutio oratoria* der Geschichtsschreibung eine wichtige Funktion in der Erziehung zum *orator perfectus* zu. Zugleich warnt er aber auch vor den Gefahren einer unkritischen Verwendung des historiographischen Stils in der Rede.

Der Vortrag verfolgt im ersten Teil die didaktischen Aufgaben der Geschichtsschreibung in der Reihenfolge des rhetorischen Curriculums und skizziert dabei auch die damit verbundenen gattungstheoretischen und gattungsgeschichtlichen Urteile Quintilians. Der zweite Teil des Vortrags gilt der Frage nach dem Hintergrund der berühmten Gattungsbestimmung: *est enim (sc. historia) proxima poetis et quodam modo carmen solutum est* = Die Geschichtsschreibung steht nämlich der Dichtung sehr nahe und ist gewissermaßen ein Gedicht in Prosa (Quint. Inst. 10, 1, 31).

Anna Werpachowska Axer

Rhetoric and Textual Theory. Selected Problems.

Classical rhetoric is sometimes viewed as a harbinger of textual theory. The paper indicates those elements in the ancient approach to the text that may be considered a precursory formulation of issues now constituting the subject of research of experts in various disciplines dealing with the analysis of discourse. Among these issues are the problems connected with the process of communication and the structure of text.

Jerzy Axer

Between practice and theory - Quintilianus quotes Cicero.

"*Institutio oratoria*" became a decisive factor in establishing Cicero's fame as an ideal orator and outstanding theoretician of oratory.

Quintilianus constantly quotes and paraphrases Cicero in his treatise. It is worth noting in what way Quintilianus, a teacher and a tribunal orator, reinterpretes texts taken from Cicero's theory and practice. We can observe here the process of crystallizing of judgements, very important for Cicero's reception in European rhetorical culture, and at the same time creating a serious obstacle to understanding the genuine practice and theory of Cicero.

Kurt W. Back

Numbers as a Rhetorical Device in Social Science: The Beginnings of Political Economy and Demography

Scientific reasoning distinguished itself from scholastic argument by relying on mathematical rules instead of reliance on authorities and discursive reasoning. The success of this method - especially in the development leading to Newton's laws - established the prestige of numbers and mathematics.

Social sciences followed this path, using numbers as a way of argument. Its rhetorical use of mathematics has consisted in quantification for its own sake without the use of mathematical rules in its theory. This use of numbers for their own sake has the use of numbers and statistical analysis a favorite rhetorical technique in these fields.

This rhetorical use of number (without the underpinning of mathematical rules) is demonstrated in the early development of political economy. A historical analysis of Malthus' work in promoting his perspective, his defenders and his opponents shows this change of the use of numbers from their use as characteristics of states to statistics as an aim in itself. The rules of statistical inference became the rhetorical laws of social science.

Michelle Ballif

Fidelities of Mind and Agents of Desire:
On the (Im)Possibilities for a "Feminist" Subject Position

In the Louvre, a terracotta statuette is displayed of a woman on her knees, hands behind her back, pierced with thirteen nails. Instructions for such an artefact, John Winkler informs us, dictate that "a wax or clay image of a kneeling and bound woman is to be accompanied by a statuette of Ares standing over her and plunging a sword into her neck. Each body part on the female is to be inscribed with a magical phrase and pierced with one of thirteen copper needles while the agent says 'I pierce such-and-such part of Miss So-and-so, in order that she have no one in mind but me, Mr. So-and-so'" (Constraints of Desire 93-4). It is Winkler's argument that such a victimage model "paradoxically incorporate[s] rather than suppress[es] women's desire"(73, see also 98). Although his argument is justifiable within its terms, it troubles me. It echoes recent feminist calls for reconstructing the history of the Western tradition by depicting women as not merely objects of desire, but as Subjects of desire.

But such a constitution of Subjectivity--as desiring subject--in no way liberates Woman from the scene of victimage, bondage, dominance, and control. For it is my argument that this scene tells us nothing, could tell us nothing, of "female" desires, but tells us only of the "male" desire to master and to control. [I have placed the words female and male in quotation marks to identify the very impossibility of using these words at all--and in particular of using these words referentially in order to designate sex, sexuality, and gender.] For the scene of victimization is the very scene of subject constitution. His dominance of woman is the act that sustains his Identity. Thus the victimization is the evidence of the mastery he has achieved over his Self. That is, the terracotta statuette with accompanying prescribed inscriptions suggests to me the phallogocentric enterprise par excellence that demands Fidelity of Mind, that requires a "Proper" Subject who is faithful to its Self, who is stable, desire-less, bounded, centered, who is the object of Being and Logos. Plato's Phaedrus, then--like so many other Ego Psychology self-help manuals--exemplifies the Master/Slave relationship that constitutes Subjectivity and Being.

In this paper, I will address the recent work of feminists such as Susan Jarratt, Susan Hekman (Gender and Knowledge), and Judith Butler (Gender Trouble) who in seeking a politics of liberation, address the possibilities of subject positions for women. I will examine if and how they escape the Master/Slave dialectical economy of mind, and explore what implications their proposed subjectivities have for the (re)reading and (re)writing of the history of rhetoric.

Paul G. Bator

"Enlightenment Rhetoric at St. Andrews: The Role of Robert Watson"

I propose to discuss the (unpublished manuscript lectures on) rhetoric of Robert Watson of St. Andrews University, Scotland, within the context of his contemporaries, notably Adam Smith and Hugh Blair. Robert Watson, in effect, was the person who passed the "rhetorical baton" between Adam Smith and Hugh Blair in Edinburgh. Watson's lectures on rhetoric appear at a critical juncture in the history of rhetoric, yet, problematically, have not received even the slightest recorded attention from scholars. Wilbur Samuel Howell (Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric) for example, acknowledges that he did not have time to investigate the unpublished rhetoric lectures of Watson.

As Henry W. Meikle, in his article, "The Chair of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in the University of Edinburgh" (University of Edinburgh Journal 13 (1944): 89-103), has it, "When Adam Smith was appointed Professor in Glasgow in 1751, Robert Watson, again with the support of Lord Kames, continued the course which Smith had initiated. Apparently," continues Meikle's account, "[Watson] followed Adam Smith's course, in part at least, pretty closely. He probably had attended his lectures and may even have borrowed his manuscript." Part of the present problem is that our understanding of Watson has been based upon mere assumption; I intend to address that problem by summarizing in this presentation my findings about the content of Watson's lectures based upon my examination of them at St. Andrews last summer (1990).

It is difficult to determine precisely when Watson's extra-mural lectures on rhetoric in Edinburgh began, but most accounts suggest 1752, the year after Smith left Edinburgh for Glasgow. Watson's lectures must have concluded by 1756, when he succeeded Henry Rymer as Professor of Logic, Rhetoric, and Metaphysics at St. Andrews, a post he held until he was appointed Principal of St. Andrews' United College in January, 1778, which he held until his death three years later. As documented in my article on the "Formation of the Regius Chair of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres at the University of Edinburgh," the Reverend Hugh Blair, Watson's relation, followed Adam Smith and Robert Watson in delivering a series of public lectures on rhetoric at Edinburgh. It was Hugh Blair's success in these public lectures which eventually led to George III's creation of a new Regius Chair, which has had significant and lasting impact upon the structure of English departments and the conduct of English department study in the United States.

Thus, in part because key rhetoricians such as Robert Watson have been neglected, we have yet to assemble a full portrait of Enlightenment rhetorical history. The significance of a completed portrait lies not only in its richer presentation of eighteenth century rhetorical and philosophical life, but equally in its potential for casting light on our assessment of the influences upon early rhetorical education at Harvard, Princeton, and other early American colleges, as well as, indirectly, upon our understanding of how present-day rhetoric and literature classes are taught and departments organized.

Charles Bazerman

Adam Smith's Rhetoric, Psychology, Politics and New Science of Economics

Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations is generally taken to mark the birth of the science of economics. It is also taken as a charter for the economic practice of capitalism; moreover, it is taken as the founding political document for those committed to a vision of government that supports, and is subordinate to, capitalism. It is even for some a credo of life, describing the psychological nature of humans, the nature of social relations, and the political and economic mechanisms by which human needs and desires may be fulfilled. There can be little doubt The Wealth of Nations was a highly persuasive document not only for the new breed of economists who developed in its wake, but for the capitalists, free-market and laissez faire politicians, supporters of modern market-oriented democracies, and competitive self-realizers who also flourished within the book's representation of the world. In order to understand the scope of Smith's vision, some commentators have read the Wealth of Nations in relation to two earlier works Lectures on Jurisprudence and The Theory of Moral Sentiments. While these studies help elaborate some of Smith's broader social thinking and thus some of the social implications of his economic system, they still do not bring forth the full set of goals of his project which can only come from a rhetorical reading. Moreover, they do not consider what it means for Smith to attempt a philosophic account of economy, that is to found a scientific discourse. To examine these issues we need to investigate Smith's earliest works Essays on Philosophical Subjects (particularly "On The History of Astronomy") and Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. An examination of the later works in relation to the earliest reveals Smith had a positive program of public persuasion aimed at reformulating the polity around what he believed would be a more stable set of understandings, based on psychological principles of public persuasion, rather than on the epistemic ground of "true principles" of economy or the rationalist ground of freely chosen compact. In line with many eighteenth century thinkers he was looking for a new basis for society and politics, but he saw persuasion, rather than reason, as at the heart of economic practice and political order. He thought he could persuade us of a new order. Perhaps he did.

Daniel R. Bender

Quintilian's Institutes, 10.1.: Rhetorical Identity and the "Liquefaction" of Models

For Quintilian, as for Renaissance humanists who followed him, literary models were essential aids in the development or "institution" of the rhetor's character. Specifically, through his metaphors of digestion and nutrition, Quintilian conceives of authors as constitutive parts of the rhetor's identity, to be incorporated through careful and repeated study. While urging the student rhetor to imitate, Quintilian cautions that the model to be imitated must be fully absorbed into the mind, "just as we do not swallow our food till we have chewed it and reduced it almost to a state of liquefaction, to assist the process of digestion." The premise behind this metaphor is that literary models supply far more than a collection of reusable techniques; the inventions, moral stances, and argumentative strategies of the model offer a potential identity to the rhetor; an identity that, furthermore, can be actualized when the circumstances of time and place require. Overarching Quintilian's interest in imitation, therefore, is an ethical aim of formation—to create a flexible, protean orator, whose words strike the understanding of variable audiences.

Quintilian's recourse to the digestive metaphor, however, reveals a strain between his intended purpose and the actual practice of reading. The student rhetor may not fully digest the model, but rather, by incomplete consumption, may absorb isolated parts, or "lumps" of discourse. In this case, it would seem that the model maintains its original, dominating status as a discursive object to imitate; but more importantly, the model loses its nutritive value as a naturalized resource from which the rhetor draws to manifest his own identity. Quintilian does not spell out the consequences of imitating an author by reiterating materials that are still in a "crude state," but it is clear that the reiteration of certain phrases or figures reasserts only the rhetor's indebtedness to an alien identity—that recorded in the words of the original author. Finally, when the rhetor reproduces those parts of the original that glisten in his memory, he removes himself from the sphere of the opportune, the appropriate, and languishes instead in the pleasure of self-reflective relation to his model. Erasmus, a keen student of Quintilian's Institutes, sought to prevent this simian reiteration of models by devising a different form of imitative "digestion" in his pedagogical text, On the Copy of Words and Arguments.

Beth S. Bennett

JAMES J. MURPHY'S PERSPECTIVE ON MEDIEVAL RHETORIC:
ITS IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS

In 1974, with the publication of his book, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance, James J. Murphy proposed an analysis of how rhetoric bridged those thousand years as a "preceptive rhetorical tradition." This tradition, Murphy argued, is fundamental to Western civilizations and is based on the principle that discourse may be rendered effective through the application of specific precepts derived from experience and transmitted through education. Thus, what Murphy claimed to be providing was "the first comparative study of the various forms in which medieval writers continued the preceptive tradition" (ix).

Essentially, the account Murphy provides details both the continuance of the classical rhetorical tradition of praecepta and the emergence of three medieval rhetorical "genres," which apply rhetorical precepts to new medieval discursive forms. As a result, though Murphy identifies classical precepts and traditional auctores, he spends as much time describing how medieval texts change or apply those precepts. The texts themselves, not specific authors or their lines of influence, seem to take priority.

In this paper, I intend to discuss the impact Murphy's account has had on the study of medieval rhetoric. Specifically, I plan to compare his perspective with that of Richard McKeon ("Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Speculum 1 [1926]: 1-32), in terms of what both views tell us about rhetoric in that age and how those views have influenced the kinds of scholarly questions asked about medieval rhetoric. Also, by showing how Murphy's rhetorical genres continued into the Renaissance, I plan to consider how the description of the tradition of rhetoric provided by Murphy's perspective competes with that offered by Wilbur Samuel Howell (Logic & Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700). Finally, I intend to discuss the scholarly implications of Murphy's perspective for both those interested in the specific study of medieval rhetoric and those interested in the general historical tradition of rhetoric.

Alain Billault

The Rhetoric of a "Divine Man": Apollonius of Tyana as Critic of Oratory and as Orator according to Philostratus

In his *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus draws a picture of Greek oratory at the time of the Roman Empire by portraying its figures. In his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, he offers another view of rhetoric in this age. Apollonius is a "divine man," a θεῖος ἄνθρωπος according to the definition by L. Bieler, that is to say someone who derives supernatural knowledge and powers from his close relationships with the gods and has a message to mankind. To do his preaching, Apollonius makes a premeditated and diverse use of speech at a time (1st century A. D.) when rhetoric already has a long history. Philostratus points out that the critical examination of this history is an important element of his eloquence. Apollonius while speaking often makes critical statements about Socrates or Aristotle's use of speech and about the rhetors' oratory. He places himself in opposition to those traditions and displays a rhetoric of authority. This rhetoric embraces a wide range of styles including laconism and exhortation, vindication and blame, but its principle never varies: the orator does not search after truth with his interlocutors, he does not try to convince or to please them. He possesses the truth. The audience is inferior to him and has just to hear him and yield to his words. So, in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, Philostratus emphasizes the rising, at the time of the Roman Empire, of another kind of rhetoric which is different from the rhetoric of the rhetors and requires the spiritual mastership of the orator. The success of such an authoritative rhetoric and the longing after this sort of authority points to a certain unsettledness of the souls which E. R. Dodds highlighted in his *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*.

Constance Blackwell

Rhetoric and a Sceptic's proof - Daniel Huet's De la Foiblesse de l'esprit humain

Daniel Huet's De la Foiblesse de l'esprit humain is one of the most famous texts of seventeenth and eighteenth century Scepticism. In it the author surveys all of human knowledge either finding Scepticism amongst philosophers or causes for Scepticism because of the great varieties of beliefs. Huet constructs a convincing work because he carefully builds up a character of the author into the familiar figure of the 'vir bonus' found in successful rhetorical speeches. This solves the Sceptic's problem of writing something which is believable since Sceptic traditionally claimed not believe one point of view more than another. Huet, on the other hand wants to convince the reader of his point of view and thus creates a believable Sceptic using a common rhetorical technique. Ironically the Sceptic's proof becomes the argument from authority. The paper will explore further the transformation of the 'persona' of the 'vir bonus' in later philosophical texts into the voice and character of the philosopher. Rhetoric and philosophy will be seen here not to be at war, but rhetoric will be seen to be a tool of the philosopher which in part transforms the text.

Sharon Bracci Blinn

Castiglione's Prudential Courtier

While the rich variety of themes explored in Baldassare Castiglione's *The Book of the Courtier (Il Cortegiano)* opens the text to a diversity of interpretations, it has very often been read as a courtesy book, serving as a prototypical handbook of manners for gentlemanly behavior. The text has also been read autobiographically, following Castiglione's own prefatory remarks to his readers. More recent internal readings of the text have suggested elements of a political treatise in Castiglione's discourse. J. R. Woodhouse argued that *Il Cortegiano* was a verbal portrait, but one that elegantly disguised its true agenda: to craft an ideal courtier possessed of charming survival skills, a crucial necessity given courtiers' precarious footing in the nascent modern state. Conversely, Eduardo Saccone argued that the courtier's attempts at advantage-gaining were assiduously directed toward specific political ends; the text is thus much more "manifesto than portrait."

This essay argues that Castiglione's courtier is, above all, a rhetorical portrait, complex enough to accommodate each of the aforementioned interpretations. Its subtle strategies affirm the protean nature of rhetoric, the multiplicity of forms the political, social and economic context encourage rhetoric to develop in order to survive in the cultural dialectic. Castiglione's principal rhetorical strategy can be viewed as Ciceronian *prudencia*, whose practiced eye seeks the opportune in the "here and now" and is self-consciously directed toward persuading an audience; the courtier has no standing except in relation to an audience. *Sprezzatura*, the text's controlling dialectical term (in a Burkean sense), serves as the intentional check on the courtier's behavior, acting as a performative counterpart to classical conceptions of rhetoric as the art which conceals art (*ars celare artem*). Finally, the roots of renaissance *virtù*, intimately connected to the courtier's prudential action, can also be traced to Ciceronian notions of habit.

J. A. E. Bons

Something New. Isocrates and the Transition from Orality.

The early development of Greek rhetoric as a literary genre can only be fully understood if one takes into account the contemporary change in culture: the gradual transition from orality to literacy, as it is described by W.J. Ong SJ in his "Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word." (London-New York 1982).

The fragments of Gorgias' rhetorical works still show a predominantly oral-based style, but the works of his pupil Isocrates have very different characteristics. Isocrates himself ascribes these characteristics to the new methods of literary composition he is using (or. 5 Phil. 25-30). His works are written to be recited or read, not to be "performed" like the speeches of judicial and political rhetoric. Therefore the text-based character of these works supposes the public to analyse their subtleties and intricacies carefully.

It will be argued that these formal characteristics, apart from the lasting importance of the content, contribute to the literary value of these works. A careful reading of theoretical passages in his work shows that Isocrates' method of composition marks a new stage in the development of literary rhetoric.

Grant Boswell

Epidictic Rhetoric and the Praise of Eloquence

In order to look self-consciously at the language of rhetoric, I propose to analyze selected praises of eloquence as examples of the rhetoric of praise. I plan to focus my study first on models of praising eloquence as a species of epidictic rhetoric demonstrated by Aphthonius, Gabriel Le Jay, and perhaps other writers who have written about this rhetorical genre. I will next analyze actual laudatory or vituperative orations to determine how closely they conform to the pedagogical descriptions of this genre of rhetoric. Finally I will attempt to determine how these orations functioned within a historical context, inculcating not only forms of rhetorical competence but also values of Renaissance culture.

Alan Brinton

THE PASSIONS IN THE SERMONS OF HUGH BLAIR

The sermons of Hugh Blair, which were widely praised by his contemporaries, but which have not fared so well at the hands of historians of preaching, have generally been assessed in either literary or homiletical terms. However, they are also significant as exemplars of a kind of late 18th century ethical preaching which is of particular interest in the context of an attempt to understand the relationship between moral philosophy and rhetorical theory of the period. The most characteristic of Blair's sermons are highly polished moral essays which espouse a popular moral philosophy having its remote origins in Post-Aristotelian philosophy, but which at the same time represent the culmination of a clearly identifiable strain of preaching which developed late in the 17th century and continued into the 19th. The moral philosophy is one which identifies virtue with the proper "government" or "regulation" of the passions. The strain of preaching is one characterized by preaching on that general topic, on "keeping the heart" and related topics, on particular affections or passions such as love of God and neighbor, anger, envy, hope, and fear, and on passion-related virtues.

Antecedents to Blair's preaching about the passions are to be found in the 17th century sermons of English preachers such as Barrow, Tillotson, Sharp, and South, but even more clearly in early 18th century sermons by Isaac Watts, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Benjamin Ibbot, Jeremiah Seed, and a host of others (many of them Dissenters). These in turn have their antecedents and concomitants in various treatises on the passions which were written throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.

"Canonical" 18th century works in British moral philosophy are likewise to a large extent preoccupied with the passions, especially those of early "Moral Sense" theorists such as Hutcheson and Butler (in his sermons), but also in Books II and III of Hume's Treatise and in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.

I propose to characterize the treatment of the passions in Blair's sermons, with attention to its antecedents, and to make some observations about (1) the relationship between this aspect of Blair's rhetorical practice and his own rhetorical theory and (2) the significance of this sort of rhetorical practice in connection with a more general investigation of the relationship between 18th century British moral philosophy and late 18th century Scottish rhetorical theory.

Michael Cahn

Schema and Figura: The Metaphorical Terminology of Rhetoric

My paper addresses the metaphorical status of two central concepts of rhetoric: Schema and Figura. It attempts to reconstruct the origins of these concepts in geometry and gymnastics respectively. It asks why these two very heterogeneous contexts should meet in the rhetorical notion of figurality.

The terminology of rhetoric is never free of rhetorical implications. The early rhetoricians invented what we now call figures with the help of the terminology of geometry and gymnastics. What are the disciplinary advantages connected with such a terminological development.

Rhetoric simultaneously evokes the natural knowledge of gymnastics and appeals to the scientific traditions of geometry. What is the logic that makes this fusion of discourses possible?

What is the price for this contradictory context? What is the significance of the fact that the metalanguage of rhetoric is involved in the very same rhetorical procedures it attempts to describe? And how does such a fuzzy divide between language and metalanguage affect the writing of a history of rhetoric?

Gualtiero Calboli

Quintilian and Horace.

The paper is divided in two parts: (1) in the first Quintilian's attitude to a classical poet as Horace will be examined, (2) in the second attention will be addressed to the reasons of the use of classical poetry by Quintilian. Some passages as Quint. inst. 10.1.94 and 96 will be considered where the rhetorician explains how Horace is usable for rhetorical purpose. Therefore the question arises how much rhetoric was in connection with literary ornament and how important literature was in the cultural life and linguistic use of the Roman Empire, and it will be pointed out that the imitation of classical poetry in the Roman school was an instrument of Roman order in contrast with barbaric disorder.

Charles Calder

Queen Margaret's Language of Denunciation: Aspects of Formal Rhetoric in 2 and 3 Henry VI

Henry Peacham wrote that the 'great and forcible flood of eloquence, is most plentifully and pleasantly poured forth by the great night of figures'. In this paper I investigate the working of selected figures employed by Margaret of Anjou in 2 and 3 Henry VI. In analysing her speeches I use the division of figures set out by Peacham in his 1577 *Garden of Eloquence: tropes/grammatical schemes/rhetorical schemes*. The tropes of mockery (e.g. sarcasm, ironia) receive consideration; another significant trope is hyperbole. I note the presence of grammatical schemes such as polysyndeton; but I devote most consideration to Margaret's deploying of rhetorical schemes of repetition (e.g. anaphora and epizeuxis); of interrogation (e.g. pyssa); of exclamation (e.g. acchonesis); and of representation (hypotyposis and its specific figures). For my description of the figures I rely on Peacham; on Puttenham; and on the Rastist François.

I concentrate on two areas of Margaret's oratorical activity: her campaign of accusation against Duke Humphrey in Part 2 and her taunting of York in 3:1:1. Margaret's arraignment of Humphrey in 2:III.i.4-41 shows Shakespeare's sovereign ability to 'put a case'. The arousing of scorn and vehemence (traditionally an activity within the oratorical sphere of pathos) is her central concern; but we find that ethical and logical properties complement the pathetic. The Queen asserts her credentials as a speaker of probity (the persuasive mode of ethos) and establishes the validity of her testimony (a topic of invention and therefore associated with logos).

The taunting of York is a bratura piece of vituperation. In my treatment I identify the energetic use of tropes of mockery and of rhetorical schemes. Particularly striking is the burning contempt which the Queen infuse into interrogative figures such as pyssa and epizeuxis.

I end by suggesting that analysis of this kind can assist us in illuminating the operation of Shakespeare's artificiosa eloquentia.

Martin Camargo

Composition Teaching at Oxford and Bologna in the Late Middle Ages

While the medieval "arts of poetry" ("prescriptive grammars," as J. J. Murphy has called them) are clearly intended to serve as general composition textbooks, suitable for teaching composition in verse or prose, several prose genres seem to have resisted amalgamation into the general composition program. Rhetoric, to the extent to which it was an applied discipline with a pedagogy (i.e., an art), came to be associated in the medieval mind with those genres that somehow exceeded the scope of "prescriptive grammar." If rhetoric became marginalized with respect to grammar, that was in part because the chief "rhetorical" genres (the letter, broadly defined, and the sermon) were taught and practiced in distinct contexts, never coalescing to form a medieval *ars rhetorica* on a par with the medieval *ars grammatica*. However, in curricular practice grammar and rhetoric often supplemented one another in the teaching of "composition," whether the dominant art was grammar (as at Oxford) or rhetoric (as at Bologna).

M. I. Cameron

Some Considerations of Methodology
for Research into Propaganda and Rhetoric

The paper proposes a set of research procedures for establishing and appraising the propaganda function of literary and sub-literary texts. The paper assumes the notion of propaganda proposed by Jacques Ellul (*Propagandes* 1962), but argues that a neutral conception of propaganda is more fruitful for purposes of research than a negative conception is. The paper argues that research into five different areas must be carried out before a text or set of texts can be responsibly said to function as propaganda: into context (that is, careful historical identification of the groups whose interests might be advanced by the text in question), into the ideology communicated in the text, into the political mythology communicated in the text, into the structures by which the text engages its readers, and into the structures by which the text establishes its authority over its readers. The paper concludes by proposing criteria for resolving the question of whether the propaganda operates by psychological manipulation or whether it operates by reasonable rhetorical means.

John Angus Campbell

After The Origin:
The Rhetorical Strategies of Darwin's Campaign for
Evolution

Though the Origin of Species marked an epoch in the history of science, the work labored under two fundamental problems which were at once conceptual and rhetorical. The explanatory mechanism of "natural selection" was persuasive neither to Darwin's scientific peers nor to the broad public, and the charm of Darwin's writing was often used as an objection to the work. The Origin, appearing as it did as an "abstract" of a larger work to come was too short to reorient standing assumptions about "design" in nature enshrined alike in common sense and popular religion. Starting with his first work after the Origin, *On The Fertilisation of Orchids*--which Darwin characterized as "a flanking movement on the enemy"--Darwin proceeded to downplay natural selection and to argue the case for evolution via strategies distinct from those of his most famous book. The paper examines the rhetorical-conceptual challenge Darwin faced in the wake of the mixed success of the Origin and the conceptual, strategic and stylistic responses he devised for addressing it in the following decade and a half.

Kermit E. Campbell

Black English Vernacular Rhetoric: Three Decades of Research on Black
Language

Over the last three decades, sociolinguists and anthropologists have described and analyzed the vernacular language spoken by many African Americans. While their work has contributed significantly to our understanding of linguistic systems and how linguistic systems function in social and cultural contexts, it hasn't had as monumental an impact on the study of rhetoric, partly because sociolinguists have often failed to link their work with rhetorical theory and because rhetoricians, working from traditional, Eurocentric models, have tended to exclude linguistic concerns from theories of rhetoric. In this paper, I argue for what Bizzell and Herzberg (1990) call greater use of rhetoric as a theory of language--in this case, a theory of Black English Vernacular (BEV). To do so, I first review the major linguistic studies on BEV since the 1960's. Then, taking Hymes's (1974) ethnography of communication as a basic framework, I identify the features of BEV rhetoric, including its form, content, ends, participants, and context. Finally, I place these features in theoretical perspective by employing Asante's (1987) idea of an Afrocentric metatheory.

Lee Campbell

Johnson, Sheridan, and the Earnest Attention to Sense

Thomas Sheridan, actor and elocutionist, is perhaps the object of more of Johnson's disapprobation than is any other character in Boswell's Life of Johnson. The personal reasons for Johnson's antipathy toward Sheridan are diverse, apparent, and well recorded by scholars such as Wallace E. Bacon. But it is questionable whether Johnson's antipathy toward Sheridan derived from personal jealousies only. An examination of what might be Johnson's more substantive objections to Sheridan and the elocutionary movement (1) elucidates Johnson's positions on language, conversation, and mird; (2) creates a new perspective on the twin developments that characterize the late 18th century as an important time in the history of rhetoric--the debilitation of orality and the "maximization" of literacy; and (3) uncovers a theme of highly literate, typographic rhetorics, what I call the "earnest attention to sense." The theme is considered as it appears in various works and comments by Johnson, in Whately's critique of elocution, and in Deborah Brandt's recent argument that literacy is marked by writers' and readers' "involvement," not by their detachment and "divorce" from the text and from each other.

The basis of Johnson's opposition to Sheridan and elocution is suggested in his Dictionary's definitions of conversation, defined as familiar, easy discourse or talk, and declamation, defined as an outcry addressed to the passions, a "harangue; a set speech; a piece of rhetorick." He appears to take a Platonic tack in his opposition to the monologic speech, which, addressed to the passions, he considers a mere knack. Speech-making, in contrast to conversation, does not test knowledge, command of the language, imagination, presence of mind, or courage.

In fact, Johnson's position on elocution does not consist in a rehashing of Platonic objections to rhetoric. In his definitions of words such as converse, to convey thoughts, and speech, the power to express thoughts by words, Johnson reveals the influence of the conduit metaphor, a frame of mind that takes language to be a conduit for ideas of things, an uncertain means of conveyance that can be facilitated by logical definition and discrimination of words and ideas. Given this implicit frame of mind, Johnson regards Sheridan's lessons--especially on action--as lessons in distorting the flow of ideas from one person to another. Johnson's version of the conduit metaphor, however, is not scientific or positivistic, depicting language users as detached transmitters of information. It is a much more interesting version of discourse in which writers and readers are involved in an absorbing, intimate process of creating a mutually accessible topical horizon. Speakers' and listeners' discourse should be as mutually engaging and demanding.

Johnson's gravest concern about elocutionism is the paradoxical lack of sincerity the false earnestness that the movement seemed to produce in its devotees. Johnson anticipates a wholly different ideal of literate discourse involving an earnest attention to sense as opposed to voice, action, and delivery in general: an earnestness about the message, which does not preclude interpersonal involvement, but which sets the message as the emergent common ground of interactants. This sort of earnestness becomes a theme in 19th-century rhetorics such as Whately's rhetoric, which stresses the earnestness to "convey" and carry one's point. It has surfaced in Brandt's vindication of literate means of maintaining interpersonal involvement. I conclude that the theme of the earnest attention to sense points to a valid dimension of literate rhetorics.

Br. Kenneth Cardwell

William Gilbert and Francis Bacon: Science as Paradoxa

Presuppositions about what science really is bedevil discussions of Francis Bacon's misprizing of his great contemporary, William Gilbert. Shifting the inquiry into the arena of rhetoric permits us to see that Bacon shared with Gilbert a fund of rhetorical doctrine. Gilbert sparsely and adequately expounds the new rhetoric appropriate to his treatise in the Prologue to the De Magneta. Much of Bacon's thinking about reportorial, "scientific" writing can be seen as the extrapolation of seminal ideas in Gilbert's watershed treatise. Key to tracing this linkage is the notion of the paradox--the opinion contrary to received opinion. Gilbert takes his definition over from the tradition, perhaps from Quintilian. Bacon acknowledges the rhetorical insight by borrowing, conceals his source by attacking.

Thomas M. Carr

Toward an Assessment of Antoine Arnauld's
Réflexions sur l'éloquence des prédicateurs

Barbara Cassin

Philosophia enim simulari potest, eloquentia non potest,
ou : le masque et l'effet.

The paper examines the apparent conflict between the narrow view of rhetoric in the 1662 Art de penser and the more accommodating attitude found in Réflexions sur l'éloquence des prédicateurs written just before Arnauld died in 1694. The Port-Royal Logic maintains that the study of rhetoric is of little use for inventio, dispositio, or elocutio. Logic suffices for the first two, and the chief stylistic rule is negative: to avoid an artificial and metaphorical style. On the other hand, the Réflexions affirm the utility of rhetorical study for the preacher, accept the Ciceronian triad of the orator's duties, defend the sublime style, and ridicule the suggestion that geometric order is required in speeches.

Does this openness to much of traditional rhetoric in the pulpit signal a more generalized acceptance of other forms of eloquence? Or is it simply, as some commentators assert, that Christian eloquence, of which preaching is the exemplar, is the only form of eloquence that meets the stringent restrictions laid down for rhetoric in the Art de penser?

The paper examines these questions in light of (1) Arnauld's own experience: his rhetorical training, his pedagogical views, and his personal relations with preachers; (2) his use of classic treatises, especially Augustine's De doctrina christiana and to a lesser extent Cicero; and (3) the implications of Cartesian method and psycho-physiology for rhetoric as filtered through the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns.

Boileau's assessment of the Réflexions ("il ne s'est rien fait en notre langage de plus beau ni de plus fort sur les matières de rhétorique") is perhaps overly generous. Nonetheless, in spite of the serious deficiencies in its treatment of invention, Arnauld's text is grounded in a broad view of eloquence that extends well beyond the pulpit, one that could later be adapted by the philosophes in the eighteenth century in their quest for an enlightened eloquence.

"Philosophia enim simulari potest, eloquentia non potest", "la philosophie peut se contrefaire, non l'éloquence (Quintilien, Institution oratoire, XIII, 3, 12).

Je voudrais faire la généalogie de cette phrase, et montrer en particulier de quelle manière subtile elle inverse, tout en paraissant le conforter, le jugement platonico-aristotélicien sur le rapport entre philosophie et sophistique, cristallisé par exemple en Métaphysique Gamma 2, 1004b 26 : "... la sophistique paraît, mais n'est pas".

J'essaierai ainsi d'éclairer chez Quintilien le rapport à la sophistique, et le rapport entre sophistique, philosophie et éloquence, en suivant une double thématique : celle du masque, de la dissimulation, de la contrefaçon, de l'imitation d'une part, celle de l'évidence de l'effet, toujours vrai car index sui, de l'autre, à l'aide de quelques jalons qui vont de Platon et Aristote, en passant par Cicéron et Philostrate, jusqu'à Perelman.

Maria Silvana Celentano

La codificazione retorica della comunicazione epistolare nell'*Ars rhetorica* di Giulio Vittore.

Sono analizzati alcuni dei molteplici aspetti teorici e pragmatici dell'epistolografia antica, quali emergono dalla lettura del capitolo *de epistolis* dell'*Ars rhetorica* di Giulio Vittore (sec. IV d.C.).

La funzione pragmatica originaria di ogni lettera - informare qualcuno di qualcosa per iscritto - fa del messaggio epistolare uno speciale tipo di messaggio: a metà tra dialogo e resoconto dei fatti, la lettera finge presente l'interlocutore e a lui si indirizza, tentando di restituire per iscritto le forme orali del discorso. La formalizzazione retorica della «lettera» fa sì che siano accuratamente studiati e classificati gli argomenti e le occasioni di una missiva, le figure del mittente e del destinatario: l'epistola è il risultato di un complesso artificio stilistico, che fissa inevitabilmente gli elementi tradizionali del genere, accoglie innovazioni e trasformazioni, stabilisce omologie con altri generi letterari.

L'esame del suddetto capitolo *de epistolis* è di notevole interesse, anzitutto perché esso costituisce la più soddisfacente sintesi sulla scrittura epistolare inserita in un manuale retorico antico ad uso scolastico; in secondo luogo perché Giulio Vittore ha collocato il *de epistolis* a conclusione della sua opera, ponendolo in stretta relazione con altri due capitoli che, rispettivamente, riguardano la necessità, per chi voglia acquisire eloquenza, di un continuo esercizio (*de exercitatione*) e l'impiego opportuno del discorso d'uso comune o conversazione (*de sermocinatione*). Si può dire che il retore, accanto ai precetti normativi sul discorso oratorio, ha voluto includere anche alcune riflessioni su quei temi che, costituendo di fatto l'attività retorica più diffusa, esigevano nuovi chiarimenti. È verosimile che l'utente a cui Giulio Vittore si rivolge, dopo aver studiato norme e principi validi per tutti i generi di eloquenza, trovi piuttosto vantaggioso avere anche un qualche orientamento per le attività che lo vedono quotidianamente coinvolto: redigere una lettera ufficiale, condurre un colloquio importante e così via.

Il manuale di Giulio Vittore, dunque, nella sua parte conclusiva e in modo speciale nel *de epistolis*, rappresenta non solo un significativo documento della realtà storica e culturale dell'epoca, ma anche una preziosa testimonianza di come il dominio della retorica si sia esteso fino a coincidere con ogni tipo di comunicazione verbale.

Marià Pilar Celma Valero

L'apporto dell'oratoria sacra alla Retórica di Mayans y Siscar

Abstract/Riassunto

Una lunga tradizione spagnola di trattati sull'ars praedicandi confluiscono nell'opera El orador christiano (1733) di Gregorio Mayans y Siscar e, a sua volta, questa determina la portata e la profondità di analisi della sua opera maggiore, Retórica (1747). A differenza dei trattati usuali, che riducono le parti del discorso, quella di Mayans y Siscar è una retorica completa in tanto in quanto adopera tutte le parti del discorso. L'importanza che concede alla memoria e all'actio mette in un piano di alto interesse questa retorica, il cui debito con le artes concionandi è così grande come quello che ha con la retorica classica.

Helena Cichočka

Aus der mittel- und osteuropäischen Forschung zur
byzantinischen Rhetorik

Die Definition der Rhetorik in osteuropäischen Arbeiten über byzantinische Literatur ist sehr eng mit der Definition der Poetik verbunden. Richtungsweisend in diesem Zusammenhang ist vor allem das Werk von Averincev "Poetika rannevizantijskoj literatury" (Moskau 1977). Er versteht die Poetik als ein System der praktischen Prinzipien eines Autors einer literarischen Schule oder einer ganzen literarischen Epoche. Diese Position von Averincev analysierend kann man behaupten, daß seine theoretische Poetik der rhetorischen Theorie gleichkommt.

Ähnliche Tendenzen finden wir auch in der Poetik bei Bachtin, die in polnischen rhetorischen Forschungen als pragmatische Poetik bezeichnet wurde. An die Konzeption der Poetik=Rhetorik von Averincev knüpfte weiters Kurbatov an. In seinem Kapitel über die byzantinische Rhetorik (in: "Kultura Vizantii. IV-pervaja polovina VII v.", Moskau 1984) wird sowohl die Rolle der Rhetorik im politischen Leben des früheren Byzanz als auch in der Entwicklung der byzantinischen Kultur und Literatur behandelt.

Mag also auch der Schwerpunkt solcher Studien zur byzantinischen Rhetorik in der Sowjetunion liegen, so haben doch Einzelprobleme u.a. in Arbeiten bulgarischer, jugoslawischer und polnischer Forscher ebenso Beachtung gefunden.

Alexandru Cizek

The Characteristic of the Progymnastic Ethopoeia

The scholastic theory of the ethopoeia as speech in character is well known to us by means of the progymnastic Greek treatises of The Hermogenes, Nicholas the Sophist, then the Byzantine commentators of the treatise of Anthonios, that is John of Sardes and John Doxopater. On the other hand there is the Latin progymnastic doctrine of the ethopoeia within the framework of rhetoric handbooks such as those of Quintilian, Emporius and Isidore of Sevilla.

As such this theory appears more consistent and coherent, although less comprehensive than its principal sources known to us: the inventio -teaching on the ethos and pathe, especially at Quintilian, and the doctrine of the style-figures, especially in the Rhetoric ad Herennium and at Rutilius Lupus.

The most important prescriptions of the progymnastic doctrine deal with the dramatic-pathetic speech in character, the so-called pathopoeia, which is also largely illustrated by many a literary product within the Progymnasmata-Collections of Libanios and Nicholas the Sophist, Severus of Alexandria, as well as in poetical pieces as those of Dracontius or the anonymous ^{ones} within Codex Sarrasianus in the Early Middle Ages. Many such pieces have got a "parahistorical" theme and an elaborated stylistic character. The most striking feature of the "pathopoeitic" theory and of its practice is their threefold temporal dimension: "ante rem", "in re", "post rem". One brings into speech an increasing worsening of the every time specific state of things: the speaking character is depicting the past as a happy time, complains about the calamity in the present and despairs with regard of the future. The same tripartition occurs in the heathen funeral speech, which does lack however the dramatic colour of the ethopoeia.

Carol E. Clark

Gargantua's silence: some paradoxes of rhetorical education in Rabelais

The turning-point of the narrative in Rabelais's Gargantua is generally taken to be the banquet scene in which the young giant's incompetence in public speech and civility is demonstrated, to his father's chagrin. As a result of this his old teachers are dismissed and he is entrusted to a modern pedagogue who undertakes his transformation into a model Renaissance pupil.

However, one surprising result of the new education is that he is virtually reduced to silence. Whereas the earliest chapters of the book show him as socially competent, verbally resourceful and at his best in dialogue, he later appears ill at ease, unable to speak or act spontaneously and only happy in rehearsing prepared monologues.

The paper will explore this paradox, paying attention to the alternation of dialogue, monologue and narratorial voice in Rabelais's text and taking issue with some (in the author's view) unduly simple accounts that have been offered of the supposed propagandistic function of the Gargantua. Within the time allowed, comparison will be made between Rabelais's fictional text and contemporary writings on education.

Of the topics mentioned, this paper would seem to fit best under the heading: orality/literacy.

The author regularly lectures on Rabelais at Oxford and has published an article on Rabelais and the rhetoric of mountebanks (MUR 1171) and a book, The Vulgar Rabelais, Glasgow 1984.

Francelia Clark &
Mark Lawrence McPhail

Rhetorical Orality: Elegy as Argument in *Beowulf*

Contemporary concerns with the relationship between orality and literacy have yet to adequately explore the role of rhetoric as a link between these two forms of communicative discourse. George Kennedy's discussion of traditional rhetoric and his observation that there are a variety of approaches to oral persuasion practiced by different cultures, provide a starting point for a consideration of the rhetorical elements of epic originating in non-classical oral tradition. The Old English epic *Beowulf* illustrates both formally and substantively how elegy functions as argument, and thus offers an excellent example of how oral-traditional and classical elements of rhetoric are unified. Our essay explores how tropes function as argumentative structures in the *Beowulf* elegies, and how these structures provide some insights into the social and cultural context in which the traditional epic was composed.

"The Lay of the Last Survivor" and "Beowulf's Lay," embedded in *Beowulf*, when compared with scholarship on the elegies of the *Exeter Book*, suggest that the *Beowulf* passages are Old English traditional elegies in terms of both definition and form. The Old English elegaic tradition, not traceable to classical models, characteristically appears as speech in a narrative context. A formal analysis of internal elements of the *Beowulf* elegies and "The Wanderer" illustrates that they share the framed monologue, the catalogue of woes, the statement that time is endless, some key diction, and a resolution. A comparison of the *Beowulf* elegies with one another suggests the strategy of this poet: particular uses of the loss of joyful hall life; a pervading image of the protector made useless; and the nature of the resolution. This comparison in turn reveals significant structures of elegy in a third area of *Beowulf*, the messenger's speech foretelling the end of the Geatish tribe.

A rhetorical analysis of the elegies illustrates how poetics and rhetoric merge and at points become indistinguishable in an oral-based literature. Elements we usually see as classical rhetoric are embedded in the elegies in the forms of exordiums, *topoi*, figures and tropes, and perorations, and the narratives are as much intended to move to action as inform, to persuade as much as delight. The elegies illustrate rhetorical manifestations that go beyond classical rhetoric, and suggest connections with contemporary rhetorical considerations of rhetoric as narrative and the generative or epistemic function of rhetoric. "Oral rhetoric" as it is manifest in the elegies does more than reflect an existing socio-cultural reality: it generates that reality as well. E. G. Stanley concurs when he notes that the "created universe is the work of a master rhetorician."

"Rhetorical Orality: Elegy as Argument in *Beowulf*" attempts to explore more fully the fine line between poetic and rhetorical forms and strategies as they are manifest in an oral-based literature. The essay considers rhetoric both as method and subject of analysis, and amplifies the work that has been done on the rhetorical elements of oral literature in order to point to connections between traditional, classical and contemporary rhetoric. It demonstrates the usefulness of discussing the relationship between oral and rhetorical forms and strategies which point to a synthesis of poetics and persuasion, and amplifies the creative possibilities inherent in the spoken word's many faceted narrative tradition.

C. Joachim Classen

Quintilian and the Italian Humanists of the Early Fifteenth Century

Though Quintilian was not entirely forgotten during the Middle Ages, with the discovery of the complete text by Poggio in 1416, an era of increasing awareness and study of the 'institutio oratoria' began.

After some preliminary remarks on Francesco Petrarca, Giovanni Boccaccio and Coluccio Salutati, i.e. the period before 1416, the paper will give a brief sketch of the interest in Quintilian's work as shown by G.F. Poggio Bracciolini, Gasparino Barzizza, Antonio Loschi, Siceo Polentone, Guarino and Lorenzo Valla and attempt a comparison of its influence on their respective works as well as on the educational ideas of Pietro Paolo Vergerio, Maffeo Vegio and Lionardo Bruni.

C. Joachim Classen

Some Remarks on the Influence of George of Trebisonde's Rhetoricorum libri V and his Commentary on Cicero's speech for Ligarius

The paper attempts to trace the influence of both the Rhetoricorum libri V of George of Trebisonde and especially of his commentary on Cicero's speech for Ligarius. Some later commentaries on the same speech will be examined to illustrate the manner in which George's explanations were made use of, and some commentaries on other speeches as well as some rhetorical handbooks will be studied to determine to what extent George's rhetorical ideas were received in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Stephen Clucas

The rhetoric of science and the structure of the object : Thomas Harriot, Walter Warner and seventeenth-century scientific discourse

In their natural philosophical speculations, two early seventeenth-century scientists and mathematicians, Thomas Harriot and Walter Warner, both employed dichotomous schemata (derived from Aristotelian or Ramist logic) in order to elaborate the subjects they wished to analyse. But how far did this anatomical reliance on logical-rhetorical 'cases' constitute a discursive vehicle, and how far did it amount to a structural determination of the field of investigation?

In this paper I propose to examine the respective manuscript writings of Warner and Harriot, on subjects as diverse as atomism, optics, the infinite continuum, the locomotive faculty, the circulation of the blood, the nature of fire, and 'strathometrics' (the mathematical disposition of military regiments, described in Dee's preface to Henry Billingsley's Euclid), in order to consider this question, and to speculate about the development of scientific discourse through the seventeenth-century. What differences, what similarities can one identify between the catenative, dichotomous discourse of Warner, for example, and the dialogic technique of Boyle's *Sceptical Chymist*, the pansophic structures of knowledge fields by mid-century reformers and encyclopaedists, and the mechanics of the 1670s and 80s? Did the change in discourse reflect the decline in the force of formal logic in the scientific sphere, or did changing conceptions of the experiment effect the structure and narrative of scientific prose?

I shall also look at the rhetorical and scientific practice of Harriot and Warner's patron, Henry Percy, Ninth Earl of Northumberland, in his marginalia and "Advices to his son". As a gifted amateur, he too appears significantly different from his later-century counterparts, the gentlemen-virtuosi.

The focus of my proposed paper, then, is this question : Can the way that science is written, the way that its objects are described, discussed or disposed not only reflect changes within scientific practice, but actually define the nature of that practice itself?

T. Conley

BYZANTIUM IN THE BOURBON COURT

Carmen Codoner

Un accessus gramatical

El tipo de accessus a las obras gramaticales ofrece variantes. Encontramos una de ellas, muy definida por cierto, en un incunable de la gramática de Pastrana. Destaca del resto por su longitud y por una serie de rasgos propios. Al margen de lo que esto supone en la evolución del modelo o modelos, su análisis puede ayudar a seguir la trayectoria de un texto tan controvertido como desconocido.

This paper will present the results of a preliminary investigation into the recovery of Byzantine imperial ideology during the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV as part of their attempts to define the culture of their Courts. The contributions of Caussin, Poussines, and Labbe will be examined to trace the development of the sort of political theory of kingship that finds its most copious expression in the political essays of Bossuet.

Rita Copeland

Rhetoric In Vernacular Systems of the Sciences In the Middle Ages

Antoine Compagnon

France, USA, and the eclipse of rhetoric
before World War I

In very different historical, social, economic, political, and cultural contexts, the history of the fade-out of classical rhetoric in France and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century appears quite similar. In France, rhetoric was driven out of the institutions of learning (high schools and universities) between 1870 and 1905 in a way that I recounted in *La Troisième République des lettres* (Paris: Seuil, 1983). I would like now to explore the similarities and dissimilarities with the changes that took place in the American institutions of higher learning, when the model of the research university replaced that of the liberal arts college. When composition became a requirement as a consequence, rhetoric, short of *inventio* however, was relocated in speech departments. This poses the question of the relation between rhetoric and modern democracy, when an egalitarian ideal takes over a liberal one, emblemized in the qualification of "République athénienne" that the French Third Republic received in its early days.

This study will be later be part of the chapter on rhetoric at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century that I have in progress for the *Histoire de la rhétorique dans l'Europe moderne (1450-1950)*, Marc Fumaroli (ed.), to be published in 1994.

This paper explores the ideological implications of rhetoric's disciplinary status in Latin and vernacular classifications of the sciences in the Middle Ages. Unifying conceptions of scientific classification have historically concealed the struggle of rhetoric to justify its place among the disciplines. To follow the fortunes of rhetoric in the development of antique and medieval classifying systems is to witness the continuing repositioning and displacement of the science of discourse, its construction by and subordination to the interests of competing disciplines: logic, moral logic, politics, ethics, or more broadly, practical sciences and *artes sermocinales*. Classification of the sciences is one of the most characteristic discourses about knowledge in medieval academic culture; and especially in the later Middle Ages it serves to support the unitary ideological interests of the clerical community by offering a stable and comprehensive picture of the hierarchical relations of knowledge. But of course these classifying paradigms are mechanisms of control and containment rather than authentic pictures of organic and internal stability. The position of rhetoric in these academic paradigms is telling: it has neither stable position nor consistent value. Its only reliable feature is its subordinate status as a subdivision of some controlling science (logic, ethics, politics, etc.). In Latin clerical contexts, where language itself is not a site of cultural contestation or even political inquiry, rhetoric has little use as anything besides a textbook art.

But vernacular classifications of the sciences provide a different picture, upsetting the epistemological hierarchies of traditional academic discourse. Vernacular paradigms of the sciences introduce an epistemological reordering, especially with regard to rhetoric. In vernacular classifications of the sciences (notably among them those of Brunetto Latini, Dante, and Gower), rhetoric often occupies a new position: it becomes one of the major divisions of the sciences, and sometimes even an epistemological category unto itself. It is elevated from subordinate to sovereign status among the sciences. This paper proposes to investigate the reasons for and conditions of this change. The shape of the argument can be projected here in brief. Rhetoric is always about language, and in medieval vernacular contexts, language is a crucial ideological site, a witness of cultural difference, and the primary mechanism of social and institutional challenge to the dominance of Latinity. In vernacular academic discourse, discussions of knowledge need to make a space for considerations of language itself as a political institution; and here rhetoric takes on unprecedented importance as the disciplinary medium of such considerations.

William A. Covino

Occult Philosophy as Rhetorical Theory: Agrippa's Itinerant Intellect

Between 1500 and 1700, the displacement of a magic cosmology by a scientific one defined a change in the nature of imagination, and initiated a scientific rhetoric (Vickers, Couliano, Bergman). Left behind in this epistemic shift were occult philosophies which, with their repeated emphasis on the creative and constitutive power of words and their extensive considerations of the effect of contextual variables on meaning, may be read as theories of rhetoric.

The work of Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim is a case in point. I will focus on Agrippa's Female Pre-eminence and Of the Vanity of the Human Arts and Sciences as extensions of his Occult Philosophy and as embodiments of a theory of rhetoric. Mindful that magic, skepticism, and rhetoric were all objects of wholesale reform by the end of the seventeenth century, we can locate Agrippa in the post-Medieval, pre-Reformation moment when intellectual enthusiasm for the imaginative and expressive possibilities of figurative language, skeptical philosophy, and occult sciences was high. His uneven and inconsistent body of writing, together with his variegated and restless career in a number of professions, allows us to consider how a belief in magic may--perhaps must--coincide with philosophical skepticism. Agrippa's advocacies of occultism, skepticism, and feminism, intersecting and contradicting each other through a career of temporary professions, shifting religious and political allegiances, and failed appeals for patronage, comprise a rhetoric of unsettled propositions which reflect both the magic belief in the plasticity of language, and the willingness of the magus to create provisional intellectual realities.

Christopher Craig

Investive loci and Deliberative Persuasion in Cicero's second

Philippic

Cicero's second Philippic, widely acknowledged as the masterpiece of classical Latin invective, has been well analyzed for its correspondence with Demosthenes' De Corona, (Taddeo, G. Kennedy, C.W. Wooten), for its style (esp. W.K. Lacey), and for its historical importance (esp. H. Frisch). But it has heretofore escaped serious treatment as an attempt at persuasion. There are two reasons for this: 1) The speech was never delivered, and so is dismissed as a pamphlet, qualitatively different from the other orationes Philippicae. (So, e.g., R.G.M. Nisbet, W. Stroh) 2) The genus causae, and thus the set of rhetorical expectations, is singularly unclear. Although obviously an invective, and thus in the province of epideictic, the text also represents a (transparently specious) attempt to persuade Antony to renounce his ways. And the audience for this is Rome's greatest deliberative assembly. Because the speech is so powerful as invective, this deliberative aspect has been almost completely ignored. As a result of these two factors, there has not yet been an attempt in the literature on the speech rigorously to frame the rhetorical challenge that Cicero must answer.

Using the testimonia of Cicero that Stroh has already applied to judicial oratory, I will defend the legitimacy of reading this speech as the representation of a fictional act of persuasion before a listening audience. Having established this approach, I will offer a new understanding of the rhetorical challenge: Cicero's speech is epideictic for one part of his listening audience, those who already despise Antony. But it is truly deliberative for another part of that audience, Caesarians who might stay with Antony or find an alternative leader in the young Octavian. A careful examination of the loci of invective in Inu. and Rhet. ad Her. in the earlier Attic tradition analyzed by W. Suess, in the Roman tradition surveyed by N.W. Merrill, and in Cicero's earlier invective against Piso, supports this interpretation; I will show that the necessity for arguing simultaneously two genera causarum before two groups within the same audience causes the orator to use the traditional loci of invective in an unprecedented manner to accommodate both epideictic and deliberative goals simultaneously.

B. J. T. Dobbs

Rhetoric in Newton's General Scholium to the Principia

"The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties." Thus did Isaac Newton introduce his rhetorical agenda of persuading European natural philosophers to abandon the cosmic system of René Descartes and a fundamental aspect of the widely cherished ideology of seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy.

Conceived in opposition to the efflorescence of occult systems in the Renaissance, Cartesian natural philosophy and other such mechanical philosophies insisted that the only acceptable explanations of natural phenomena must be based on matter and motion, that any transfer of motion from one particle of matter to another must take place only by impact or pressure. The mysterious efficacy of occult "influences," "virtues," "rays," or "powers" emanating from the stars or other natural centers of "active principles" were all denied by the commonsensical billiard-ball model of natural activity proposed by the mechanical philosophers.

Included in the mechanical program of explanation was the mysterious force of gravity, which was also to be explained by the principles of impact or pressure. For that purpose Descartes had postulated the existence of an imperceptible material aether filling the heavens, swirling about the planets, the sun, and the stars, in vortex patterns. The vortex of this fine matter about the sun, for example, was supposed to carry the planets around the sun in the sun-centered orbits postulated by the new Copernican astronomy. Descartes's cosmic system was the first really comprehensive one to be created since Aristotle's, and it had been received with great enthusiasm and admiration by the European intellectual community.

Newton himself seems to have been a fairly orthodox Cartesian for about twenty years, until his own work on The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (the Principia) forced him to abandon the "hypothesis of vortices." This paper will explore the rhetorical means by which Newton attempted to persuade other natural philosophers to follow his lead in abandoning Cartesian principles in the matter of gravity and also in modifying the dominant ideology of mechanical philosophy regarding impact physics.

Paul M. Dombrowski

Existential Psychology and the Rhetoric of
Martin Luther King, Jr.

King is a major figure in the recent history of rhetorical practice. Surprisingly few rhetorical analyses of his two principal speeches, "I Have a Dream" and "I've Been to the Mountaintop," have been published, however. One reason for this paucity, I contend, is the existentialistic nature of the speeches.

Existentialism figures in these speeches because King studied existentialism and found it valuable, and because black pulpit oratory itself resonates with existential overtones. Thus, in a cross-fertilization of disciplines, existential psychology should yield rhetorical insights into these speeches that would be difficult to obtain through traditional rhetorical methods.

I develop a rhetorical perspective based on Irvin Yalom's existential psychology along the lines of Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory (which itself has an existential cast). The major features of Yalom's psychology are death, transcendence, existential freedom, existential isolation, and the felt need for meaning. I find that existential features pervade the speeches. These features facilitate the identification of King with the audience and among themselves, in turn facilitating the induction of cooperative action. In "Dream," the dream is transcendent and the pervasive theme is freedom. These features bind the audience in collective identification on the basis of King's dream and American foundational principles, facilitating cooperative action toward freedom and equality. In "Mountaintop," death and time-transcendence are primary. These features bind the audience in identification with King and with Biblical Israelites and so with both Christians and Jews, living and dead, facilitating cooperative action toward the pursuit of full civil rights even in the event of King's death.

I conclude that this perspective yields important insights into King's rhetoric that would be difficult to obtain through traditional rhetorical methods. This existential psychological rhetorical perspective provides both a framework for disparate devices and an explanatory principle for unusual rhetorical devices such as death and King's dream, which has been criticized as narcotizing, unreal, and counterproductive.

Georgiana Donavin

A Parody of Rhetorical Instruction: Book VII of
John Gower's Confessio Amantis

Book VII of John Gower's Confessio Amantis (circa 1390) presents the first treatment of Rhetoric in English. James J. Murphy illuminated this fact nearly thirty years ago, but since he declared Gower's discussion vague and uninformed, the Confessio has never been considered significant for the history of Rhetoric. It is the purpose of this paper to claim Book VII for the history of Rhetoric, to reveal its parodic nature and show how it alludes to a sophisticated rhetorical tradition.

Read literally, the discussion of "Rhetorique" in Book VII is obtuse: it vaguely connects Rhetoric to practical reasoning, logic, grammar, disputation and forensics. It mentions "Iulius" and "Cithero" as if they were two different people. The irony of this lore becomes apparent, though, when we note that it is related by an untrustworthy character--Genius, priest of Venus. Called upon to relate the education of Alexander, Genius even declares himself unqualified to remark on Aristotle's philosophy. He is, in my reading, a parody of a university master unable to reconcile the Ciceronian and Augustinian rhetorical traditions with the new Aristotelian theory infiltrating Oxford during Gower's time.

The poet Gower, however, clearly understood Aristotle's contribution to Rhetoric and could distinguish the Rhetoric from the pseudo-Aristotelian teachings of Alexander. This he indicated in his own Latin gloss on this section of the manuscript which paraphrases Aristotle's injunction that the truth is most persuasive.

It is most significant that Gower expected his courtly audience to understand the allusions to different rhetorical theories and to laugh at Genius' inept treatment of them. If the courtly audience is so sophisticated, Book VII adds credence to P. Osmond-Lewry's suggestions about the availability of Aristotle's Rhetoric and the advanced state of rhetorical training at Oxford during the fourteenth century.

Milad Doueih

Philosophy From the Desert: Descartes' Eloquence

An analysis of Descartes' letter of 1628 in defense of Balzac's Lettres and its relations to the rhetorical structure of the Discours sur la Méthode. Is there such a thing as Cartesian rhetoric and what are the relations between Descartes' dismissal of eloquence and the structure and order of the method.

Joachim Dyck

Quintilian's significance for Rhetorics and Poetics
of German Enlightenment

The significance given to speech during the age of Enlightenment was not limited to rhetorics but also had an effect on related fields. Leibniz's treatise on the German language had already put in a claim for a standardized national language, which is based in a broad sense on rhetorical rules. Literary theory and aesthetics develop according to rhetorical concepts of effects. The debate revolving around taste (J.U. König) and the sublime style (Schiller) is influenced by elements of classical rhetorics. It is the thesis of the paper that the reflections on rhetorics concerning aesthetics and poetics are basically a fundamental rehabilitation of ancient Rhetorics. That, however, implies above all the reception of Quintilian. How did this reception take place?

I. Rhetorics of Enlightenment is based to a high degree on French models by the very close connection to Lamy, Rapin, Du Bos, Rollin, etc. These authors refer to Quintilian.
II. The great interest in Quintilian is shown by the edition of his works, Heumann, Göttingen 1719, Burmann, Leyden 1720, Capperonier, Paris 1725, Gesner, Göttingen 1738, etc.

In my paper I will elaborate on the following theses: In the 18th-Century
1. Q. served as means for the rhetorical renaissance and for the resistance against Baroque mannerism; examples: Fabricius, Hallbauer, Gottsched.

2. Baumgarten and Meier as founders of modern aesthetics in Germany adapt their reflections on irrationalism and subjectivity from Q..

3. Also Q.'s thoughts on "ingenium" and "inventio" serve as a fundamental basis for the concept of "Originalgenie" in the Storm and Stress (Goethe, Schiller).

4. Rhetorics in a strict sense as taught in "Gymnasien" takes its ideal of the orator from Q.'s concept of the "vir bonus" and thus becomes an influential factor in the development of middle class ethics.

Kathy Eden

Strategies of Accommodation in Erasmian Hermeneutics

Robert R. Dyer

VALUES IN CLASSICAL EDUCATION

Classical education, as the heir of the ancient *trivium*, has aspired to teach grammar, logic and rhetoric as a preparation for the study of humane letters or "the humanities" at college or university. However, it has historically shifted according to the concept of humanities in vogue at the colleges of first choice. Today's university schools of literature, history, philosophy and so on have little to do with what Cicero envisioned when he first put the ideals of a humane education into the mouth of Licinius Crassus in *de Oratore*. There Cicero is responding to two somewhat distinct dangers in rhetorical training: (1) that those so trained will lack the understanding of the human mind necessary for political persuasion (I 12. 53), and (2) that they will lack a full and proper education (34. 158-9). Crassus complains that rhetoric has been falsely divided from the study of justice, duty, administration and how to live one's life (III 31.122 ff.), and states that those who are not richly equipped with wide knowledge and education come to high office and the administration of the state 'naked and defenseless' (33.136).

The Christian tradition has responded to this call by searching classical history, philosophy (chiefly Plato and Aristotle) and literature for episodes that may exemplify Christian values, e.g. Sir Thomas Eliot's *Governour*, and the consequent misreadings have tended to discredit the rhetorical tradition in education.

I have the good fortune to teach in a private school where the tradition has been maintained, at least in Classics. But we face pressures from the pluralistic nature of American society and from our own desire for a more interdependent *humanitas* dedicated to solving the global crises of the environment and natural resources such as oil. Those of us who believe in the *trivium* of rhetoric as a valuable educational discipline must begin to redefine the values which may appropriately be discussed in a post-modern humane education to satisfy the requirements of Cicero's Crassus: "The poets should be read, histories learned, teachers of all good areas of study (*artes*) read, thoroughly explored, and, for the sake of practice, praised, interpreted, corrected, censured and refuted. The opposite sides of every question should be debated, and what might seem persuasive in each matter should be ferreted out." (I 34. 158)

I challenge the membership of this International Society to begin the task of defining those values which must be debated in our humane educations if those we teach are one day to understand the viewpoints of those with whom they disagree and to begin the dialectic process of persuasion and agreement.

NOTE: Argument to be extended by discussion of actual values taught in the teaching of classical authors such as Vergil's *Aeneid*.

Recovering the rhetorical origins of accommodation (*οικονομία*, *accommodatio*) more generally, the biblical hermeneutics of Erasmus' later works, especially the *Methodus*, *Ratio* and *Ecclesiastes*, seeks to replace the strategy of accommodation most approved by the *neoteric*, namely allegory, with the one regularly practiced by the classical forensic orators, namely equity. Based on the familiar principle of decorum, understood as accommodation to the particularities of the case--such as the time, place, subject matter, the nature of the audience and the character of the speaker--the equitable interpretation accomplishes what the allegorical cannot: it leaves the text free to respond to change even while it preserves the historical or grammatical meaning. And it does so by invoking the legal fiction of intentionality.

This argument from intention takes its most traditional form in antiquity within the rhetorical discussions of *interpretatio scripti* as the controversy between *scriptum* and *voluntas*--the written word versus the writer's intention. Erasmus inherits not only this classical formulation and its association with equity, but also the Christian, largely Augustinian, adaptation of this controversy into the opposition between literal or corporeal and spiritual reading. Constructed on the premises of this double inheritance, classical and Christian, the hermeneutics of Erasmus' later works reconstructs, as it were, the historical development of these premises and advances a method of reading that is at once equitable and spiritual.

Monica M. Elbert

The Rhetoric of Advertising in Mary W. Freeman's Fiction

Late nineteenth-century American culture may be perceived as a period when the colonization of women in the domestic sphere occurred through advertisement, a business which was coming into its own. Mary W. Freeman, pejoratively labeled a local colorist by her contemporary male realist school of writers, wrote stories which ostensibly focused on women's domestic props--furniture, household goods, and homemade panaceas. This is the realm of housewifely and matronly duties assigned to woman by advertising. However, even though the rhetoric of advertising which catered to a female audience, as in those magazines where Freeman first published her stories, sought to make woman a consumer and motherhood a commodity, Freeman is able to subvert the meanings which the male business of advertising has assigned to woman. The psychology and slogans of early advertising tried to undermine woman's authority by limiting her role in the world and also by showing her ignorance of that realm to which she was relegated. The imperialization of the kitchen culture hinged upon deception, but Freeman's plots and conversations revolve around a deception, a counter-deception of sorts, to undermine the male plot to dictate woman's life style. So, what seems innocuously domestic, an example of woman's local color, is quite insidiously anti-capitalistic and anti-competitive. In order to outwit their men and to critique the male mode of productivity, Freeman's women use the same type of lies and lines that advertisers have enforced upon them. In the end, Mary Freeman is more than a retiring local colorist as she responds to the capitalistic jargon of the ad-man, who complacently feels in control. Indeed, her stories are not about how to run a household but how to counter men's deceptions, how to compete in the male business world, and ultimately how to beat men at their own game.

Jody Enders

Prosopopoeia and Quintilian's Theory of Dramatic Illusion.

Quintilian once wrote that it was not sufficient that the lawyer speak on behalf of his client: he was to speak as his client in the most literal and literary act of "representation." In a crucial passage from Book VI, a costumed, gesticulating orator attempts to stir the emotions of judge and audience during delivery by "impersonating" his client in a triumph of prosopopoeia:

The bare facts are no doubt moving in themselves; but when we pretend [fingimus] that the persons concerned themselves are speaking, the personal note adds to the emotional effect. For then the judge seems no longer to be listening to a voice bewailing another's ills, but to hear the voice and feelings of the unhappy victims, men whose appearance alone would call forth his tears even though they uttered never a word. . . . We may draw a parallel from the stage, where the actor's voice and delivery produce greater emotional effect when he is speaking in an assumed role rather than when he speaks in his own character. (VI, 1.25-27)

What was that, if not the momentous introduction into forensic rhetoric of dramatic impersonation-- long held to be the single most important critical criterion for the discovery of the very origins of drama in different modes of ritual discourse. In this paper, I argue that forensic rhetoric was as ritualized a discourse as the medieval Christian liturgy in which drama is known to have emerged. Characterized by such cornerstones of drama as theatrical space, costume, gesture, conflict, audience participation, pity and fear, and, especially, impersonation, legal rhetoric was the site of a profound ontological between ritual and representation: it was a protodrama.

Long before Honorius of Autun described the Mass as a dramatic conflict "represented" by a priest/tragicus ("sic tragicus noster pugnam Christi populo Christiano in theatro ecclesiae gestibus suis repraesentat" [Gemma animae]), Plato himself had observed that lawyers were the "authors of a tragedy (tragoidias)" and that forensic discourse was "framed as a representation (mimesis)" (Laws 817B). Considered in the performative context of delivery, this explicit focus on the mimetic nature of law suggests the paramouncy in the rhetorical tradition of a veritable theory of dramatic illusion which, in turn, sheds new light on the origins of drama itself.

Elaine Fantham

The Concept of Nature and human nature in Quintilian's pedagogy and rhetorical theory.

Because Latin natura early took on the range of meanings of Greek physis it became a key term in Roman rhetorical theory. After George Kennedy drew attention to the importance of this concept for Quintilian's theories of teaching and speaking, it was taken as subject of a dissertation, Der rhetorische Naturbegriff bei Quintilian by F.R. Varwig [Heidelberg 1976]. This examines most of the significant uses of natura, relating them to Cicero [de Oratore 1.115f] and Plato [Phaedrus 269 ed]; on the contribution of natural talent to rhetorical success.

But Varwig's study, though shrewd in appraising Quintilian's argumentation, leaves aside the historical origin of his theories outside these two influential passages, and so ignores problems arising from Quintilian's adaptation of principles ultimately derived from different systems: in particular Varwig does not investigate the contradictory roles of nature in Quintilian's theory of imitation.

This paper supplements Varwig's material and conclusions to explore three aspects of nature in the Institutio.

- 1) The basis for Quintilian's psychology in Isocrates and in Aristotle's rhetoric, and the slippage between theories derived from the two systems. This coincides with the shift in the balance of nature and nurture (natura /cura) from the training of young children to the teaching of adolescent or adult students, illustrated from book 2. chs. 8, 17 and 19.
- 2) The role of Nature as external reality in explaining the original formation of theory, and its reinterpretation by Quintilian to justify rhetorical imitation.
- 3) As Varwig notes, Quintilian's persuasive use of personified Nature varies for different components of rhetorical skill, inventio and dispositio, elocutio, memoria and actio. This variation will be my last topic. Analyzing Quintilian's language I will show that nature is represented as coercive in the logical processes of argumentation and composition, but as passive or permissive in the aesthetic processes of expression and performance. Since "Nature" had been used by Quintilian's antagonists to deprecate rhetorical theory, he relies on redefinition of Nature to defend important later sections of his teaching. This use is independent of his appeal to human nature for reassurance that both moral and rhetorical excellence can be attained.

Claire Farago

The Epistemological Value of Ornament in New Mexican Santos

Language, the organization of society, and what we loosely call "art" have been powerful ethnocentric markers of cultural difference. Aristotle's definition of the "human" arts has played a central role in these developments. In neo-Aristotelian psychology, the difference between human and animal art requires the distinction between human rational fantasy, which is associated with reason and reminiscence, and the fixed imagination of animals (*De anima* 434a9-10). It is a complex matter, however, to examine the history of our distinctions between "art" and "artifact." Currently, a number of art historians have taken exception to the history of art as a "history of vision" because the assumption that the work of art is a model of perception is conventional and culturally specific. Many writers currently feel that history and cultural memory work in opposition to one another, encoding memory in different ways for different groups. This paper contributes to this ongoing critique of our inherited notions of art by exploring the historical circumstances in which the western stereotype of "primitive" arose. More specifically, in a careful examination of the visual evidence, it will reevaluate devotional art of Spanish New Mexico by treating it as the product of cross-cultural contact.

Sixteenth-century Italy provided a particularly rich setting for the development and institutionalization of theories of artistic inspiration. Giorgio Vasari, in line with the theory of images adopted by the Council of Trent in 1563, condemned art produced in the absence of reason: the "maniera barbara" is the product of unbridled fantasy; it consists of fantastic embellishments that do not observe "measure and proportion." His ideas and those of his contemporaries are deeply indebted to ancient rhetoric, which evaluates the arts of representation in terms of artistic license manifested as artifice. Ornament, according to the neo-Aristotelian psychology of Cicero and Quintilian, is judged by sense to be either appropriate or inappropriate to the subject. The shared identity of orator, subject, and judging audience was transferred to Renaissance literature on art, where it continued to be a conventional premise of considerable importance. In 1435, Alberti reformulated the ancient conception of stylistic ornamentation for the modern painter in terms which became the foundation for Academic theories of art. Alberti's rhetorical concept of painting encouraged (no doubt also reflected) a growing preference for artifice that depends on scientific knowledge conspicuously displayed in artistic feats of illusionism. The appropriate incorporation of "fantastic" ornament meets these criteria by demonstrating the artist's rational fantasy as well as his ability to emulate nature's *bizarrie*.

During the same period Europeans confronted what they considered to be completely alien cultures in a "New World." When Amerindians, *mestizos*, and untrained Europeans were drafted into the service of European missionaries, the Spanish who directed their efforts were not thinking of artistic license, but of converting heathen souls. How was the ideology of the images produced in this setting different for New Mexicans than it was for Europeans? How did European ideals associated with artistic practices emerge in the midst of indigenous traditions based on entirely different premises? Did this multicultural setting reinforce or alter the European conception that people could be categorized as lacking in the higher rational functions of the human soul on the basis of their art? Did New Mexican artists encode their own ideals and ideas in the devotional images they were ordered to produce? These questions will be explored as part of an epistemological critique of *santos*, especially their ornament, with the aim of respecting cultural diversity.

Sue Farquhar

Rhetoric, Ethics and Politics in Montaigne's *Essais*

This study examines the tensions between public and private spheres in the ethical discourse of the essayist Michel de Montaigne relative to the changing civic role of (legal) humanists in late 16th century France. Montaigne's early retirement from public office to pursue a writing vocation and his resolutely anti-political stance throughout the *Essais* are traditionally cited as evidence of his withdrawal into the privacy of the self to pursue writing in isolation from worldly concerns. However, Montaigne's ethical discourse while pretending to be apolitical, addresses current political and ethical issues and opens a new role for the legal humanist whose possibilities for political action had become increasingly restricted during the religious wars. Focusing on self-portraiture in the *Essais* I argue that irony as a discursive practice is key to the formulation and success of Montaigne's innovative mode of ethical inquiry into the self relative to social and political pressures of the time. In specifying Montaigne's particular use of irony, this paper will contribute to the need for more specialized studies of Renaissance rhetorical concepts and uses of irony.

In an essay entitled "On Presumption" (II,17), Montaigne presents his first full-fledged self portrait to explain why he is inept at household management and unfit for public office. In humorously emphasizing his faults, his self-description incorporates tacit references to a model of Ciceronian civic humanism. This classical ideal presupposes a practice of moral and political deliberation based on reason, yet Montaigne's vocabulary effectively re-describes the practices and goals of civic humanism in terms of a critical sense of discernment or self-consciousness. The ability to "sift out" the truth (about oneself) is not a God-given, innate conscience, referred to by some (Protestant) writers as a sign of one's aptitude for public office nor does it imply the discovery of an essential character, or *ethos*, the stamp which Greek philosophers thought had been impressed on all of us and constituted human existence. Montaigne's project, both modest and daring, is to describe himself in terms of the idiosyncracies and accidents that particularize him. His "scar", the character trait of indecisiveness which disqualifies him from public office, is just such an accident. Thus, Montaigne gives up the classical attempt to unite the public and private, the combined search for social betterment and individual excellence. By focusing on his singularity, he constructs instead a private vocabulary of moral deliberation for self-discovery that is radically different. Ironically, his own inadequacies and quirks can be seen as positive traits or virtues which emphasize the corruption of contemporary politics, targeting in particular the Machiavellian political pragmatism that (he suggests) permeates courtly life.

I propose that the self-portrait, inaugurated in "On Presumption", is the model for subsequent ironic self-revelation in the *Essais*. Montaigne opens this essay with an allusion to a passage in Aristotle's description of the "honest" man as opposed to the boastful or overly modest man (*Nicomachean Ethics*). The latter's modesty he compares to Socratic *ironia*, or dissimulation of one's knowledge, and states that such understatement, although dishonest, is preferable to bragging. In admitting that he too errs on the side of modesty, Montaigne implicitly announces the ironic mode that his self-portrait will take. Specifically, he adopts Socratic irony as defined by Quintilian for his inquiry into private and public dimensions of the self. During the classical period Quintilian had enlarged the import and parameters of irony, conceiving of irony not only as a brief trope or verbal conflict, but also as a figure whose meaning and whole aspect conflicts with the language and tone; Quintilian extended this to include "a man's whole life may be colored with irony as was the case with Socrates". Quintilianesque irony may have indicated *ethos* "which is commended to our approval by goodness more than sought else..." Quintilian also considered irony as "the most effective of all means of stealing into the minds of men and a most attractive device, so long as we adopt a conversational rather than a controversial tone." (See *Institutiones oratoriae* IX, ii 44-53, VI, ii 9-16, and IX I, 29) The complete text of Quintilian's *Institutiones*, little known during the Middle Ages, if at all, was not widely circulated until the 15th century. A study of Montaigne's uses of the "irony of manner" relative to Renaissance rhetorical definitions and practices of irony brings out his innovative adaptation of Quintilian's concept of Socratic irony. In the *Essais*, irony plays a crucial part in the constitution of a vocabulary of self-description for it communicates Montaigne's pervasive view of the contingency of the self and of language. As a strategy of address, of "stealing" into the reader's mind, irony serves as a heuristic device, raising reader consciousness and allowing an exploration of the subject's situation in society. Ironic self-revelation for Montaigne is an ongoing process of inquiry with no fixed end or intrinsic "truth" to be discovered. From self-description a portrait emerges, not of the orator or statesman, but of an author. Thus, the dialogue Montaigne initiates through ironic self-description inaugurates a shift in humanist inquiry from the classical Renaissance ideal of civic humanism toward a new kind of activity for the humanist as reader, (literary) critic and writer.

Linda Ferreira-Buckley

The Influence of Belletristic Rhetoric in Victorian England

Although historians of rhetoric have demonstrated the influence of Hugh Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* in America and Scotland, they have not yet traced its influence in England. Perhaps the reason for this neglect is that most studies during the last two centuries have focused on Oxford and Cambridge Universities and the great public schools; and these schools—unlike those in Scotland and America—tended to have an elite membership and did not usually offer formal instruction in rhetoric. Such instruction was the responsibility of the English academies and new universities, about which we know little. These differences are crucial because Blair's rhetoric arose out of the eighteenth-century Scottish educational system, which instructed not only the upper classes, but the middle and lower classes as well, as the English system would the following century. Instruction in rhetoric became not simply instruction in effective communication but a vehicle for the transmission of culture; Blair, as Hirsch has written, "gathered and codified for the Scots materials that literate English men had absorbed through the pores." In the nineteenth century, as the English were opening education to the trade and lower classes, belletristic rhetoric became influential in language education. In fact, Blair's *Lectures* exerted considerable influence in Britain, both in and out of the classroom, going through twenty-six complete and fifty-two abridged editions. My paper discusses the ways in which the belletristic school of rhetoric helped to shape the ideas of Victorian social prophets about education, literature, and culture.

Blair's treatise—indeed the assumptions and promises of belletristic rhetoric—was attractive to Victorian educational reformers. They set about developing a language curriculum grounded on the belief that the faculty of taste was inherent to some degree in all men but that education and social circumstance determined the extent to which that faculty would be developed. In reforming the curriculum—that is, in introducing the people to an English untainted by error and misuse and to the texts that embody the knowledge and values "England" held dear—the educational reformers sought to transform the populace. My paper discusses the ways in which the belletristic school of rhetoric helped to shape the ideas of Victorian social reformers. I will thus review what was being taught by way of language education in the English secondary schools to demonstrate the significance of belletristic rhetoric, due primarily to the popularity of Blair's *Lectures*. My research reveals that in fact Victorians read Blair and appropriated his doctrine; contrary to what historians of rhetoric have maintained, the Victorians were schooled in rhetoric, albeit under the rubric of "literary studies." In the course of the nineteenth century, then, literature became the guardian of civilizing powers formerly under rhetoric's domain. Because histories of language education in Victorian England have been written by literary historians, however, the contributions of "rhetorical studies" to "literary studies" have been too long overlooked.

Paula Findlen

THE COURT AS LABORATORY: THE PERSUASIONS OF SCIENCE
IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ITALY

In the seventeenth century the court was one of the primary loci of scientific production. In this paper, I would like to examine how the rhetorical strategies and extra-scientific activities of the seventeenth-century courts actively shaped the style and the content of science. This study will focus on the activities of the Tuscan court physician and naturalist Francesco Redi. During his long and productive career at the Medicean court, as *archiatro* to Ferdinando II and Cosimo III, Redi attempted to rewrite natural history. This was done in the context of numerous "experiments" performed at court, usually in front of the Grand Duke and his courtiers whose presence gave Redi's conclusions social credibility. Redi's approach to natural history was not simply shaped by the performative aspect of his *esperienza*, however; it was materially determined by the court. The relationship between hunting, leisure and experiment provides the best case in point. The majority of the Tuscan naturalist's observations occurred due to the proliferation of flora and fauna at the court, in the form of the catch of the day, additions to the menagerie, and exotic tributes to the Grand Duke. Thus Redi's role as the manager of the "natural resources" of the court gave him access to the materials with which to controvert ancient and contemporary fables of natural history, and his sensitivity to his unique position in the hierarchy of court scientists is amply reflected in the argumentative structure of his writings.

While focusing on Redi, this essay will also situate the rhetorical structure of his work in the broader context of early modern court science. The best point in contrast is the case of Galileo, an earlier success at the same court. From a more distanced perspective, the late sixteenth-century naturalist Ulisse Aldrovandi, who enjoyed a close relationship with Francesco I, can also be cast in a similar role. By outlining the contours of the Medicean patronage of science from the late sixteenth through the seventeenth century, I hope to demonstrate how the court indeed shaped the nature of scientific inquiry by creating a focal point towards which natural philosophers could direct their efforts in order to enhance the credibility of their conclusions.

The paper presents a reading of the seduction episode in the story of Zima (*Decameron* III 5). The goal is to define in linguistic and rhetorical terms the silence that intervenes in the dialogue between the two lovers and the strategy enacted by Zima in order to fill it. 'Sermocinatio', 'conformatio', 'sibi ipsi responsio', reported speech, are amongst the tools used to understand the nature of the response to silence around which the story is built. References are made to Andreas Capellanus (*De amore*), the *Novellino*, Passavanti, Dante (*Vita nuova*), J. L. Austin (*How to Do Things with Words*).

Maurice A. Finocchiaro

SCIENCE AND RHETORIC IN GALILEO

The place of Galileo in the history of science is both well-founded and well-known: this is not to say that there is a scholarly consensus about the interpretation and evaluation of his scientific work, but rather that the ongoing scholarly controversies are largely due to the pivotal role he occupies. The same cannot, of course, be said in regard to the history of rhetoric; nevertheless, there is a growing appreciation of Galileo on the part of rhetorically oriented scholars, as shown in works by B. Vickers, J. D. Moss, P. K. Feyerabend, and the present author.

It may be useful to review some of the main approaches and motivations underlying this growing interest. I believe it is possible to reduce these to two, relating to (1) the history of rhetorical practice, and (2) the methodological and epistemological problem of the role of rhetoric in scientific inquiry. The history of rhetorical practice certainly deserves at least as much study as the history of rhetorical theory, and the fact is that Galileo's writings are full of rhetorically significant elements. On the other hand, the recent dissolution of the positivist conception of science has led increasingly to the realization that there is more to science than observation, experiment, calculation, deduction, and induction; and that the additional elements include such activities as criticism, evaluation, judgment, persuasion, image-projection, effective communication, and aesthetic appeal, many of the which are rhetorical activities. Galileo's work then acquires new interest because of its classic scientific status and because of the lessons it suggests on the question of the role of rhetoric in science.

If there is time, I should like to pursue such a joint historical and epistemological project by examining some particular writings by Galileo and perhaps by other relevant authors. One promising exercise would be to examine systematically his reflections on the relationship between science and rhetoric, and to explore whether his explicit pronouncements on "science" can be taken any more seriously than his explicit pronouncements on "rhetoric." Another would be to explore some rhetorical aspects of the Galileo affair, namely of the series of events beginning in 1613 and climaxing with the Inquisition trial of 1633. A third one would be to examine some of the rhetoric in the controversy about the Galileo affair, namely the controversy which began with the condemnation of 1633 and continues to our own day; here the interpretation of Pierre Duhem would serve as an instructive case study.

William Fortenbaugh

Quintilian 6.2: *ethos* and *pathos* and the ancient tradition

After discussing the peroration to judicial speeches (6.1), Quintilian proposes to study emotional response. His reasons for doing so are straightforward: emotions are fundamental to the peroration (6.2.1) and their nature is not simple (*eorum non simplex natura* 6.2.2), so that the orator will benefit from a thorough analysis. In many ways the study itself is also straightforward. Introductory remarks on the importance of emotions (6.2.2-7) are followed by a discussion of kinds of emotional response (6.2.8-28), and that in turn is followed by a consideration of how an orator can arouse emotion in himself (6.2.29-36). But if the general outline of the study is clear, details are often puzzling. This is especially true of Quintilian's use of earlier sources, both in regard to the nature of emotional response and for setting out the best means of arousing emotion in the orator himself. The latter case has recently been the subject of a thoughtful discussion by Pieter Schrijvers; the former has been discussed as part of a larger study of *ethos* and *pathos* by Christopher Gill. Much of what Gill has to say is certainly correct. I am, however, unhappy with the claim that the distinction between *ethos* and *pathos* reported by Quintilian "is not based on any psychological theory". I want to offer a correction by focusing on the ancient tradition (*sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus* 6.2.8) to which Quintilian refers at the beginning of his analysis of emotional response. In particular, I want to argue that degree of difference is important for distinguishing between kinds of emotion and that Peripatetics after Aristotle offered such an analysis. I also want to suggest that using the term *ethos* as a label for milder emotions is not as wrong-headed as it appears at first reading. For Peripatetics treated *eunoia* (*caritas*) as an emotion, and *eunoia* is an important ingredient in ethical persuasion. The orator exhibits it, and the audience returns it. It seems, then, that the ancient tradition introduced by Quintilian is in some important ways Peripatetic. But having said that I want to make clear that the tradition need not derive directly from an early Peripatetic like Theophrastus. Quintilian may have it from a later source.

P. France

QUINTILIAN AND ROUSSEAU

This paper is offered to the Quintilian sub-section of the conference, but it is devoted principally to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile. The Institutio is more than a treatise on rhetoric; it offers a broader vision of the education of a Roman citizen. The Emile presents itself - in its subtitle - as a treatise on education, but it presents a global vision of human nature and human possibilities. While Rousseau does not set out specifically to propose a new philosophical rhetoric to replace the traditional discipline, he returns repeatedly to questions of sociability, in which a non-formal rhetoric is implicit. The aim of this paper, taking the Institutio as a point of comparison, is to explore how the Emile might be seen as proposing a rhetoric for a free man - and perhaps a free woman? - in the modern world.

David Foster

"In a Drop of Dew": Classical Analogies in the Discourse of English Natural Religion

The theologians and early scientists who formulated the arguments of seventeenth century English "natural religion" (e.g. members of the Royal Society, "physico-theologians" and Boyle lecturers) are studied most often as pioneers of the new science or as forerunners of the Deist school. But their presentation of a central tenet of their religion--the belief in natural evidences of divine providence--is based upon deeply traditional arguments. Recent scholarship has focused on their strategies for defending a rational faith. But it does not sufficiently recognize how strongly these proponents of "rational religion" actually relied on traditional figurative strategies to ground their arguments. Nor has it been noted how thoroughly these figurative strategies are shaped by--often drawn directly from--classical sources.

The logical structure of the apologetics of English natural religion is augmented by a strong analogical dimension. Influenced by Bacon's assertion in *De Augmentis* that "the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination with observations and images, to second reason," the natural theologians relied on analogical strategies for appeals to imagination to reinforce their readers' acceptance of providential design in nature. I want to focus particularly on their habitual recourse to analogies of natural teleology drawn from classical texts. Teleological metaphors, drawn from Plato through Zeno and the early Stoics to Cicero's later writings, inform and sustain their apologetics. These analogical strategies enable the natural theologians to connect the concept of God's general providence with the idea of his special providence over natural events and forces, reinforcing their view of a deity transcendent in nature yet particularized and immediate in attributes. I want to show how direct borrowings from classical sources, particularly Cicero, emerge in the writings of such men as John Wilkins, Joseph Glanvill, John Ray, and Robert Boyle, who press classical metaphors of natural design drawn from Stoic tradition into use to anchor their presentation of a natural religion.

Henry Fullenwider

"Philosophical Discourse as Medicine in Lipsius' De constantia (1584)

Justus Lipsius once stated that he had written his De constantia libri duo (1584) principally to destroy the notion that philosophical letters were incompatible with literary elegance. He was, as he states in the preface ad lectorem, not unaware of those new judgements and censures he was likely to undergo in this new way of writing.

We are so keenly aware of these judgements and censures that it is not easy for us to appreciate the positive stylistic achievement Lipsius was referring to. One point of access to this achievement lies in an understanding of the medical imagery which is employed at the beginning and the end of Lipsius' masterpiece and which thus provides a stylistic frame-work for it. Not without irony, Lipsius allows himself throughout this friendly disputation to be instructed by a certain Charles Longius, whose view of the relationship between the style of philosophy and the style of philology is conveyed in an elaborate medical analogy. Understanding this analogy can help us arrive at a more objective assessment of Lipsius' understanding of rhetoric.

(I will attempt to place the analogy Philosophical Discourse = Surgical Cutting and Burning in a larger historical framework)

Rosalind J. Gabin

THE TRANSLATION OF A RHETORICAL CONCEPT: THE CASE OF ETHOS

In his recently published and finely detailed commentary on Bks. I and II of Aristotle's Rhetoric, William Grimaldi asserts (1) that ethos as Aristotle uses it is a complex term that includes the ethos of the audience along with that of the speaker; (2) that the Romans, lacking an equivalent, translated it as mores, a term which lacks the range and complexity of Aristotelian usage; and (3) that the Romans further diluted the sense of ethos by tending to conflate it with pathos. ("In its strict sense as moral character," Grimaldi concludes, "Aristotelian ethos does not appear to have been understood in the Latin tradition." [vol. II, p. 188]) I explore in this paper some of the consequences of the attenuation, through translation, of Aristotelian ethos. I conclude that its attenuation reinforces a whole series of tensions already present in Greek rhetoric but which become even more pronounced and more troublesome in Roman rhetoric: (1) the tension between moral character and playacting (between ethos and persona); (2) the tension between the flat assertion of the importance of moral principles on the one hand and the training of the schoolboy on the other in the techniques of the actor; and (3) the tension between ethical and pathetic appeal, with pathos overtaking ethos and style overtaking both ethical and logical proof. Cicero's De oratore and Orator and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria all richly attest to these double lessons in the art of rhetoric (literally these "duplicities"), as do many subsequent humanist rhetorics through the eighteenth century.

Robert N. Gaines

On the Nature of Philodemus' Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ὑποδηματικῶν

For nearly a century, the standard account of Philodemus' rhetorical corpus has been as follows: Philodemus wrote a short work, Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ὑποδηματικῶν, for circulation among a narrow circle of friends. This work defended the position of Zeno, Philodemus' teacher at the Epicurean school in Athens, proposing that sophistic rhetoric was an art according to the chief Epicurean authorities. A copy of the work came into the hands of an Epicurean at Rhodes, who, taking the text to be Zeno's and its stance to be heterodoxical, wrote a polemical response. The polemic found its way to Philodemus, who replied in a large work, Περὶ ῥητορικῆς. (See, e.g., Sudhaus 1895, 1896, Hubbell 1920, Tait 1941, Kennedy 1963.)

In this paper I reject the received view of Philodemus' Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ὑποδηματικῶν and propose an alternative interpretation. The received view is implausible for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with Philodemus' own explanation of the controversy which preceded Περὶ ῥητορικῆς. In Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, book 2, Philodemus clearly states that the controversy arose when Epicurean students carried reports of Zeno's position from Athens to Rhodes (151 B LII 11-153 B LIII 14 [Longo Auricchio]). Of course, it has been insisted by Sudhaus that Philodemus' explanation of the controversy makes reference to a certain ὑποδηματικῶν in response to which the Rhodian is to have composed his polemic (1895 [Philologus 54]: 83-84). But Sudhaus' claim is based on textual conjectures that must be ruled out in light of Longo Auricchio's reexamination of the papyrological materials which bear on the passage at issue (165 [Pherc. 1672] B₁ VIII 30-167 B₁ IX 7). Second, the received view of Philodemus' ὑποδηματικῶν finds no support in the work itself. In fact, the text furnishes not a hint of Zeno's controversial doctrine that sophistic rhetoric is an art, this despite more than twenty references to sophistic rhetoric and sophistic rhetorical instruction (II 199 fr. X; 200 fr. XIII, fr. XIV; 217 XIII 8-9; 219 XV 1-2; 234 XXXV 6; 235 XXXV 14; 240 XXXIX 18; 243 XLI 26-27; 247 XLIV 18; 250 XLVI 23-24; 251 XLVII 7-8, 26; 252 XLVII 32, XLVIII 5; 256 IIIA 6, 27; 258 Va 4; 259 Va 20; 260 VIa 16-17; 261 VIIa 20-21, 267 XIIa 4; 278 fr. XXb; 280 fr. I; 299 fr. VI [Sudhaus]).

Rather than a departure from orthodox Epicureanism, Philodemus' ὑποδηματικῶν seems to be a continuation of Epicurean dogma in regard to rhetoric. The work is generally coherent with what is known of the rhetorical views of Epicurus, Hermarchus, and Metrodorus (concerning these views, see Longo Auricchio 1985). It is also similar in doctrine to the position expressed by the conservative Epicurean whose polemic inspired response from Philodemus in Περὶ ῥητορικῆς (see, e.g., 155 B LIV 10-159 B LVI 17 [Longo Auricchio]). Thus, it seems best to interpret the work as a brief and intentionally uncontroversial summary of Epicurean rhetorical doctrine. To the extent that this interpretation is acceptable, it supplements our knowledge of rhetorical thought among early Epicureans and assists our comprehension of traditional and innovative features in Philodemus' Περὶ ῥητορικῆς.

Perrine Galand-Hallyn

Sterilis materia: Pline l'Ancien entre sécheresse scientifique et fécondité rhétorique.

Dans la Préface de l'Histoire Naturelle, Pline l'Ancien affirme son intention de pratiquer une rhétorique de la transparence, dépourvue des "fleurs" habituelles, et donc adaptée au "sujet stérile" qu'est la description de la "vie" même. Il se trouve alors confronté aux mêmes difficultés que connaîtront les écrivains théologiens: comment concilier transmission référentielle et effacement des signifiants, avec l'irrésistible tentation narcissique que porte en elle, par essence toute entreprise descriptive. Le langage "scientifique", comme le langage théologique, doit fuir l'"idolâtrie". Il s'agit de voir comment Pline remplit le contrat qu'il s'est proposé à lui-même, sans renoncer au statut d'écrivain, et comment la fécondité même d'une certaine rhétorique trouve naturellement sa place dans la destinée scientifique de son oeuvre.

F. G. Gale

Reprising the Platonic-Sophistic Debate: Modern Jurisprudence

The intellectual revolt that occurred in Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. is still an event of importance in the Western world. The debate between Plato and his followers on the one hand, and the Sophists on the other, reflects a philosophical shift of interest from divine phenomena to human affairs, a shift that was evident foremost in a preoccupation with the nature of reality and its relation to sensible phenomena. The relative importance of the appearance of things and events in contradistinction to their abstract "reality" was the central concern of the sophists. This view of the world, typified by the philosophy of Protagoras, leads to an ethics of relativism and to legal realism, the view that the interpretation of laws is a pragmatic, situational concern deeply involved with social practices and economic interests. Opposing it is the philosophy of Plato that there are absolute standards and unvarying truths transcending sensible reality. The former view is primarily reflected today in the writings of neo-pragmatists like Richard Rorty, and the latter in the writings of rationalists like Jürgen Habermas and essentialists like Noam Chomsky. In between lie the anti-philosophical strategy of the deconstructionists and the approach of social constructionism, two views of language that themselves are deeply opposed over the issue of whether it is possible for language to represent reality. The modern venue has largely shifted from perception to language, but it fundamentally contains the same issue as the Platonists and sophists argued twenty-four centuries ago. The current debate over legal interpretation takes the same form: whether there can be a transcendent system of interpretation, a hermeneutic that can systematize legal decisions, or whether, to the contrary, no such system is possible. Some recent scholarship, by C.H. Knoblauch among others, suggests a resurgence of interest in the sophistic teachings as a way out of the *aporeia* induced by heavy doses of poststructuralism and social constructionism. In examining the role of sophists and sophistic writings in the development of the Greek legal system during the critical last half of the fifth century and the fourth century B.C., I note two major philosophical views, and an emerging third view, which I would characterize as the most modern. Edward Hussey calls these the negative, skeptical view—exemplified by Parmenides and Zeno—and the positive, humanistic view—exemplified by Gorgias and Hippias. Untersteiner reads Hippias hermeneutically, finding a "reconciliation of the two themes of historical dialectic." The third view is the social compact theory implied by Protagoras, and by Socrates in his defence of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*, and later clarified by Lycophron and Aristotle. Despite the opposition of Platonic philosophy, under the influence of the sophists, written discourse came to dominate oral discourse in Athenian courts, and this influence is reflected in modern commercial and forensic practices.

Mary M. Garrett

Chinese Responses to Indian Dialectical Disputation

In this paper I will examine the Chinese reception of Indian methods of argumentation and disputation. Indian philosophical argument typically involved debates on metaphysical theses, which proceeded by means of strict and well-developed sequences of syllogistic deduction; in Aristotelean terms it was a form of dialectic. These methods of disputation were brought into China by Indian Buddhist monks from roughly 100 to 700 C.E. These monks also translated Indian tracts on disputation and on logic.

Although Buddhism came to dominate Chinese culture, dialectical argumentation did not. It remained restricted mainly to Buddhist monasteries, and even here it did not retain its original nature. On the one hand, it ossified into a ritualized system of questions appended to lectures; on the other, it metamorphosed into the anti-logical system of Chan (Japanese Zen) meditation.

Contact with Indian Buddhist monks did inspire more rigorous debate among Chinese literati. However, this did not mean that they adopted its strict deductive reasoning. Instead, they became more careful, subtle, and discriminating in their use of the traditional non-dialectical types of arguments (such as example, historical example, analogy, appeal to authorities, consequences, and even citation of poetry).

I will conclude by asking why dialectical argumentation was not perceived as useful, valuable, or even particularly interesting by most educated members of Chinese society. I will suggest that the psychological need for certainty which dialectic satisfies was already met in China by resort to other sources, primarily the appeal to experience as encapsulated in history. This meant that in most cases the impetus needed to master this demanding form of discourse would not be generated or sustained.

Eugene Garver

Growing Older and Wiser with Aristotle: *Rhetoric* II.12-14

The three chapters from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on youth, old age, and the prime of life are a microcosm of two central problems of interpreting the *Rhetoric*. The description of the times of life seen in several respects to echo the account of growing up offered by Callicles against Socrates in the *Gorgias*, in which moral education consists in giving up philosophy for business, trading in nobility for utility. The description of the times of life in the *Rhetoric* also seems in important respects to differ from the accounts of moral education in Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*. It is my thesis that the *Rhetoric* presents a *natural*, as opposed to an *ethical*, description of the stages of life, thus deepening our understanding of the way the moral virtues are, as Aristotle, says, neither natural nor contrary to nature.

Because of the similarities and differences between *Rhetoric* II.12-14 and the *Gorgias* on the one hand and the *Ethics* and *Politics* on the other, these three chapters consequently offer the opportunity, first, to construct a hypothesis about the relation connection between Aristotle's rhetorical project and the sophistic initiative, especially in its moral dimensions, symbolized by Callicles. In addition, they also provide opportunity for formulating a relationship between the Aristotle's art of rhetoric and his sciences of ethics and politics with regard to the fundamental ethical, political, and rhetorical problem of moral education.

Jesse M. Gellrich

The Rhetoric of the Page: Between Orality and Writing
in Medieval Illuminated Manuscripts

Since the art of eloquence in the middle ages is available to us only in written form, scholarship has been well aware of the difficulties of appreciating its relation to oral tradition (Stock, Ong). But, recent work on illuminated manuscripts of the Romanesque and Gothic periods (Camille) provides an opportunity for breaking through this impasse. As the illuminated page was developed in a society still on the margins of oral custom, it offers unique evidence for the "vocal" and "audible" form of dictation, inscription, reading, and preaching. The art and inscription of the page have direct bearing on understanding the relation of rhetoric to oral and written traditions in the later middle ages. The iconography of rhetorica and preaching is an obvious representation of the oral context of the discipline. But even more compelling evidence is available in other characteristics of illumination, such as the relation between decoration and inscription, image and text, voice and letter, page and marginalia. The borders separating these elements became the focus of intense interactions between vocal and literate skills, and they develop into elaborate strategies of overlapping and borrowing between the two modes of speaking and writing. Insofar as such borrowing of skills corresponds to one of the oldest capacities of rhetoric, the illuminated page has a "rhetoric" of its own. It consists not simply in the depiction of speech acts, but much more emphatically in the interplay between oral and written conventions of communicating. This conclusion qualifies three different opinions which have been assumed in both art history and literary scholarship of the middle ages: 1) that the art of rhetoric was largely a fossilized form (Curtius); 2) that it was subordinated to other disciplines of the trivium (McKeon); and 3) that it disappeared into "textuality" (Vance). To the contrary, the art of the medieval book invites a new appreciation of the vitality of rhetoric as reflected by the viva voce of illumination and inscription toward the end of manuscript culture in the West.

Michelle W. Gellrich

"The Spell of Persuasion: Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece"

The battle between rhetoric and philosophy in classical Greece may be fruitfully situated within a context that has received scant attention, namely, primitive ideas about the magical efficacy of speech. Ancient views of persuasion are closely bound up with charisma, with the physical allure of oral performance. Thus, the libidinal bond (eros) provides the earliest model for persuasion as a force generated by the speaking body, which constitutes itself as an object of desire, and as such has the power to lead the souls of the listeners. The somatic basis of early views of persuasion is integrally tied with the Platonic critique of poetry and rhetoric, which is essentially a critique of enchantment. Though scholars of orality such as Ong (Orality and Literacy) and Havelock (Preface to Plato) have suggested as much, they do not go far in explaining how the creation of a coherent idea of magic in the Western world is enmeshed with the persuasive logos and with the self-definition of philosophy.

I propose to approach these ideas through a reading of Gorgias' Encomium on Helen, which offers a perspective on magic of great interest for reinterpreting the battle between philosophy and rhetoric initiated by Plato. This work suggests an important linkage between the enchanting power of persuasion, commonly called goeteia in Greek and used persistently by Gorgias to describe the logos, and the goes. In prehistoric Greece, the power to lead the soul via techniques of language is associated with the goes, literally, "the howler," a kind of shaman presiding over ritual of the dead. An entrepreneur of great prestige in the community, the goes negotiates the boundary between body and soul, the visible and the invisible, by leading the deceased to their place of rest and reinstating stability in the social group. Salient among his strategies is incantation, which "binds" the subjects over whom he assumes control. While the details of such rituals are lost to us, Gorgias helps us track some of the fundamental continuities between the psychopompic activity of the primitive soul-man and his latter-day competitors--the orator and the philosopher. The Encomium on Helen provides an angle from which we can appreciate in a new way the ancient battle between leaders of the soul who are morphologically related to the goes and who vie for his prerogatives at the same time as they redefine them.

Joan Gibson

The Dialectic of *The Whore's Rhetoric*

The purpose of this paper is to raise a series of questions about attitudes toward women's language in Renaissance rhetorical practice. Renaissance writers of advice books to women and humanist authors of literature regarding women's education, almost to a man, seek to bar women from the study of logic and rhetoric, and even severely curtail the allowable kinds of grammar study. Predictably, rhetorical theory does not expand on women's speech, but much information can be gleaned from a variety of Renaissance works focussing on the language arts. Although I include material from logics and early vernacular grammars, I will concentrate on Renaissance dialogues in which there are specific discussions of women and language. An especially important subset of these dialogues are those whose speakers are all women. It is striking that the (male) authors of these dialogues concentrate almost exclusively on the moral viciousness of women and their linguistic duplicity. In this respect, a tradition of dialogues using prostitutes as speakers is particularly illustrative. While its antecedents lie with Lucian, notable Renaissance examples are found in the dialogues of Aretino and in Ferrante Fallavicino's 1642 dialogue *La rettorica della puttane*. An anonymous Restoration adaptation in English, *A Whore's Rhetorick Calculated to the Meridian of London and conform'd to the Rules of Art* (1683), self-consciously follows the Renaissance model and develops the theme of women's speech most explicitly. The work consists of dialogues in which an old whore attempts to attract a young girl into her profession. The work plays both with the art of deceiving men with false words, emotions, and actions and with the deceit being practiced on a gullible new recruit, as well as with parodies of contemporary rhetorical practice.

Completely inverting Cicero's description of the orator, it reinforces the well known injunction to women to remain chaste, silent, and obedient by portraying what women have to say as licentious, pretentious, loquacious, and subversive. Given the frequent discussion of issues of language, decorum and virtuous action in Renaissance dialogues from *The Courtier* onward, as well as Renaissance rationales for elevating rhetoric over logic, the satires of language debates couched in terms of women of the streets are all the more notable. These prostitute dialogues are in especially marked contrast to the Christian/Platonic dialogue tradition in which women educate and elevate the male participants, whether the women derive from the possibly mythic Diotima or the long line of authoritative, allegorical, maidens initiated by Boethius' Lady Philosophy.

I wish first of all simply to document the complexity of roles assigned to women speakers in texts on the language arts. Secondly I highlight particular issues arising when women are fitted into rhetorical roles; specifically: the relation of the speaker and audience within the dialogue; the relation of a dialogue and the audience for which it is intended; the relation of art and virtue for women; the elision of public and private through equation of courtiers and courtesans; and the use of specific rhetorical figures.

Andr  Goddu

Copernicus's Argumentative Strategies in *De Revolutionibus*
in Light of 15th-Century Cracovian Rhetoric and Dialectic

The proposed paper will provide a summary of research to be conducted in 1991 in the archives of the University of Krak w. The research will focus on developments in logic, rhetoric, and dialectic that seem to have influenced Copernicus in developing the argumentative strategies that appeared in Book I of *De Revolutionibus*. Copernicus's principal argument against Ptolemaic geocentrism and his principal argument in behalf of heliocentrism were the result of innovative applications of a doctrine of implication that was developed and held by a number of philosophers at Krak w in the fifteenth century, or so the hypothesis suggests. The research will survey a number of authors and the paper will present the hypothesis and a summary of the results.

David Goslee

Newman's Subversive Rhetoric: Whately Made Radical

Dena Goodman

"The Parisian Salon: The Well-Governed Space of Enlightenment Sociability"

In the eighteenth century, "salon" referred to a type of room found in homes influenced by trendy Italian design concepts. The salon was a newly-defined public area in the private homes of the elite, both noble and non-noble, in urban Paris. When we speak of salons today, we tend to refer to what went on in these architectural spaces: the regular and regulated gatherings of men of letters under the guidance of women and whose purpose was the exchange and distribution of discourse, both spoken (conversation) and written (letters, manuscripts, newsletters, poems), and both (readings). Indeed, we have taken the word "salon" to mean any gathering that fits these criteria, even if it took place in another room. What the eighteenth-century referred to as "dinners" we call "salons." In the eighteenth century, most "salons" actually took place in dining rooms.

The Enlightenment salon was a social and intellectual space articulated in a discourse that was regulated by the one person who could be both inside the room and outside the discourse because of her social and intellectual status and formation: the *salonnière*. The *salonnière* governed salon discourse according to principles that were at once epistemological, political, and aesthetic. In this paper I intend to expose these principles with reference to texts by and about the three major *salonnières* of the high Enlightenment: Mme Geoffrin, Mlle de Lespinasse, and Mme Necker. For if the Parisian salon was more of a discursive space than a physical one, a space that could be located in a dining room as easily as in a salon, then the person who ordered the words into pleasing and useful harmonies, who was responsible for achieving the balance that was the goal of conversation was the *salonnière*.

Apart from the analysis of persuasion implicit in John Henry Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, this master rhetorician has left us no coherent body of theory. Yet his most influential mentor at Oxford was also the most famous rhetorician of his day, Richard Whately. Newman contributed to his *Logic* and, as McKerrow has shown, wrote an early precis of the *Rhetoric* itself. Although he remained unflinchingly generous in his praise of the man who "taught me to think for myself," his moral earnestness soon made him suspicious of Whately's intellectual breadth. When he assumed the informal leadership of the Oxford Tractarians, he tried to guide the Anglican establishment away from Whately's theological liberalism and back toward the Patristic church. In recently published letters, his strategies for mobilizing friends and followers transfer his case against Whately from religion to rhetoric. In promoting this reactionary agenda, Newman consciously replaces the more traditional advice in Whately's famous text with a radical rhetoric which looks backwards to the Old Testament prophets and forward to twentieth-century revolutionaries.

Whately's *Rhetoric*, for example, taught the aspiring apologist how to exploit burden of proof to defend the already established Anglican Church. Even at the height of the Oxford Movement, however, Newman recognized that his "true church" existed only in his own mind and in fourth-century Alexandria. Hence he substitutes the claim that he can project a transcendent cause from his own mind and heart: "to write on the assumption of a state of things . . . is the way to realize that state." For Whately's conventional advocacy of pathos he substitutes aggravation: "I am projecting then a pamphlet . . . on Church grievances, to irritate, and shall (if so) write it as rhetorically and vehemently as I can." Audiences who cannot be convinced are to be annihilated: "men are made of glass . . . the sooner we break them the better." For Whately's ethos he substitutes any role which will call attention to himself and his message: "I expect to be called a Papist when my opinions are know[n]. . . . Let me be thought extravagant, and yet be copied." Finally, for Whately's appeal to pedagogical gentleness he substitutes a rival heuristic in which confrontation becomes both the occasion and the model for writing: "Controversy is like the heat administered to [invisible] ink." Newman's unconventional rhetoric nearly established his vision of the *Via Media*: it did establish him as a reader, writer, and thinker fiercely independent of all other systems and institutions.

Rossella Granatelli

Quintiliano, *Institutio oratoria* II: struttura e problemi interpretativi.

Il secondo libro dell'*Institutio oratoria* di Quintiliano si può dividere in due parti: la prima parte (cap. 1-10) è dedicata all'elencazione e alla descrizione dei nove esercizi preliminari (*progymnasmata*) che Quintiliano ritiene debbano essere affidati all'insegnamento del retore; la seconda parte (cap. 11-21) contiene i cosiddetti *prolegomena rhetorica* cioè tutti quei problemi preliminari che non troverebbero posto nella seguente escussione delle parti della retorica, che inizia col terzo libro.

Per quanto riguarda la prima parte si tenta un raffronto con gli scrittori greci di *Progymnasmata*, con particolare riferimento ad Elio Teone, che ha in comune con Quintiliano una serie di esercizi preliminari che in seguito scompariranno dal canone dei *progymnasmata*.

Per quanto riguarda la seconda parte vengono presi in esame diversi problemi interpretativi, con particolare riguardo al cap. 15, che contiene una serie di definizioni di retorica di autori greci e latini precedenti a Quintiliano, da Gorgia fino ai suoi giorni: in particolare c'è la possibilità di ricostruire un frammento finora sconosciuto del *Grillo* di Aristotele, con l'aiuto della comparazione con gli autori raccolti da H. Rabe in *Rhetores Graeci* XIV *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, Lipsiae 1931.

S. K. Grantham

Gender Socialization of the Interlocutor in the *Phaedrus*

In the *Phaedrus*, the character of Phaedrus is "turned" by Socrates in such a way as to suggest a socialization as Other, a socialization based on distinctions or attributes of gender. Such socialization has been described in recent feminist psychological theory, particularly that of Mary Belenky et al's in *Women's Ways of Knowing*. Textual evidence indicates that Phaedrus undergoes a socialization much like that of the women described in this study; he begins in a position or a way of knowing which might be described as "received knowing," in which position knowers hear the voices of others, and subordinate their actions to symbolic representations of the good that they are able to hear in the voices of others. Moral language in this position consists of "should" and "ought" and is based in sharp dichotomies of right and wrong, leader and follower. Socrates appears to be moving Phaedrus toward the position of "procedural knowledge," which Belenky et al describe as the point at which the knower achieves an uneasy balance between the "inner voice" and the voice of authority, compromising to acquire the procedures necessary to advance one's own voice in the outer world. Socrates himself would appear to be firmly esconced in this position, hence his repeated expressions of self-doubt and his calling on the voice of his muse. What both Socrates and Phaedrus apparently miss is the position described by Belenky et al as "constructed knowledge"-- all knowledge is constructed, and the knower is an intimate part of the known. This position echoes the recent paradigm shifts in Western thought, and in rhetoric and composition theory--described by Richard Rorty and David Bleich among others--shifts characterized by an emphasis on the subjective, not objective, nature of knowledge. This reading of the *Phaedrus* suggests that in seeking what Plato/Socrates might characterize as the "good" or the "truth" of our profession, as rhetoricians we can never stop questioning the structures by which we know the good or the truth, whether they are provided by individuals or communities. No matter what the "reading" given--formalist, feminist, Marxist, new historical--we must always ask ourselves who and what may be privileged by such a reading. Only by continually stretching awareness, a conscious shifting of viewpoint and a recognition of subjectivity, can we hope to meaningfully "construct" the connections which have always characterized rhetoric as a vital field.

S. Michael Halloran

THE USE OF QUINTILIAN IN HUGH BLAIR'S
LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND BELLES LETTRES

Alan G. Gross

Rhetoric of Science without Constraints

McGuire and Melia's moderate view of rhetoric of science is of the kind that seems generally to prevail. They accept the importance of rhetoric in getting science across, even to scientists. But they stop short where scientific knowledge begins: epistemologically, they defer to science. Reasonably so: is there a cognitive enterprise in the West, or anywhere, that is more successful? Nevertheless I argue that McGuire and Melia are mistaken, that there is no line that can be successfully drawn between rhetoric and scientific knowledge. Further, I contend that the Burkean "recalcitrance" they espouse to ground their realism explains nothing about science; worse, it adds unnecessarily to the burden of explanation. Finally, I maintain an apparent paradox: if there is a case against a radical rhetorical stance, a case in McGuire and Melia's favor, it is best discovered by means of the radical rhetorical analysis they abjure.

What are the stakes in this intellectual debate? By means of the rhetorical analysis of the hard sciences--biology, chemistry, and physics--rhetoric of inquiry inserts itself into the inner sanctum of epistemological and ontological privilege. If no aspect of these sciences is proof against this analysis, the case for the rhetorical construction of all knowledge is immeasurably strengthened.

Standard treatments of the eighteenth-century Scottish rhetorics emphasize their discontinuity with classical rhetoric. W. S. Howell's influential Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric, for example, states flatly that "British writers of rhetoric in the second half of the eighteenth century regarded Ciceronian rhetoric as an anachronism," (p. 44), and goes on to articulate the idea of a "New Rhetoric" rooted in philosophical empiricism and French belletrism. According to Howell's analysis, this New Rhetoric is exemplified in the lectures and treatises of Adam Smith, George Campbell, David Hume, John Lashson, Joseph Priestley, Hugh Blair, and John Witherspoon. While recognizing the substantial differences among these writers, Howell sees them as unified in their opposition to classical rhetoric. His emphasis on this disjunction has become a commonplace of scholarship on eighteenth-century rhetoric.

My paper will explore the contrary idea that the New Rhetoricians of eighteenth-century Scotland drew significantly on the tradition of classical rhetoric. I will focus specifically on citations of Quintilian in Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), a work that was influential in both Great Britain and America. My object is not to overturn the standard view of Blair and the other "New Rhetoricians," but to correct an overemphasis on their anti-classicism. Blair was clearly learned in Roman rhetoric, and he expected students to understand and value it. To appreciate both Blair's Lectures and their influence, we must understand his affinities with classical rhetoric as well as his departures from it.

This paper emerges from two larger projects: an edition of Blair's Lectures which I am preparing with a colleague for publication by Southern Illinois University Press, and a study of the rhetorical tradition in American higher education and culture. It is motivated in part by a desire to understand how Blair's supposedly anti-classical Lectures could become the most commonly used rhetoric text in American colleges during the early decades of the nineteenth century, when neo-classicism was an important intellectual and political force. While my paper will emphasize the narrow question of how Blair used Quintilian in his Lectures, it will also consider broader issues of how Roman rhetoric was being appropriated in British and American culture during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Fernand Hallyn

Castelvetro sur la métaphore: entre Aristote et la Nouvelle Rhétorique

En situant l'analyse consacrée par Castelvetro à la métaphore dans son commentaire de la Poétique d'Aristote par rapport aux autres commentaires italiens du XVIII^{ème} siècle (Daniello, Minturno, etc.), il s'agit, d'une part, de montrer l'originalité et la cohérence de son propos. Il s'agit également, d'autre part, de montrer comment sa conception préfigure, au fond, des avancées et des impasses que l'on retrouve dans la Nouvelle Rhétorique, notamment chez le Groupe *J*.

Stina Hansson

A LANGUAGE FOR THE SOUL: RHETORIC, DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE AND ROMANTICISM

The procedures and practices embedded in the language of devotional literature from the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth century Europe are strongly indebted to classical rhetorical theory but still to be seen as a literary model for the 'new sensibility' in secular literature of the eighteenth century, as well as for the ways of describing the emotions of an individual and the 'landscapes of the soul' in Romanticism. The devotional texts thus, by affording literary models that could be transformed for a new use, bridged the gap between, on the one hand, the official, hierarchically organized secular literature from the Renaissance up to the middle of the eighteenth century, and on the other hand, the private, intimate and individual ways of expressing emotions which can be found in secular literature from that time and onwards. The devotional texts gained these transgressive powers not by opposing the rules of classical rhetoric but in its attempts to make them correspond with the special needs of the practice of Christian devotion: in the adaptation of the texts for individual reading and meditating, in transforming speaker and audience into an "I" exhorting his own soul, in depicting the religious 'facts' by means of the emotions roused by them, and in the early literary use of familiar language.

The paper is to present some of the results of a work on Swedish devotional literature, which, for the greatest part, was translated from German and other European languages: the results would therefore be applicable to other literatures as well.

John T. Harwood

Robert Boyle and Rhetorical Theory

Although Robert Boyle (1627-1691) was one of the major figures of Restoration science, only half of his voluminous writings focus on scientific topics. His non-scientific works deal most often with religious and philosophical subjects, but before he was twenty-five, he also wrote a religious romance (The Martyrdom of Theodora), a substantive analysis of style (The Style of Scripture), and a guide to meditation (Occasional Reflections). The connections between Boyle's philosophical and scientific writings are particularly intriguing: both interests are centrally concerned with the possibilities and perils of rhetoric. His comments on rhetorical theory persist throughout his career, and considered as a body of discourse, his notions about scientific communication deserve far more prominence, say, than those of Thomas Sprat, whose History of the Royal Society (1667) is in many ways unrepresentative of the actual discourse community it purports to describe. For Boyle, science writing and writing science were separate but related topics.

In this presentation I draw on my research in the Boyle papers preserved in the Royal Society (London). Having recently an edition of his early writings, The Early Essays and Ethics of Robert Boyle (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, forthcoming), I illuminate Boyle's theory of discourse with examples of his own composing process, preserved in the successive drafts of his published and unpublished works. I also consider the numerous comments about rhetoric with which he prefaces many of his published works. Since I have also discovered a partial inventory of his library, I can place Boyle's theory of discourse within the rhetorical traditions of his century.

This approach to Boyle places in a new context his interest in communication and his subsequent achievements in natural philosophy.

Judith Rice Henderson

Familiar Tully: Cicero's Letters in Sixteenth-Century Education

The imitation of Cicero's letters had become a humanist fashion by the late fifteenth century. Angelo Poliziano thought it had gone too far. He criticized the "Ciceronian" letters that Paolo Cortesi sent him and defended the variety and eclecticism of his own epistolary style. Desiderius Erasmus admired Poliziano's letters and agreed with his views. Erasmus objected to extremists who insisted that all letters be written in the same style: brief, clear, unadorned. In classical theory the letter was a genre of sermo or conversation. In the medieval ars dictaminis, on the other hand, it was a miniature oration, divided into parts and ornamented with rhetorical figures and prose rhythm. Fifteenth-century Italian textbooks modified the ars dictaminis by correcting barbarous Latin and by paying lip service to the classical definition of the letter as a conversation between absent friends. At the same time, they classified letters by their arguments—exhortation, admonition, congratulation, consolation, petition, recommendation, accusation, defense, and so on—and incorporated into their precepts the riches of such rediscovered rhetorics as Cicero's Orator, Brutus, and De oratore and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria. "Ciceronian" extremists rejected this instruction and attempted to reduce Renaissance letter-writing to familiar conversation. By the time he read Poliziano's letters, Erasmus had already drafted a thorough rhetoric of letter-writing, describing the topics of invention and the order of disposition the student should use in persuading the correspondent. When he revised this textbook, he argued that letters cannot be reduced to one style. Invoking the principle of decorum, he observed that letters treat an infinite variety of subjects and are written under many different circumstances and to many different personalities. Their stylistic variety must therefore be infinite. Indeed, this variety itself defines the letter and distinguishes it from the book, whose style is fixed by its learned public audience. In support of his argument, he cited the example of Cicero himself, whose letters are far from artless, often persuade, and indeed sometimes rise to impassioned argument.

Erasmus' Opus de conscribendis epistolis was published in 1522, his Ciceronianus in 1528. Many northern humanists found Erasmus' textbook on letter-writing essential, yet they disagreed with his position in the Ciceronian controversy. They thought that Latin should be taught through imitation of Cicero and his immediate contemporaries rather than through the broad program of reading that Erasmus advocated. This was increasingly true as the content of education grew more narrow under the pressures of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The solution to the dilemma in which many sixteenth-century educators found themselves was to build on Erasmus' argument. If Cicero had written letters on every subject and in every style, he alone could serve as a model for the student who wished to learn grammar and rhetoric through the exercise of letter-writing. They therefore edited and analyzed for use in the schools those letters of Cicero that could best serve as models for the humanist letter-writer, for instance, Cicero's self-defense to Lentulus or his petition to Luccius to celebrate his achievements. This "Erasmian Ciceronianism," I shall argue, led to a distorted reading of Cicero. Humanist letter-writing was not so much modelled on Cicero as Cicero was molded to humanist letter-writing.

Martha L. Henning

The Faculty Psychology of George Campbell
as Reflected in Nineteenth-Century American Women's Fiction

George Campbell opens his Philosophy of Rhetoric explaining that eloquence is "intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will." He adds, "we do not argue to gain barely the assent of the understanding, but, which is infinitely more important, the consent of the will." Several modern historians of rhetoric have demonstrated the impact of Campbell's ideas on nineteenth-century American universities; likewise, Campbell's thought informed the rhetorical tradition underlying the period's popular literature.

Campbell's philosophy manifests itself in 1850's American popular women's literature in two respects. First, the concept often appears thematically. Presented with some obstacle, the heroine gathers an understanding of the situation, uses her imagination, and conquers her passions or emotions to influence her own or another's will. Second, nineteenth-century American woman authors characteristically appealed to a multifaceted concept of human being, urging their readership to change their lives and/or shape the national ethic. The practice predicts Paulo Freire's concept that discourse comprises "naming reality and changing reality." Analyzing these works in conjunction with Campbell's philosophy of rhetoric urges us to value literature beyond our mere understanding of it.

Susan Hiner

ABSTRACT: LA NOUVELLE ALLEGORIQUE : MILITARY TACTICS IN THE WAR OF THE WORDS

The seventeenth century marks a turning point in the evolution of the idea of literature in France. With the founding in 1635 of the Académie française, whose project was to codify the French language by writing its dictionary, literary and linguistic reflection becomes a state-funded institution for the first time. This new object of analysis thus occupies a central place in the thought and literature of the century and gives rise to a self-criticism in the attempt to define Literature. Antoine Furetière's Nouvelle Allégorique ou Histoire des Derniers troubles arrivés au Royaume d'Eloquence, published in 1658, addresses this intellectual preoccupation. The struggle that precedes the birth of a national identity of Literature is given a narrative structure in the allegorical war that forms the novella's plot.

The central conceit of this multi-dimensional text is an esthetic debate in the guise of an allegorical war. This text belongs to literary history as it represents, in fictional form, the literary figures of the era as well as their interaction in the series of "querelles" that so mark French intellectual history of the seventeenth century. It also serves as a sort of rhetorical treatise, even a dictionary, which, under the veil of fiction, catalogs and defines the figures of discourse. Finally, it is a satire that pits the pédants against the éloquents, whose fortress is the Académie. The satire is ambiguous, however: no one truly escapes, because eloquence and pedantry share the same elements. I would like to propose to read this much-neglected text in terms of these multiple roles, by which analysis I hope to discover the notion of Literature that emerges in the work of Furetière and in his portrait of the rhetorical climate of the era.

Hanns Hohmann

CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ROMAN LAW

In the ongoing debate about the significance of classical rhetoric for the argumentation of Roman jurists, classical philologists have tended to be receptive to the idea of such a connection between disciplines, while legal historians have been more inclined to minimize or deny outright what many of them perceive to be an alien or even pernicious influence.

But arguments based on letter and intent of normative texts are undeniably present in juristic writings, and efforts to prove that the jurisprudential understanding of this legal status is significantly different from the rhetorical one are based on a selective reading of the rhetorical sources. Attempts to argue for the absence of the other three status legales (ambiguity, contradictory laws, and analogy) from the absence of specific rhetorical terminology fail to consider the important distinction between rhetorical theory and applied rhetoric.

However, even if such arguments were to succeed, they would still fail to serve their apparent underlying purpose of showing that Roman law was free from rhetoric in the sense of probable and audience-dependent, as opposed to certain and absolutely objective arguments. Classical rhetoric could provide an appropriate framework for the analysis of Roman law even if Roman jurists had not internalized rhetoric as a conceptual foundation of their work.

Leigh Holmes

Protorhetoric in Theory to Rhetoric in History:
Focus upon Locke

Rhetorical patterns are discoverable within social contract and social covenant theories. Such patterns can be usefully thought of as protorhetorical. Protorhetoric is defined as that rhetoric which can be deduced from theory and which is associated with a social stability linked to persuasion in theory as compared to expressions of its ideas in real life discourse. In Lockean theory, it is a rhetoric of logic and of in-depth appeal, as pristine institutions are seen formed in relation to one another within a discourse environment bolstered by confidence in the possibility of human understanding.

One identifies qualities of optimism and compelling metaphors in the protorhetoric of Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and in his Second Treatise on Civil Government. The tropes of his protorhetoric became historically useful in the play of power which developed between the British monarchical system and the American colonial revolutionary congresses.

The features of Lockean protorhetoric and Lockean historic rhetoric are explored in my essay. Early on, master tropes are examined in Locke's two masterworks. Then representative historic texts using Lockean language are studied. Included is Samuel West's 1776 election sermon, which mentions Locke and makes use of natural law theory. Characterizations of protorhetoric and rhetoric are identified in the conclusion.

Winifred Bryan Horner

THE ENDS OF RHETORIC

In English studies, we speak of the "end of rhetoric" in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries (Murphy, Kennedy, and others). It was at this period that rhetoric with its traditional terminology disappears from the college curricula in Scotland, England and the United States. In this paper, I shall begin by exploring some of the reasons for this phenomenon. The larger part of the paper, however, will look at the disciplines that arose directly from the old rhetoric. I will trace in detail through lectures and student notes this progression, particularly as it initially took place in Scotland and in the United States. I will demonstrate how psychology, "the study of the mind," evolved out of the rhetoric course of Alexander Bain at the University of Aberdeen, how criticism and the study of English literature evolved out of the rhetoric and belles lettres course of Edward Edmonstone Aytoun at the University of Aberdeen, and how "composition" was developing in the course of George Jardine at Glasgow. I will further explore the social and economic conditions out of which these courses evolved as explanation of why they developed where and when they did. Finally, I will explain why the composition course failed to develop in Scotland and England, and why it flourished and continues to flourish in the universities of the United States.

Lynette Hunter

Moore and Ranelagh in the Hartlib Circle

The paper will study the contributions of Dorothy Moore and Lady Ranelagh to the Hartlib Circle, 1630-1662. The concerns of the circle are relatively comprehensive, although primarily what we might call scientific. These women intervene into scientific discussions, but also into the wider issues of education, religion and politics.

I will focus on three aspects of their contributions:

The rhetoric of their writing for the primary scientific circle,

The consciousness of that rhetoric,

Their plans for the education of women to fit them for participation in this discourse of science and rhetoric.

Yoshihisa Itaba

"The Rhetorical Conflict Resolution:

The Meiji Restoration and the 1904 Okuma Doctrine"

The arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1853) divided the Japanese national consciousness into two important ideological communities. One group emphasized the importance of opening its doors to the outside world, supporting the Shogunate open-doors policy with the slogan often spelled "*Se-Asku, Ksi-koku* (Support the Shogun; Open the Country)." The other group, however, saw the Shogunate government as weakening the nation and advocated the reconstruction of the nation based on the Emperor with the slogan, "*Soo-no, Jo-i* (Revere the Emperor; Expel the Barbarians)." After a decade and a half, the Emperor was brought back to power while the nation opened its doors for foreign intercourse, which is generally called the Meiji Restoration (1868). The Restoration was an attempt to combine the above-mentioned two competing ideologies, but it, at the same time, harbored a conflict in the rhetoric of the nation, because as long as the Japanese revered the Emperor, they were "a chosen people," but once they turned their eyes to the outside superior forces through the open doors, they were "not a chosen people."

The purpose of this paper, then, is to see how this newly emerged contradiction was resolved in the national consciousness as manifest in the rhetorical discourse of the national leaders. To this end, the paper examines the Okuma Doctrine of 1904 delivered during the Russo-Japanese War, not only because Shigenobu Okuma was one of the nation's powerful leaders of the Meiji era, contributing to creating the national identity, but also because Okuma's life up to the Restoration exemplified the process of change experienced by the nation. Therefore, the paper approaches his Doctrine by employing a critical perspective of psychosocial reality; the discourse is analyzed by looking at Okuma's individual reality (i.e., psychological reality) as manifest in his biography and by observing the nation's experience (i.e., social reality). The paper, finally, concludes that this national leader's attempt to resolve the conflict resulted in Japanese militarism.

Jeroen Jansen

The Language of the Court in the Seventeenth Century Netherlands

Recent research into the stylistic features of courtly language in the German, the French, and the English Renaissance has resulted in fruitful discussions (see e.g. the proceedings of the conference on "Europäische Hofkultur im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert", organized by the 'Wolfenbütteler Arbeitskreis für Renaissanceforschung' in 1979). For various courtly circles a connection has been established between, on the one hand, the availability of such treatises as Castiglione's *Il Cortesiano* and Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie*, and, on the other hand, the (literary) style adopted in these circles, a style characterized by *grazia*, *dissimulatio*, *sprezzatura* and a copious use of tropes. The Northern Netherlands had no court comparable to that of most West European states, let alone a flourishing courtly culture. However, some leading authors held important diplomatic posts in the seventeenth century, e.g. Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, Jacob Cats and Constantijn Huygens. Of these three the poet Huygens (1596-1687) could perhaps be termed a 'courtly' poet. As secretary to three successive stadholders in the mighty province of Holland, he maintained close relations with a considerable number of West European dynasties and as a consequence communicated with politicians, scientists as well as poets.

In my paper I shall demonstrate how some prefaces, dedications, poems and letters reflect a distinct poetical theory and signal the development of what may be termed a 'courtly style' in the Netherlands. Direct (written) contacts with prominent politicians and stadholders enable one to gain new insights into the stylistic features that were required or appreciated. They also broaden our perception of the developing stylistic presentation in seventeenth century literary criticism.

Susan C. Jarratt

Athenian Democracy and Contemporary Social Struggles

The impetus for this paper is a desire to articulate a rhetorical theory and practice suited to the progressive political agendas of feminism and other struggles of oppressed minorities, not only within the United States but globally. The language surrounding the construction of the world's first democracy offers a tempting starting point because of its resonance with our own. Like today's progressive movements, the ancient Greeks argued over questions of sameness (*homonoia*) and equality (*isegoria*): how to decide who was "one of us" (part of the *dēmos*) and who was "other" (*xenos*). The "translation" of the language of classical democracy for the analysis of contemporary political situations poses a historiographical problem: attending to the differences in context.

Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* offers a careful reading of the changes in meaning of terms like public/private and political/social, showing how ancient polis-formation has been filtered through liberal political philosophy by Adam Smith as well as Karl Marx. Arendt's proposal for speaking of individual action within a narrative frame constitutes a rhetorical theory compatible with the work of some contemporary feminists struggling with questions of essence and difference. Rejecting the limitations of both philosophical essentialism and the decentered subject of poststructuralism, feminists such as Teresa de Lauretis, Gayatri Spivak, and Trinh T. Minh-ha insist on the necessity for narrating "singular histories" toward the discovery of common experiences among multiple and contradictory subjectivities in historically specified contexts. These solutions to the dilemma of developing effective political strategies (necessarily collective) while respecting differences are reminiscent of the rhetorical practice of the first sophists, who taught from the *nomoi* (custom-laws) of each city and encouraged the exploration of *dissoi logoi* (contradictory positions). Sophists as non-Athenians practicing an Athenian discourse suggest a rhetoric of territorial sensitivity and remind us of the simultaneity of sameness and multiple differences.

My conclusion is that a contemporary rhetoric of social change should focus more on space or location than on the traditional *kairos*, the timely moment, and should emphasize narrative as a central organizing principle. The speaking/writing subjects of social struggles like feminism might employ a dialect of singular and group experience—a rhetoric of self-representation in language that accounts for historical transformation, difference, and social connection. Using such a rhetoric, writing teachers can help students acknowledge and use contradictions within written selves toward creating new possibilities for socially situated understanding and action.

Margaret Jennings

"Virtus in media est": Erasmus and the Artes praedicandi

Most recent scholarship links Erasmus' Ecclesiastes to Augustine's De doctrina christiana, thereby acting like New Yorkers and Californians who think of the central United States as certainly unknown and possibly unworthy. This paper makes a case for Chicago--or in rhetorical terms for the existence of arts of preaching in the period between the sixth and sixteenth centuries which have relevance for Erasmus' treatise in goal, design, and content.

A brief glance at the Ecclesiastes and at contemporaneous preaching manuals vis-a-vis the structure of the Ecclesiastes shows why some critics have called Erasmus' work the "death blow" to the artes praedicandi. But the lingering rhetorical doctrina in those late fifteenth and early sixteenth century prescriptive texts points to an age when, like Erasmus, a group of writers employed the tenets of classical rhetoric to create an effective sermon design. Indeed, many of the important points that Erasmus makes are more readily referable to the medieval manuals than to Renaissance concerns or to Augustine's De doctrina christiana.

Is Erasmus, then, the last medieval? Hardly. But the achievement of the Ecclesiastes should be set within a whole tradition of prescriptive manuals and not rest solely on its linkage with a single exemplar. As people from my home town (Brooklyn) might say, when asked to elaborate on the meaning of traditio, "Erasmus didn't come from nowhere."

S. Vernon Jensen

Thomas Henry Huxley's Inaugural Lecture at Johns Hopkins, September 1876

In the last half of the nineteenth century, the English biologist-educator-rhetorician, Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-95), was a leading expositor and advocate of science and of Darwinism in particular. Spoken of as the premier orator of science, his fame spread to the United States and elsewhere. Since the early 1860s Huxley had developed close working ties with the American publisher, D. Appleton and Company and with other science publishers, so that by 1876 American scientists, educators, students, and the general reading public were quite familiar with him. Near the height of his career, the fifty-one-year-old Huxley set out on his only trip to the United States, a seven-week lecture tour which included an address at the opening of the new Johns Hopkins University.

He had long desired to visit his favorite sister who had emigrated to the South in 1850. The likelihood of earning some money from lecturing while fostering science education and Darwinism was an appealing way to spend a much needed vacation from his strenuous duties. Shortly before he left, Huxley received an invitation from the president of Johns Hopkins, Daniel Coit Gilman, inviting him to give a lecture which would inaugurate a special lecture series by distinguished scientists. Huxley and his wife arrived in New York City on 5 August, were hosted by the Appletons, visited Yale and Harvard scientists, and attended the twenty-fifth annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Buffalo, where Huxley made an informal speech. In Nashville he had the reunion with his sister and her family and delivered a public lecture on science.

On September 12th in the Academy of Music in Baltimore before a distinguished audience of over two thousand, including the governor, mayor, Johns Hopkins trustees and other dignitaries, Huxley delivered his famous "Address on University Education." Some years later President Gilman explained the rationale in selecting Huxley: "His reputation as an investigator was very high, and as the popular interpreter and defender of biological investigations he was without a peer....As a public speaker upon scientific subjects there was no superior....The moment was opportune for informing the public, through the speech of this master, in respect to the requirements of modern medicine and the value of biological research" which Johns Hopkins sought to emphasize. In his speech Huxley stressed the need for more science education at all educational levels, urged linking research to teaching, and admonished that science be used for the larger purpose of building a better life for humanity. His address was printed in the New York Tribune, in Nature magazine, and in a special volume by Appleton entitled American Addresses, which included Huxley's subsequent three lectures on evolution in New York City later in September, which had been sponsored by Appleton. His Baltimore address thus reached a wide audience, and it was a reason for scholars to say in later years that his American addresses were very important in giving science educators confidence that they were no longer second class citizens in academia.

Robert Jewett

"Classical Rhetoric as a Key to Interpreting Paul's Letter to the Romans"

The modern history of interpreting Romans is dominated by sectarian conflict, since the letter played such a crucial role in the Protestant Reformation. It provided slogans for Lutheran orthodoxy and themes for Calvinist radicalism as well as pietistic spiritualism and moralism but was also interpreted by Catholics to support their position. Each tradition perceived the "high point" of the letter in those passages supporting their theology. The immense scholarly and sectarian literature on this letter, larger than on any other document in Western Culture, aimed at supporting sectarian constructions while discrediting alternative views by minute investigations of grammatical and theological details. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the letter was understood as falling under the judicial genre of rhetoric, usually as a defense of true theology.

Recent studies are suggesting that Romans fits a sub-type of the demonstrative genre, combining the philosophical essay with ambassadorial discourse in order to present Paul and his theology as a plausible candidate for Roman support of a difficult mission project to Spain. Its audience was the splintered house churches of Rome, whose ideological and cultural conflicts must be overcome before they would be in a position to participate in missionizing the "barbarians" in Spain. The rhetorical situation of the letter thus required finding common ground between conservative Jewish Christians and radical Gentile Christians. Paul proposes a trans-cultural approach to truth that would be able not only to unite these churches but also offer a gospel to Spain that was devoid of chauvinism.

The disposition and style of Romans are carefully designed to appeal to its mixed audience and to legitimate the cultural preferences of their adversaries. The very details that were originally intended to find common ground have been misused by sectarian interpreters to support cultural and theological exclusivism. Classical rhetoric thus opens the door to a revolutionary appraisal of this letter, allowing it to emerge as a document of ecumenical tolerance and global unification.

Kurt Johannesson

The Portrait of the Prince as a Rhetorical Genre

In 1541 the Swedish king Gustavus Vasa asked Fredrick of Denmark to send his painter to the Swedish court for a time. The request was granted and this painter, Jacob Binck, made the first portrait known of Gustavus Vasa. This king is commonly regarded as the founder of the modern state in Sweden. Thus his portrait has been used to our own time to represent the power and the authority of the state as such.

The portrait of the prince is one of the new and significant genres in Renaissance art, with Dürer, Holbein, Tizian and other artists. There is an extensive literature on this genre. In this paper I will add a rhetorical aspect, to demonstrate how such portraits were invented and interpreted according to rhetorical principles during the Renaissance.

Erasmus, Machiavelli, Castiglione and other writers of political treatises and manuals of courtiers maintained that the prince should behave and function as a living *exemplum*. The elaborated and dazzling ceremonies of the Renaissance court were above all meant to bring the *exemplum* before the eyes of the courtiers and the subjects. The poems and histories written to praise the princes served the same end, to impress specific political virtues on the minds of the elite and the people by the examples of the princes.

All *exempla* are *facta et dicta*, they should instruct with admirable deeds and sayings worthy of imitation and meditation. The historians in the service of Gustavus Vasa always portray him as speaking to his people, his courtiers and foreign ambassadors with a sublime eloquence. But the numerous portraits painted of him and his sons were also meant to "speak" to the spectators, by means of the features and expressions of the faces and the bodies, the gestures and the dresses. There were also inscriptions in Latin on the portraits to specify which virtues each of them were meant to express. This idea of an

Nan Johnson

Quintilian and the Nineteenth-Century Rhetorical Tradition

The extent to which nineteenth-century rhetorical theory was influenced by classical presumptions has yet to be clearly understood. In response to the frequently argued assertion that the rise and subsequent dominion of the epistemological and belletristic views of the New Rhetoric had compromised the status of classical rhetoric by the early 1800's, I will argue that there is ample evidence that Quintilian's influence on the development of rhetorical theory endured through the nineteenth-century. Often quoted and frequently acknowledged along with Cicero under the respectful title "the ancients," Quintilian emerges within the nineteenth-century tradition as a respected voice on the nature and practice of rhetoric. Edward T. Channing, G.P. Quackenbos, Henry N. Day, and influential homiletician, John A. Broadus were just a few of the prominent nineteenth-century theorists who referred to Quintilian's teachings in their analyses of the canons and the responsibilities of the speaker. It will be the purpose of my discussion to show that nineteenth-century rhetoricians followed the example of their predecessors, Campbell, Blair, and Whately, in promoting Quintilian's views on invention, arrangement, style, and the qualities of the good orator.

Mark D. Johnston

The Ars Arengandi at the Fourteenth-Century Court of Aragon

Modern scholarship on medieval rhetorical theory remains organized, as J. J. Murphy's standard studies show, around the Latin ars poetriae, ars dictaminis, and ars praedicandi. Other arts, especially those developed in the vernacular, remain far less known. Perhaps the most developed yet least studied of these are the arts of secular oratory commonly known as the ars arengandi (art of political address), ars consuliendi (art of giving counsel), and ars ambasciandi (art of bearing embassy). Related to the ars dictaminis, these arts were already flourishing in thirteenth-century Northern Italy and evidently spread soon across Southern Europe. Vernacular encyclopedists around 1300, like the Italian Brunetto Latini, Catalan Ramon Llull, and Provençal Guillem Molinier, include accounts of these arts in their works.

The relevance of doctrines from these secular oratorical arts to the development of later Humanist rhetoric has long been obvious, as in the case of Guido Fabra's Arengue. None the less, only a handful of these treatises have ever appeared in complete modern editions, most of these prepared by Italian scholars earlier in this century (e.g. Carlo Frati, "Flora de parlare" or "Somma d'arengare" attribuita a Ser Giovanni Fiorentino da Vignano in un codice Marciano," Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana 61 (1913): 1-31). Although only a very few scholars are presently working on these arts, they surely merit much closer attention, especially in regard to their possible role in the development of courtly political discourse.

The very incomplete state of current knowledge concerning the ars arengandi, ars consuliendi, and ars ambasciandi makes any general assessment of their diffusion and practice extremely difficult. This paper will therefore examine the use of the ars arengandi alone in one particular case, the court of the kings of Aragon, for which published historical documents and scholarship provide sufficient material. Complete records of the formal speeches given in the Aragonese parliament survive from 1350 on and modern Catalan historians have already investigated in some detail the development of literary styles in the Aragonese chancery of the fourteenth century. The speeches of king Pere IV of Aragon (1320-1387), famed in his day as a learned and skilled orator despite his physical weakness, offer especially attractive material for studying the practice of the ars arengandi. This paper will examine one or two of his speeches in the light of specific precepts from contemporary Catalan artes arengandi and general evidence regarding knowledge of the ars arengandi in fourteenth-century Aragon, in order to demonstrate the sophisticated development attained by this secular branch of medieval rhetorical theory.

Walter Jost

"The Two-Fold Logos: Philosophy as Rhetoric in John Henry Newman"

In the past two decades historians and theorists of rhetoric have increasingly come to recognize the extraordinary range of rhetoric in nineteenth-century England, yet the significant, even pivotal role played by John Henry Newman has continued, for various reasons, to go unremarked and unassimilated. From his early Oxford sermons (1826-1843) to his masterful An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870), Newman successfully challenged the reigning empiricist epistemology by refusing the limits placed on rhetoric by Whately, and by fashioning a sense of "reason" more profound than that of Mill. Indeed, in the nineteenth century it is Newman, not Whately, who most fully and innovatively embodies the rhetorical tradition traceable back through Coleridge, Burke, Johnson and Bacon to Cicero and Aristotle; Newman, who articulated a rhetorical sense of reason and argument widely shared by Macaulay, Carlyle, Arnold and others; and Newman, again, who bequeathed to our own time a theory and practice of rhetoric deserving the closest study.

Within the limits of this paper I examine the main features of that theory and practice as directed to the "practical" broadly conceived, that is, to facts, people, action, the popular and timely, and effects. In all of his writings, from his theological treatises to his philosophy of education, Newman is intent to remind us of the severe limitations of the logical and scientific; to use and defend non-scientific criteria in the judgment of truth in concrete cases and disciplines; to adjust theory to the facts of non-replicable cases; and to generate theory sensitive to opportunities for invention and change. Although Newman scholars rarely fail to observe the rhetorical dimensions of Newman's thought in all of the fields in which he worked, none has explored the rhetorical nature of his principles and methods. In doing so this paper is able to show not only the unity of Newman's thought, but the power of rhetorical theory to clarify a major thinker, and the importance to rhetoric of one who appeared to have no place in the canon.

In order to grasp Newman's comprehensive "view" (as he would call it) and practice of rhetoric, I consider in the first section of the paper Newman's own account of his method as set forth in the Oxford University Sermons and the Grammar of Assent, though the full implications of that account can emerge only on application to specific cases. In the second section, therefore, I consider very briefly how theory plays out in practice in Newman's famous but profoundly mis-read The Idea of a University. And in the concluding section I indicate in a general way how Newman contributes to rhetorical theory.

George A. Kennedy

QUINTILIAN'S BACKGROUND AND CAREER, RECONSIDERED

Theresa Kelley

Un"maydenly" Women and the Rhetoric of Romanticism

The essay described in this abstract considers the problem of rhetoric in Romantic texts (how it exists in a superficially anti-rhetorical field or poetics, how it is or is not attentive to the values and dispositions of classical rhetoric) obliquely, by way of woman as a figure of rhetoric or eloquence. Although Cicero's discussion of metaphor is not explicitly sexualized, it serves as the classical ground for later presentations of woman as the figure of metaphor. Personifying metaphor as a modest, deferential figure "who ought to have an apologetic air, ... as if it had come with permission, not forced its way in" (*De Oratore*, 41.165), Cicero uses the imperative mode to indicate that the rhetorical modesty of figures is required not natural. In the Renaissance, Fenner provides a sexualized version of the classical imperative when he argues that metaphor ought to redirect literal meaning toward its own figurative ends in a manner that is "shamefest, and as it were maydenly, that it may seeme rather to be led by the hand to another signification, then to be driven by force" (*Arts of Logike and Rethorike*). One Enlightenment effect of this tradition in the history of rhetoric is Locke's famous rant against rhetorical eloquence, which accuses, "all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, [which] are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are a perfect cheat" (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 3.10.34). The misogynist edge of Locke's characterization of rhetoric gestures toward the undeclared but implicit threat that rhetoricians -- classical and since -- attempt to ward off by specifying the "maydenly," submissive character of metaphor worthy of its name and function. For what Fenner fears is what Locke's feminized figure of rhetoric inadvertently creates: a metaphor (in the most expansive sense of the term) so powerful that it is anything but "led by the hand." Nor is it "driven by [the] force" of Locke as the rhetor in charge. Instead, in the very midst of an argument against excessive or ornate figuration, Locke creates an allegory in which rhetoric is the prostitute text-walker whose artificial passions are the stalking horse for the kind of eloquence he wants above all to exclude.

The relation between these telling anecdotes in the history of rhetoric and Romanticism is instructively oblique. Here I will only enumerate the leading threads that bind that relation: the large presence of figures of women in the emblematic tradition; the initial French revolutionary exploitation of a female figure of Liberty and subsequent substitution of a male Hercules; the Romantic casting off, most notably by Blake, Wordsworth, and Keats, of women as "other" -- but significantly as figured "others" whose rhetorical pathos (the passion and force resisted by Cicero, Fenner, and Locke in the name of submissive metaphor) acts out the oblique presence of classical rhetorical issues and constraints in an era allegedly unembarrassed by an allegiance to classical rhetoric.

The turns of argument indicated in this approach to the rhetoric of Romanticism do not assume that classical rhetoric is imported whole cloth (or smuggled) into Romantic culture in ways wholly congruent with classical forms. Instead, the rhetoric that is Romanticism registers deeply classical impulses -- in figure and argument -- by means that are historically conditioned in the sense that they are tuned to historical pressures that help to specify Romanticism as a field and culture.

In my 1969 book, *Quintilian*, pp. 11-30, I gave an account of Quintilian's personal life and professional work, as I understood it, in a number of respects going beyond what had been noticed by others and drawing on some evidence not previously noticed.

Since then, others have commented on some facets of the subject and I have read and taught Quintilian's work repeatedly, altering my views of some matters. I would now like to present a revised account of what may reasonably be said about the chronology of his life and the form and content of his teaching.

Andrew King

The Classical Tradition of the Locus of Authority: The Post Modern Rhetorical Attack on Universals

Will the nation state remain a community of destiny or will it become a theme park in which no core cultural identity remains? Thirty years ago Richard McKeon suggested that the weakening of the nation-state might usher in an era when regional subcultures regained their vitality. Thus a global economy might actually increase the force of regional identity and the authority of local mores and arrangements. This post modern decentering of the nation as a locus of authority invests the particularistic traditions with increased meaning and makes them a center of loyalty. The Liberation Gospel in South America pits the claims of local and subculture against the classical universalism of the historic Church; Europeans rediscover themselves as Bretons, Corkonians, Rhizelanders, Savoyards, Flemings and Catalonians

A Post Modern Rhetorical Theory has arisen -- this paper argues -- as a way of understanding and even shaping the new rhetorical practices that characterize a decentered world. In order to illustrate the new locus of authority, the paper will consider the rhetoric of many formerly muted but now emerging voices -- ethnic groups in Europe and North America and religious and political organizations on the periphery of mainstream discourse.

Robert L. King

Political Rhetoric, Narration and the Execution of Charles I

The most recent studies of Charles I as a tragic martyr focus on the ways the imagery created by his execution was exploited, while his own rhetorical strategies and those of his followers are overlooked or ignored. Those strategies countered the attempts of Charles's executioners to control what one contemporary called "the discourse of the kingdom"; in that rhetorical struggle, those who controlled narration not only carried the day but also determined how Charles would be presented in historical accounts for centuries. Charles made history in at least two senses of the expression—he is undoubtedly the first example in the Anglo-American tradition of deliberate political image-making in a popular print medium. His Puritan opponents blundered rhetorically when they allowed "naked" or "perfect" narrations of his trial and execution to appear in the first English newspapers. Those accounts spoke with dramatic fervor on Charles's behalf because no proposition created an informing context for them. While a judicial oration would shape a narration to suit its proposition, the newspaper accounts—even those with Puritan imprimaturs—lack an informing assertion such as: The King is guilty of capital crimes. His judges may well have known that no legal precedent justified their behavior; they did naively put their faith in fairly objective versions of events, but they turned them to no clearly articulated rhetorical goal. For his part, with a persona derived from Foxe, the Bible, The Mirror for Magistrates and other culturally sanctioned sources, Charles's tragic acting shaped the narration to his own purposes and directed an interpretation of sweeping general worth: A public figure who suffers and dies in this manner earns transcendence, like Christ. The public, political image of Charles in the court and on the scaffold contributed to the success of his apologia, Eikon Basilike, and the irrefutable fictional elements in this eminently successful work were recognized in near frustration by John Milton in Eikonoklastes. My paper would sketch the tradition which gave life to Charles's persona, summarize the newspaper narrations, define the image (or eikon) that outlived Charles in the seventeenth century and notice the survivals of that image in standard histories. I would conclude by noting how other political narrations in the seventeenth century create or derive from the kind of deductions that were already under attack from reformers like Bacon.

Note: The two most recent studies are Nancy Klein Maguire's "The Theatrical Mask/Masque of Politics: The Case of Charles I" (Journal of British Studies, 28 [January 1989], 1-22) and Lois Potter's Secret Rites and Secret Writing: Royalist Literature, 1641-1660 (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

James L. Kinneavy

Greek Rhetorical Origins of the Christian Concept of Faith

The paper argues that the Christian concept of pistis is partially drawn from the meaning of this word in the Greek rhetorical tradition. Three different kinds of arguments are used to support this position: a semantic argument, a historical argument, and an analytical argument.

It is possible to show that the semantic understructures of the Christian meaning and the Greek rhetorical meaning share much in common. It is possible to map the concept of faith of a number of major contemporary theologians from various Christian sects and from Judaism onto the Greek rhetorical concept. The two concepts are quite compatible.

Secondly, by examining the Hellenization of Palestine during the period of the formation of the Christian canon, it can be shown that the writers of the New Testament were undoubtedly aware of some Greek rhetoric and of the centrality of the word pistis in the rhetorical tradition. They would have encountered it in the politics of the cities of Northern Palestine and in the schools of the period, whether they were organized by the polis or by Jewish educators.

Thirdly, it can be shown that the vast majority of the 491 occurrences of the noun pistis and the very pisteuo support the meaning of "persuasion." The pericope in nearly all of these occurrences makes it possible to give a clearly rhetorical meaning to the terms used.

Thus there are semantic, historical, and analytical arguments to posit a basic rhetorical meaning of the word pistis in the New Testament. Thus there is a Greek rhetorical origin to some of the elements of the Christian concept of faith.

John T. Kirby

Conceptual Rhetoric in the Archaic Period?

We have accustomed ourselves to thinking of rhetoric as being first conceptualized by the Sophists and imported by them from Sicily to Athens. Our historical sources indicate that theirs were the first written $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\nu\alpha$. But are we to reserve the notion of 'conceptual rhetoric' for what was articulated in this period?

The thesis of this paper is that rhetoric was in fact 'conceptualized' much earlier, indeed at least as far back as the earliest extant Western literature: namely, in the Archaic period. By this I mean to suggest that, as early as the works of Hesiod, we may discover a fully self-conscious sensibility of the nature and function of rhetoric, as well as insights into the specific details of its *modus operandi*. While it is true that he does not offer technical advice of the sort that we might speculate was written down by Corax or Tisias, the contour of Hesiod's conceptualization of rhetoric was arguably more significant: he takes the first step toward an actual working philosophy of rhetoric.

A 'table of contents' for the Hesiodic rhetoric (extrapolated from his *Theogony and Works and Days*) would include, among other topics, the following:

Theology of Rhetoric:

The origin of *peitho*

The place of *peitho* in the cosmos

Rhetoric and poetics

The social role of the rhetor

Political effects of *peitho*

Ethical responsibilities of the rhetor

William Kirkwood

Images of the Sage: The Use of Rhetorical Narrative
in the *Chuang Tzu*

Believed to have lived in about the 4th century, B.C.E., the Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu is the reputed author of a text which has circulated in its present form since at least the 2nd century, B.C.E. One of the seminal texts of Taoism, the *Chuang Tzu* is admirable not only for its philosophical insights, but also for the rhetorical skill with which it delivers them. Of particular interest to modern students of rhetoric is Chuang Tzu's reliance on narrative as a strategy for communicating various elements of the Taoist philosophy and way of life. In the service of this goal he tells a wealth of stories about mythical beasts, public officials, and philosophers. But perhaps the most compelling stories Chuang Tzu tells are those portraying Taoist sages--the "holy men" or "perfect men" (and women) in whose lives the Tao is embodied.

Disclosing the way of life and the state of mind of the sage is a central theme of the *Chuang Tzu*, one which occupies much of the text. Yet Chuang Tzu stresses that it is not easily achieved, for descriptions of sages are easily misunderstood and often rejected as improbable. Once, he writes, a man heard a story about a sage who lived atop a mountain, where he lived on nothing more than wind and dew, rode dragons, and perfected his spirit. The man "thought it was all insane and refused to believe it." But, Chuang Tzu responds, "We can't expect a blind man to appreciate beautiful patterns or a deaf man to listen to bells and drums. And blindness and deafness are not confined to the body alone--the understanding has them too . . ." (Watson, p. 27) In other cases, Chuang Tzu adds, even those who encounter sages firsthand fail to understand their unorthodox behavior. Hence neither accurate description nor actual experience may be sufficient to reveal the nature of the sage.

In this paper I will examine the rhetorical strategies by which Chuang Tzu tries to acquaint readers suffering from "blindness" and "deafness" with the Taoist sage. I will argue that Chuang Tzu's rhetoric serves an ontological purpose, disclosing unsuspected possibilities to those unacquainted with them. While Chuang Tzu uses several methods to achieve this goal, his primary method is telling carefully constructed stories--sometimes about the sages themselves, sometimes about such unlikely heroes as butchers, woodcarvers, convicted criminals, and social misfits. While the ambiguity of description and actual experience allows people to supply their own interpretations, rather than confronting the state of mind of the sage, invented narratives can overcome this obstacle. Thus, while Chuang Tzu sometimes disparages the value of language, rhetorically constructed realities are indispensable in revealing the way of the sage.

In concluding the essay I will argue that understanding how Chuang Tzu's stories function can help scholars appreciate both the advantages and limitations of narrative rhetoric generally.

References

Watson, Burton, trans. *Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings*. (New York: Columbia U P, 1964.)

Anna Kissin

Sidney's Rhetoric and the "Chain of Becoming"

A study of Sidney's elocutionary devices in their poetic context reveals a vision identifying rhetoric, guided by the "fore-conceit," with the very process of poetic composition. What I have called the "Chain of Becoming" is the principle of "dynamic elocution" which looks, Janus-like, in two directions at once: the philosophical and the stylistic. The "Chain of Being" tradition - including the "fore-conceits" of progress and plenitude; of a universal order, relation, and continuity; cosmological assumptions; the development of scientific method; and related philosophical concepts central to Sidney's work and to his age in a broad sense - is incarnated in rhetorical strategies and stylistic structures, as Sidney's practice makes clear. This mimetic correlation between some formal patterns and the underlying movement of thought endows Sidney's style with a characteristic mobile, ordered dynamic quality that allows for a reciprocal illumination of other, related patterns, and the conceptual matrices from which they are generated.

Lawrence Klein

COFFEE CLASHES: THE POLITICS OF CONVERSATION IN SEVENTEENTH- AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

The coffeehouse was a new institution in later seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England, and a much discussed one. This paper takes advantage of the voluminous comment in periodicals, pamphlets and books to examine the construction of the coffeehouse in its relation to consumption, sociability and inquiry. The literature of the coffeehouse illuminates both the politics of contemporary intellectual and cultural institutions and also the status of conversation as a mode of inquiry.

The scenes in which English writers located conversation were augmented in the later seventeenth and eighteenth century by new developments in urban living. As commercial life expanded and the English gentry established new ties with the city, London grew in size and in the kinds of facilities it offered for material and cultural consumption. Prominent among the innovations were coffeehouses which first appeared in London in the mid-seventeenth century when coffee importation created a new market of coffee drinkers.

The coffeehouse joined an array of existing establishments that purveyed food, drink and sociability. However, because the coffeehouse developed a distinctive character, defined by its size, arrangement, pattern of service, ambience and clientele, sociability came to be its paramount function. Moreover, it became associated not only with private exchange but with conversation on a wide array of topics of public interest. Thus, the coffeehouse intersected with the history not only of institutions associated with food and drink but also of institutions associated with conversation, inquiry, learning and opinion. Since the coffeehouse seemed to challenge or supersede a number of more traditional sites of intellectual and cultural production, commentators found it an apt reference point for re-assessing the claims of the Court, the Church and the traditional educational institutions.

It was easy enough for critics to come up with complaints about the coffeehouse, especially in the early decades of their existence. Since coffeehouse conversation was equivalent to unregulated opinion, it could be seen as spawning bad taste, irreligion and political subversion. (Indeed, coffeehouses in Restoration London were important intersections in networks of religious and political dissent.) They thus could be depicted as dangerous parodies of such traditionally authoritative institutions as the Church and the universities. However, particularly after the 1688 Revolution, apologists came to defend coffeehouses precisely because they belonged to a network of urban institutions offering itself as an alternative to traditional authoritative ones. Since urban conversation could be seen as crucial in refining society, taste, religion and politics, the coffeehouse could be assigned a central role in the construction of a polite public.

These arguments about the status of the coffeehouse in relation to other intellectual and cultural institutions led, in turn, to assessments of the worth of conversation in its relation to truth, philosophy, religion and public good.

Dilwyn Knox
Instruction in Rhetoric in Sixteenth- and Early
Seventeenth-Century Protestant Schools

My paper attempts to address some elementary questions about instruction in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century schools in Protestant Germany. The questions include: What text books were used? Were classical or contemporary rhetorical works the more popular? Who read these texts, at what age, in what language and how frequently? How was rhetoric taught? Were some parts of rhetoric considered more important than others? How did instruction in rhetoric fit into other parts of the curricula of Protestant schools? To what degree were the demands of the curriculum met? Did Protestant and Catholic, particularly Jesuit, school instruction in rhetoric differ significantly?

My answers, obviously provisional, are mainly based on a survey of surviving curricula and visitation reports for different types of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Protestant schools.

L. G. Korpel

RHETORIC AND DUTCH TRANSLATION THEORY (1750-1820)

Dutch translation theory between 1750 and 1820 is to a large extent shaped by rhetorical principles. Two major characteristics of Dutch translation theory, viz. its prospective disposition and its emphasis on adjustment and improvement, have their roots in a rhetorical approach to literature in general, including translation. Most importantly, this approach gives high priority to the function of texts. In Dutch translation theory this leads to a translational attitude where acceptability and readability of a translation are more important than fidelity to (all aspects of) the original text. Secondly, the rhetorical orientation of general literary theory means a great deal of attention for the shaping of a text: its presentation, its style, its ornamentation and the rules these have to follow. This orientation, combined with the focus on the function of a text, makes that in Dutch translation theory much room is given to a translator to adapt a translation to the taste and poetics of Dutch culture, as well as to change and improve the wording of the original. Metaphors used to define the process of translation illustrate these translational principles. The language theory which conditions this rhetorical approach to translations, with its separation of words ('signifiant') and meaning ('signifié'), still seems valid in The Netherlands between 1750 and 1820.

For most of the period 1750-1820, trends in Dutch translation theory run parallel to those in other Western-European countries. However, when towards the end of the 18th century changes begin to occur in literary and translation theory in countries like England, France and Germany, The Netherlands seem to lag behind. Basically, these changes mean that texts begin to be viewed more as an expression of an individual author or nation rather than as instruments to convey a particular, demonstrable, message, and that language theory begins to emphasize that not only the effect but also the meaning of an utterance is largely determined by the way it is expressed. Translation theory is gradually adjusted to these new insights. This involves a drastic reduction of the freedom of the translator in rephrasing the original; fidelity to the original expression becomes more necessary, yet more difficult. The role of the translator as rhetorician seems to be over. However, though occasionally there are signs of changing attitudes, none of these adjustments seems to be made in Dutch translation theory between 1750 and 1820.

Jiri Kraus

The Reception of Byzantium in Slavonic Countries
(The Case of Constantin the Philosopher)

Since the 860's two tendencies of Old-Slavonic literature in Great Moravia developed: (a) translational (poetics of Gospel and liturgic texts, confrontation of Old-Slavonic with Greek), (b) apologetic (defense of Old-Slavonic liturgy, polemic with the opponents of Old-Slavonic liturgy - triglots).

The beginnings of both tendencies are connected with the works and activities of Constantin (Cyril) the Philosopher from Thessaloniki who was together with his brother Method charged by Byzantine Patriarch Fotius with the Christianization of Great Moravia.

The impact of Byzantine rhetoric (Aphthonian-hermogenic Corpus, III.-IV. century, Ioannes Sardinianus, IX century) can be markedly traced in style and composition of Constantin's Polemic with Triglot (867), which was originally delivered in Greek and Latin, however, preserved exclusively in the Old-Slavonic translation as a part of hagiographic Life of Constantin from 970's.

The text of the polemical speech is characterized by rich tropology according to the tradition of Progymnasmata which represented the most influential part of the Hermogenes' Corpus.

José Angel Blesa Lalinde

ELOCUTIO ET SILENTIUM
Vers une typologie des figures du silence dans la poésie
espagnole contemporaine

Jiri Kraus

Quintilian's Influence on the History of Language Culture and Language Education in Central Europe

The Czech, Polish, German and Austrian educational systems were influenced by Quintilian's *Institutiones* from the beginning of the 14th century, when the universities in Prague (1348), Vienna (1365), Cracow (1364), Leipzig (1409) etc.-- with the chairs of rhetoric, *artes dictaminis praedicandi*--were established. The inspiring role of Quintilian was decisive not only for language education in the period of Renaissance and Humanism (Sturmius, Comenius), but also in the history of European academies which tried to cultivate Latin as well as to develop and regulate national languages (vernaculars), especially in their functions of literary, scientific and administrative communication.

Quintilian's concepts of correct language and appropriate style underlying the humanist idea of 'culture idionatis' serve as guides to both prescriptive and descriptive linguistics and find interesting analogies in the works of modern authors (viz. Prague School stylistics, neorhetorical tendencies in philology, text linguistics, etc.).

Tout acte de parole rompt le silence, cependant le discours littéraire, suspendu dans le vide du contexte, le brise et le réinsère.

Le fait n'est pas nouveau. En effet la rhétorique classique avait déjà réuni la *percursorio*, la *praeteritio* et la *reticentia* sous l'épigraphe de *Figurae per detractionem*. Et dans une optique beaucoup plus moderne, Paolo Valesio, dans sa version italienne de *Novantiqua* (1980), aboutit à *Ascoltare il silenzio* (1986).

Le silence peut être verbalisé, et comme contenus, apparaissent alors la réflexion sur le silence lui-même, son éloquence, le thème de l'ineffable, le secret, etc.

Or, une lecture de la poésie espagnole contemporaine révèle que le silence résonne très fréquemment dans ses textes, incorporé à son expression formelle. Cette évidence exige, d'une part, une description des procédés chez les poètes qui inscrivent le silence dans leurs créations, une *elocutio* du silence devenu signe.

1) L'un des modèles les plus importants est celui du poème fragmenté, incomplet, ce qui peut être exprimé par divers moyens:

a) points de suspension b) espaces en blanc. c) l'inclusion dans le titre du mot "fragment", ou d'autres termes similaires. d) ou "à suivre" à la fin, etc.

2) Un autre procédé qui rappelle le silence avec éloquence est l'apparition de taches noires qui effacent certains segments de l'écriture.

3) L'adoption d'un langage cryptique, méconnu du lecteur, qui le considère comme simple signifiant, soit par déformation de la langue naturelle (ou sa représentation écrite), soit par la création de mots inexistant dans le dictionnaire.

4) L'adoption de mots qui appartiennent à d'autres langues, dans des poèmes qui, pour un lecteur non-multilingue, sont de véritables mots vides

5) Si pour la rhétorique classique, la *brevitas* est une *virtus* qui devient *vitiata* si elle est appliquée sans respect aux normes, dans la poésie moderne, apparaissent fréquemment les poèmes à un seul vers ou composés parfois de quelques vers (comme dans le haïku), développement du blanc de la page, du silence de l'environnement.

6) Paradoxalement, la multiplicité textuelle engendre, dans son bruit, le silence; les exemples de "murmure" sont divers:

a) poèmes à plusieurs vers qui diversifient la voix et le sens. b) poèmes auxquels l'auteur ajoute quelques notes, parfois accompagnées de variantes, dès le début. c) poèmes qui possèdent deux ou trois versions, etc.

La présence du silence dans le texte réclame, outre la classification formelle qui en a été esquissée, une réflexion sur l'influence qu'il exerce sur le lecteur et sur sa propre fonction. Si Jacques Denida a fait remarquer que tout poème court le risque de ne pas avoir de sens et que c'est justement ce risque qui donne une entité au poème (*L'écriture et la différence*, 1967), ce risque pousse par ailleurs les poèmes imprégnés de silence dans un abîme où aucune voix ne se manifeste.

Marcelle Laplace

Le roman de Chariton, Chairéas et Callirhoé, et la tradition de l'éloquence et de la rhétorique.

Cette communication vise à situer le roman de Chariton (1er s. p.C.) dans la tradition de l'éloquence et de la rhétorique, en montrant qu'il ressortit au discours panégyrique dont Isocrate fut l'initiateur.

Les termes εὐγγέλιον / εὐγγέλιον par lesquels Chariton désigne son récit ne sont pas réservés aux récits historiques ; ils s'appliquent à toute composition écrite, et notamment à l'éloquence épideictique (voir, par ex. Isocr., Lettre à Denys, 5-6). Or le récit de Chariton se présente, pour l'essentiel, comme la mise par écrit d'exposés prononcés à Syracuse, par les protagonistes masculins, devant une foule rassemblée en une circonstance solennelle (VIII, 7, 1-8, 11). De plus, la guerre à l'issue de laquelle Chairéas retrouve Callirhoé et la ramène à Syracuse se substitue à un jugement du Roi des Perses dans un procès qui, avant d'être interrompu pour être remplacé par la guerre, est comparé à un concours olympique, dont Callirhoé serait le "prix" (V, 4, 4 ; VI, 2, 2-3). Et cette guerre qui rend le bonheur à Chairéas est comme la réalisation, au bénéfice de Syracuse, du projet exposé par Isocrate dans le Panégyrique, et repris dans le Philippe : la lutte des Grecs contre les Perses, afin d'y exceller et de ramener le bonheur d'Asie en Europe (Panégyr., 186-187). L'incohérence chronologique, souvent relevée, sans être expliquée, des faits historiques sur lesquels s'appuie la narration de Chariton résulte de ce qu'ils correspondent à ceux qu'Isocrate cite comme exempla pour son argumentation. Et si Chariton combine les références et les allusions historiques à d'autres, empruntées à l'épopée et au théâtre, c'est qu'il souscrit à l'ambition d'Isocrate revendiquant pour l'éloquence épideictique la rivalité avec tous les grands genres littéraires antérieurs.

Cependant, l'adhésion du romancier à cette ambition aboutit au rejet de la hiérarchie, affirmée par l'orateur, entre les sujets privés, futiles, et les sujets politiques, nobles, et à la constante imbrication, volontiers soulignée, des deux registres dans les aventures de Chairéas et Callirhoé. Le roman, tel qu'il apparaît chez Chariton, est donc un genre totalisant qui porte à son achèvement les revendications d'Isocrate pour l'éloquence épideictique. Il témoigne, dans l'ordre de la création littéraire, d'un dessein analogue à ce que seront, dans l'ordre de la théorie, la reprise, par le Peri Ideôn d'Hermogène, de l'idéal d'art oratoire unique défendu par Platon, et la définition extensive du terme de discours panégyrique.

Jameela Lares

Abstract: Elocutio as Apologetic in the 17th Century Defense of the Scriptures

Some of the most significant 17th century discussions of elocutio are found, not in texts on language or rhetoric, but in Christian apologetics and polemics. Seventeenth-century Christian polemicists and apologists found it necessary to defend Scriptural elocutio when countering the arguments of their adversaries. But efforts to defend the tropes and figures of Scripture in terms of 17th century understandings of elocutio meant reading a Greco-Roman aesthetic into the Semitic text. The very disjunction between the text being defended and the tradition brought to its defense makes for extensive discussions of elocutio, often tucked away into apologetic and polemic texts rather than into texts ostensibly dealing with language or rhetoric.

Socinians and other heterodox writers challenged Biblical authority by dismissing much of the text as mere metaphor. Other writers selectively dismissed certain metaphors which would weaken their own doctrinal position. Still others complained that the Bible was inferior to classical texts because it was less ornamented by tropes and figures. In order to respond to these antagonists, such polemicists and apologists as Louis DuPin, Robert Ferguson, Cornelius Norwood and Robert Boyle discussed Scriptural elocutio at length, defining its nature and scope, providing in some cases lists of classical tropes and figures which could be found in the Biblical text, and praising the ornamentation of Scripture. Thomas Delaune's Tropologia (1681), a folio-length discussion of "scripture-metaphors," is striking in that it does not contain any such defense, but his 1682 revision contains an adequate, if grudging, discussion of the subject, apparently included at the insistence of his audience.

Yameng Liu

RETHINKING CLASSICAL CHINESE RHETORIC

Bo Lindberg

Rhetorical pathology according to G.J. Vossius

This paper will examine the doctrine of the passions in the rhetorical works of the Dutch philologist and humanist G.J. Vossius (d. 1649). The following aspects will be focussed on:

- a) The relation to Aristotle. Vossius was an Aristotelian and his treatment of the passions follows that of Aristotle in book II of the *Rhetorica*. The differences are strikingly small, and there is no reflection in Vossius on the historical gap between antiquity and his own time.
- b) Vossius' distinction between the rhetorical and the philosophical treatment of the passions. To the rhetorician, the problem is how to manipulate the passions in order to control the audience. From the philosophical point of view, the question is how to master one's passions in order to maintain ethical freedom.
- c) The concept of man implicated in the doctrine of the passions.

The classical age in China (c.722-221 B.C.) was more than anything else an Age of Rhetoric. The pre-Qin rhetors were either respected or condemned for the crucial role they played in political life. The power, influence and social prestige oratory once enjoyed are demonstrated by the peculiar way this turbulent time was chronicled by its contemporaries in terms of a series of rhetorical situations. And all major thinkers of the "one hundred schools" (e.g. Confucian, Taoist, Moist, Legalist, etc.) were preoccupied with the unmistakably rhetorical concern of how discourse influences human behavior.

The centrality of eloquence during this period has not been appreciated, in part because the canonical Chinese texts were annotated, studied and translated at a time when rhetoric as an intellectual discipline had fallen into disfavor in both China and the West. As a consequence, classical texts which should be treated primarily as rhetorical texts (e.g. the "Canons and Explanations" of the later Moists actually is a treatise on *inventio* and *copia*) have been studied chiefly for their literary, philosophical, linguistic or historical interest, and key rhetorical terminologies have been so inappropriately rendered as to distort our conception of Chinese oratory. By assigning a marginal or subordinate role to the rhetorical concerns of classical texts, modern scholars tend to formulate irrelevant questions, or focus attention on technical aspects of Chinese rhetoric while neglecting the broader implications of its peculiar argumentative modes and stylistic preferences.

To put classical Chinese rhetoric in perspective, we need to restore its historical standing as an architectonic art and a dominant social and intellectual practice. A reinterpretation of major texts in this light will generate new topics (e.g. "what does the tendency toward 'negative conceptualization' among major rhetoricians say about the classical Chinese conception of the theory/practice relationship?" or "how are we to understand the phenomenon of 'rhetoric against itself' toward the end of the Warring States?"). And it would certainly lead to a more fruitful discussion on major thinkers as rhetoricians rather than philosophers—a discussion that addresses not only their common concerns (e.g. "how to deal with the rhetorical fluidity of human discourse?"), but also their different theoretical orientations (e.g. the Taoist ideal of sprezzatura, the Confucian rhetoric of ethos and Han Fei's preoccupation with pathos and with the power relations between addresser [shuozhe] and addressee [suoshuo]).

Michael Lowenstein

Making It Safe: Fiction and Eighteenth-Century
British Rhetoric

Human beings are "so remarkably addicted to truth and reality," wrote Lord Kames in his Elements of Criticism (1762), "one should little dream that fiction can have any effect upon them." Yet for Kames and such contemporaries of his as Hume, Blair, Campbell, Watts, Priestley, and Burke, the evidence of fiction's power was as clear as it was intriguing. The spectacle of reasonable theatergoers weeping over the misfortunes of King Lear or readers over those of Clarissa Harlowe was a puzzle that demanded exploring. The rhetoricians' quest for understanding, as my presentation will show, led them to try to explain the power of fiction and explore its uses and implications for orators and writers.

I will focus first on the ingeniously cogent way the rhetoricians based their understanding of fiction's power on their notion of how the senses, reason, memory, and imagination operated in the real world. Fiction's power to arouse the feelings and imagination and thus influence the behavior of the reader or listener turned out to depend on how closely the fiction resembled real experience-- a conclusion that would certainly force novelists to pass through a very narrow gate indeed but allowed Kames and the others to accept lies into their world of "truth and reality." I will then go on to show how the rhetoricians specified techniques whereby writers and speakers could give their images and narratives the verisimilitude that was said to be the secret of fiction's power and the moral force that was said to be its principal rationale.

Peter Machamer

GALILEO AND THE RHETORIC OF RELATIVITY

Perhaps Galileo's most famous contribution to the history of physics was the introduction of the principle of the relativity of observed motion. This principle is used throughout Book II of his Dialogo through a series of concrete, easily imaginable examples to show the irrelevance of a cosmological system, Ptolemaic or Copernican, to observations of local motion on the earth. The arguments are not logically "tight", but they are good arguments and they are very persuasive.

I claim that Galileo's introduction of this principle of relativity originated from the form of Archimedean geometry that he used as early as 1590 in De Motu. This geometry was a relational, proportional geometry that depended upon the arbitrary stipulation of standards to provide measures or to assign numbers. Many of Galileo's texts exhibit this arbitrary character.

More significantly and surprisingly, I claim that Galileo's use of this geometry and its accompanying relativity principle are but two instances of many in which Galileo subscribed to a person centered, neo-Protagorean perspective of the place of the human being in the cosmos. This was a reasonably new way of looking at the world and the role of the person in it. Galileo's use of personal examples throughout his work, his epistemological comments about the limitations of human knowledge, and his temporally relativistic way of interpreting the Bible, all are ways in which his writing reflected the new, non-absolute, non-objective order of things.

Yet Galileo, like many of his predecessors, sought to establish an objective, non-person-dependent science. This desire conflicted with the adoption of the person-centered perspective. Galileo never resolved these tensions, even in his Discorsi. The pre-suppositions lying behind Galileo's dilemma were played out throughout the rest of the 17th Century.

Peter Mack

Rhetoric and the Essay

The Essay may have been the only literary genre created in the Renaissance and it may still be the dominant genre of written reportage and argument. Although essayists and students of the genre have often defined it in terms of its opposition to rhetoric and logic, many of the most famous essays depend on and exploit the techniques of rhetoric.

In this paper I shall trace the intricate history of the relations between rhetoric and the essay, concentrating on four moments: Montaigne's creation of the essay, the essayists of early seventeenth century England from Bacon to Cowley, the 'classic' form of the English essay in Addison, and (some of) the various educational uses of the essay.

Even this rather restricted focus will illustrate the extraordinary range of content, structure, treatment and style found in the essay form. Essayists have exploited rhetoric, and have marked their distance from it, in many different ways. Teachers have found many rhetorical ways of analysing, disciplining, and passing on, the tradition of the essay.

Henry Maguire

Imperial Angels, Angelic Emperors: Art and Oratory in the Service of the Byzantine State

On some coins of the early Palaeologan period the Byzantine emperor is shown with wings. This strange image can be related to a long-standing tradition of Byzantine visual and spoken rhetoric, namely the synkrisis of the emperor with the immaterial (i.e. superhuman) angels. Verbal comparisons of the emperors to the angels were made in the early Macedonian period, but became more explicit and more daring in the speeches of eleventh-century orators such as Michael Psellos. By the twelfth century the idea became a common-place of imperial oratory, particularly under the dynasty of the Angeloi.

In visual rhetoric, an early portrayal of the comparison is the scepter of Leo VI in Berlin, which juxtaposes mirror images of the emperor and of the Archangel Gabriel, both dressed in imperial costume (loros and divitision) and both holding identical attributes of orb and scepter. In tenth century and later Byzantine art, the dressing of angels in the imperial robes of loros and divitision became standard iconography in depictions of the heavenly court. It will be argued that this iconographic type was promoted by the early Macedonian rulers for political motives. In terms of the heavenly hierarchy, it made little sense for angels to be dressed as emperors (logic would demand that Christ would be emperor in the heavenly court). However, any Byzantine subject who looked upon an image of an angel in imperial dress would be reminded, indirectly, of the emperor's closeness to the immaterial beings, and thus of his position in the world of spiritual powers. The general adoption of the image of the imperial angel in Byzantine church art must be considered as one of the great successes of Byzantine imperial rhetoric. However the closeness of emperor to angel was only implicitly expressed through the device of similarities of costume; it was hinted at, not stated explicitly. The Palaeologan emperors were the first to find an image which conveyed the idea in an unambiguous fashion, through the portrait of the emperor with wings. There is good reason to believe that they were led to this more concrete formulation of the idea as a result of the influence of western models.

Gregory Maillet

"Richard II, Lear, and the Maturation of Shakespeare's Use of Rhetoric"

As Brian Vickers noted, "the mature Shakespearean style absorbs the structures of rhetoric to produce new and expressive structures of feeling," and therefore modern stylistic approaches to Shakespeare have "been able to ignore the rhetorical framework in the mature style and discuss the life and feeling direct" (Shakespeare's Use 406). No critic has been able, in George Wright's opinion, to show that rhetoric remains an integral part of how, "in the plays from Hamlet on, when the school figures are loosened, transformed, adapted to his most complex purposes, the great Shakespearean style performs its work" (411). Yet critics with a detailed knowledge of Renaissance rhetoric, such as Victor or Sister Miriam Joseph, do find numerous examples of individual rhetorical figures in Shakespeare's mature plays, and the issue here may not be whether Shakespeare abandoned rhetoric in mid-career, but rather how, and why, the rhetoric in the later plays subtly conceals itself from an audience's attention.

A rather obvious approach to this issue, given Shakespeare's tendency to 'recycle' (Kenneth Muir's term) throughout his career, is to compare the rhetorical techniques of characters from early and mature plays whose dramatic lives are structurally and thematically analogous. Richard II and King Lear are two exceptionally eloquent candidates who meet this criteria, and my essay will use texts such as Erasmus' On Copia of Words and Ideas, Puttenham's The Arte of English Poesie, and Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence to analyze the style of Richard and Lear.

My emphasis upon the figurist tradition in Renaissance rhetoric will follow Vickers and his theory of the emotional efficacy of the schemes, yet will also include a discussion of tropes and of the delivery called for by each speaker's elocution; this performance approach to rhetorical criticism will allow me to consider speaker, speech, and audience while analyzing both the "internal" and "external" (Browne 91) rhetoric of the two deposed kings. By comparing and contrasting their rhetorical strategies during both the loss of their material kingdoms and their subsequent growth in self-knowledge, my analysis will show that however obvious its importance in the language of Richard II, Renaissance rhetoric can also help us to appreciate the skills by which Shakespeare created even so wondrous and complex a style as that spoken by Lear.

Steven Mailloux

Rhetorical Pragmatism and the Greek Sophists

This paper will examine current revisionist histories of Sophistic rhetoric by placing those histories in relation to the revival of American pragmatism. I will begin with the texts attributed to Protagoras and Gorgias and then outline two traditions of interpreting these Sophists' arguments: The first, dominant tradition derives from various readings and misreadings of Plato's attack on the Sophists. This first tradition includes readings that dismiss the Sophists as trivial and unimportant in Western thought; others that see the Sophists as philosophically significant but reject their subjective idealism and relativism; and others that repeat charges about the ethical dangers of Sophistic rhetoric. I will examine the arguments of later participants in this first tradition, including Hegel, Zeller, and several twentieth century historians of philosophy and rhetoric. A second tradition challenges the first either by arguing in favor of Sophistic subjective idealism, or by rejecting the claim that Sophistic rhetoric is dangerous, or, most interestingly, by proposing that the Sophists are not subjective idealists at all, that relativism is impossible, and that the dangers of rhetoric cannot be proscribed by philosophy. Later participants in this second tradition include Grote, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Kerferd, and Jarrett.

I will then examine that strand of revisionist interpretations within the second tradition that rejects the dominant Hegelian reading of the Sophists as subjective idealists and the Platonic view of foundational philosophy as a solution to the dangers of Sophistic rhetoric. I will make this examination through a reading of an interpreter of the Sophists usually ignored by most historians of rhetoric and philosophy: the British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller. In particular I will focus on his 1908 pamphlet, Plato or Protagoras? and his essays in Mind responding to reviews of the pamphlet. I will conclude by relating my reading of Schiller to current revisionist histories of Sophistic rhetoric and argue that the recent emergence of neo-pragmatism fits quite comfortably within the Sophistic rhetorical tradition.

Donald G. Marshall

Making Letters Speak: Interpreter as Orator in Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*"

It is a well-established received opinion that Augustine's is a "rhetoric of silence": for him, language must ultimately extinguish itself and yield to an immediate, contemplative relation to God. While acknowledging the erudition and analytic subtlety on which this insight is based, I want to make a case for an opposed valuation of the discursive in Augustine. Tracing the theme of language in the *Confessions*, we can see Augustine's career secretly progressing toward an unprecedented discursive ideal, the figure of the preacher. Once Augustine takes on this role, he speaks out his understanding of scripture, particularly the Creation story and the Psalms. In *De doctrina christiana*, he most fully explores how an individual called to the role of Christian teacher is to go about meeting that call. Implicitly drawing on a division that runs all through ancient culture, Augustine situates the preacher or teacher between the philosopher and the rhetorician. This contrast can be put in terms of an opposition between the written and the spoken. "Literacy" and "orality" go beyond a simple empirical contrast between graphic marks and vocalization. I accept Brian Stock's cautions about the complex interrelations of the two realms. By late antiquity, philosophical schools gave over much of their activity to the interpretation of texts. That interpretative activity aimed to lead students to a particular way of life that both facilitated and manifested philosophic insight. Interpretation was "silent" in the sense that it did not enter into the sphere of public life, but remained sheltered in the academic grove where a few friends spoke quietly to each other. By contrast, the rhetorician spoke in public. His "orality" comprised elaborate patterns of style and thought that were supposed to make his speeches effective with a non-select audience gathered within a political entity. The preacher is situated between these two figures. His specific task is to read and understand scripture, but then to articulate that understanding to an audience bound together as the body of Christ, a transposition of the *ecclesia* from a political to a religious context. Bound to the task of expounding scripture, he must draw on the interpretive resources of philosophy, at the same time losing the rhetorician's power freely to invent discourse so as to master any given situation. But he must employ some kind of rhetoric in order to speak out, to enable scripture (once interpreted) to address a congregation. My aim will be to characterize more precisely the interplay between the philosophical and the rhetorical, the written and the spoken, as Augustine rethinks ancient culture in order to gather resources for the preacher's unprecedented discursive task.

John Stephen Martin

JOHN WITHERSPOON AND RHETORIC AT PRINCETON

John Witherspoon's place in American education during the eighteenth century is of great importance. He was the President of the Presbyterian College of New Jersey--present-day Princeton University--from 1768 to 1793, except for the war years of 1776 to 1782, when all universities were closed. Witherspoon introduced the study of philosophy, French, history, and oratory--that subdivision of rhetoric which was to blossom in the colonies, preparing men to raise their voices in political life. Although his interest in oratory was a result both of his calling as a Presbyterian minister able to deliver learned sermons, his personal achievement was in implementing his belief that education should fit a man for public usefulness.

When John Witherspoon came from Scotland to Princeton in 1768, his view of rhetoric was greatly stimulated by the Scottish Common Sense school of philosophy. He subscribed to the typical view of the Scottish school, as he put it, that "the impression [of a sensation within the mind] itself implies and supposes something external that communicates it, and cannot be separated from that supposition"; therefore, ideas do reflect external actualities.

Witherspoon wrote out his own lectures as a complement to Kames and Blair on style, and they were published posthumously in 1800 as *Lectures on Moral Philosophy and Eloquence*. Initially, he followed Hutchinson in making a distinction between "taste" and the "moral sense," and dabbled in explaining the "sublime" while upholding traditional biblical exegesis. However, his true mentor was George Campbell, who prepared Scottish youth for the demands of modern industrial life, in which salesmanship and practical inventiveness were central. In teaching moral philosophy to the fourth-year students, Witherspoon emphasized that there be a practical, moral end to education, and that intellection not be an end in itself. Such practicality, however, assumed that whatever was true was both practical and "experiential"--to be known by experience, and what was practical was indicative of what was true. Thus, rhetoric not only gave an individual an approach to persuasion; it also revealed experientially how an individual came upon truths as the mind struggled to persuade others. In sum, rhetoric--in its common-sense method of inventing arguments to deal with practical problems--became a means of articulating problems between the mind, the "moral sense," and the external world. Furthermore, in inventing such arguments, rhetoric regained its role of making experience logical, an aspect that it had lost during the century in the eyes of analytic, empirical philosophers. Witherspoon's rhetoric thus became America's moral philosophy.

María Rubio Martín

Art, Eloquence and Literary Criticism in the Ximénez Patón's Rhetoric

The treatment of some questions about the Rhetoric and Poetics in the Mercurius Trimegistus (1621) show us the intimate relation between Ximénez Patón and the contemporary rhetoric. In this sense we study three points about this relation:

- Ximénez Patón and the classical rhetoric system: the schemes of inventio, dispositio and elocutio.
- Rhetoric as elocutio.
- Eloquence, conceptism and the spanish literature in the seventeen century.

Kathleen Massey

A Sturdy Pedagogy:
John Ward's A System of Oratory

Rhetoric has always pointed towards practice as well as theory. We can see this clearly in the work of John Ward. Ward intended A System of Oratory for his middle-class auditors at Gresham College--the citizens, merchants and artisans of London--as a sturdy pedagogy, systematized and clear, designed for the needs of a non-elitist audience interested in acquiring practical knowledge.

Gresham College, founded in 1597, was a "center of adult education," as Christopher Hill points out in Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution, open to all comers, without charge, and without the necessity of exams or degrees, in distinct contrast to Oxford and Cambridge. Ward knew well the "Rules and Orders for the Readers in Gresham College," outlined in Sir Thomas Gresham's will and later confirmed by the trustees of Gresham College--the Mercers Guild and the Mayor and City Council of London: The lectures were to be chiefly in English so that "the good, that will ensue, wilbee mo^t publique" for "the founder seemeth to have a special respect of the citizens, of whome few or none understand the Latine tongue," and they were to be practical, aimed at the "common people," and, as in the Rules for the professor of law, be selected "as best may serve to the good liking and capacitie of the saied auditorie, and ar more usuall in common practice." Because Ward took such instructions to Gresham professors very seriously, he designed his series of lectures to teach the practical art of persuasion and to give the people "soe much tast of learning, as that they shall not dispise it."

Although it has been held by historians that Ward's system was seriously outdated, my research shows that his rhetoric played a quietly influential role in supporting an art which did, indeed, outlive the eighteenth-century.

My work follows that of social historians such as Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine who rely on the evidence found in textbooks, student notes and theses in order to determine the realities of humanist education apart from the pieties.

James M. May

CICERO AND THE BEASTIES

At four separate stages of his career, Cicero characterizes his chief archenemies, Verres, Catiline, Clodius, and Antony, in terms descriptive of some sort of animal or inhuman beast. The orator regularly juxtaposes this portrait of personified darkness and evil, shaded by recurring character themes of madness, frenzy, and debauchery, to a sharply contrasting portrait of personified goodness, namely that of Cicero supported by all loyal Romans. Such character delineation (as previous scholarship has already indicated; cf. Wooten, *Cicero's Philippics*, 63-68 and May, *Trials of Character*, 148 ff.) is but a part of Cicero's grander rhetorical strategy of presenting his audience with two mutually exclusive alternatives that in reality leave little room for choice.

It is perhaps striking that Cicero, an orator skilled and copious in the art of character delineation, should rely so heavily on one image to describe all of his major foes. Yet this portrait is not, at least for him, merely a hackneyed, dead metaphor, or a slick rhetorical tactic, or a stock epithet of invective. Rather, a close examination of the word *bestia* (and other related words) in the works of Cicero indicates that his choice of characterization is deliberate and central to his belief about human beings and their relationship to the community and to the state.

The bond that links together all humanity is, according to Cicero, the bond of *ratio et oratio*, speech and reason, those faculties that raise human beings above every other beast (cf. *De Off.* 1. 50). It is this natural bond that enables them to form laws, societies, and governments; when humans employ these faculties for the good of their fellows, they are most ennobled and glorified. When someone, however, through the perversion of these gifts, assails the community of justice that has been established by his fellow-human beings, that man renounces his humanity and becomes a beast in human form. Tarquin the Proud, who betrayed his office, abandoned his solicitousness for the people and turned to tyranny was, according to Cicero (*Rep.* 2. 48), such a man:

For as soon as this king turned to a mastery less just than before, he instantly became a tyrant; and no creature more vile or horrible than a tyrant, or more hateful to gods and men, can be imagined; for though he bears a human form, yet he surpasses the most monstrous of the wild beasts in the inhumanity of his nature. For how could the name of human being rightly be given to a creature who desires no community of justice, no partnership in human life with his fellow-citizens--aye, even with any part of the human race?

It is no surprise that Cicero would interpret the activities of Verres, Catiline, Clodius, and Antony as attacks on the community of justice and the fellowship of society by madmen suing for tyrannical powers (cf., e.g., his characterization of Clodius as a tyrant in *Pro Mil.* 78-91). This line of reasoning not only explains Cicero's motivation for similarly depicting these four adversaries at four distinct times during his career, but also accounts for the severity and bitterness with which he deals with these enemies: By calling for their elimination from the state, Cicero is advocating not murder, but rather tyrannicide, the duty of a patriot who is working for the common interest of justice and the preservation of the state (*De Off.* 3. 32):

We have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill;--nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper measures; for as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage beasts in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity.

Glen McGlish

Defoe and Rhetoric: The Example of Colonel Jack

This essay considers the representation of rhetoric in the novels of Daniel Defoe--one of the more remarkable rhetors of eighteenth-century England. G. A. Starr has argued that the term "casuistry" best describes the debates that distinguish the external debates featured in these works are central to Defoe's fictive world, I find the term casuistry itself less useful. Casuistry is defined specifically as "That part of ethics which resolves cases of conscience, applying the general rules of religion and morality to particular instances in which 'circumstances alter case,' or in which there appears to be a conflict of duties." Yet Starr applies this very specific system of thought to "the weighing of counterpoised circumstances" in general, even when ethics are not directly involved. Thus, rhetoric (the broad-based, humanist tradition), rather than casuistry (the specific practice of ethical decision making), best describes the extensive range of "counterpoised circumstances" present in Defoe's work. So important is the practice of rhetoric, in fact, that one could consider it a central unifying force in Defoe's fictive narratives. Along with--and, ultimately, complexly related to--the theme of survival, rhetoric occupies a primary position in the consciousness of Defoe's narrators and characters. In this essay, I would like to marshal Colonel Jack--perhaps the most uniformly positive portrayal of rhetoric in the canon--to exemplify Defoe's abiding interest in the powers of persuasion. I will close by discussing the broader ramifications of Defoe's specific interest in rhetoric, both for eighteenth-century fiction and for rhetoric in general.

J. E. McGuire &
Trevor Melia

The Rhetoric of the Radical Rhetoric of Science

We shall show that Gross, and those whom he follows, accords to rhetoric the privileges he denies to science. In so doing he assimilates the minimal realism we do propose to crude forms of realism that we do not propose. We reject the 'Gods eye view', the claim that there is one true theory which represents all there is to be represented. In our view the practices of science are fundamental. We take seriously, therefore, the scientific contention that science interacts with a non-human world through the exercise of its practices. Among Gross's rhetorical strategems is the technique of exclusive dichotomizing, of assimilating issues to one or other extreme on a spectrum. He draws his opponent to a polar opposite on a spectrum of positions, further assimilates all the intermediate positions to one or other of the poles, and then constrains his opponent's choice to one or other of the polar opposites. This and other rhetorical devices stack the deck toward the radical rhetoric of science which he espouses. They allow him to argue that brute facts and brute regularities are not science. Science, on the contrary, is entirely an exercise in constructed linguistic analysis, and thus reduces to text. We are therefore offered a radical choice between the Royal Society's Nullius in verba, and what Peter Dear has aptly called Totius in verba. We shall continue to press the claims of a rhetoric of science situated at the equilibrium between these two extremes.

Kees Meerhoff

Méthode et interprétation à la Renaissance

S'inspirant de l'oeuvre de Rudolphe Agricola, le pédagogue allemand Philipp Melanchthon a mis au point une méthode d'analyse destinée à dégager la technique oratoire des grands auteurs sacrés et profanes.

Par un curieux effet circulaire, cette approche méthodique met en lumière la méthode de composition exemplaire des auteurs analysés.

Appliquée et enseignée un peu partout en Europe de l'Ouest, la méthode herméneutique a servi de base à l'homilétique moderne.

Rev. Judith M. McDaniel

Cursus and the Ars Rithmica in the Late Middle Ages

This paper examines the theoretical connection between ars rithmica and the rhythmical prose style known as cursus. Drawing and clarifying distinctions between metre and rhythm, quantity and quality of syllabic verse, poetic and prosaic inflexion in Greek and Latin composition, it explores the historical roots and abstract bases of cursus from the Classical era to the medieval in order to propose some ramifications for future study from the conjunction of history, theory, and practice.

Beginning with the proposition that the segregation of knowledge into separate fields was not as absolute to the medieval as to the enlightenment mind, this paper develops the thesis that while cursus was a development of the rhetorical tradition studied as part of the trivium, a major component of its theoretical basis was a part of the quadrivium, the distinction between mathematical and musical pulse.

It concludes with an examination of the relationship between the theoretical bases and practical applications of cursus.

Allan Megill

Topics and Justification in Historiography

The proposed paper is a continuation of two earlier papers on theory of historiography that I have written: "Recounting the Past: 'Description,' Explanation, and Narrative in Historiography," *American Historical Review* 94, 3 (June 1989): 627-53, and "Grand Narrative and the Discipline of History," which will probably be published in a proposed anthology edited by Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner.

In the first of those papers, I explicitly left aside "the justificatory question: What grounds do we, author and audience, have for believing that such-and-such was the case, and that such-and-such is why it was the case?" (637 n.39). The proposed paper aims to pick up this question--expanding it, now, to include not only the question of why we should think a given historical account to be true, but why we should think it to be worth attending to.

My methodological aim in this series of papers is to operate on as general a level as possible. Hence the concern is not primarily why particular works of history, or assertions within works of history, have been thought true and important, but rather with what more generally stands behind their being thought true and important.

I do not think that it is possible to provide a universal theory of historiographical justification, as I think one can of the tasks of historiography (which I see as recounting, explanation, argument or justification, and interpretation). But I am inclined to think that one can provide a rhetoric of historiographical justification. Such a rhetoric would see the essential task of the historian as that of enriching our grasp of reality through the application, not of universal theory, but of particular and somewhat localized topoi (I say somewhat localized, because the interest of a topos is precisely that it is applicable in more than one place). And appeal to the idea of the topos means, of course, an appeal to an aspect of the rhetorical tradition.

The paper is as yet unwritten, and so I cannot predict what will be delivered in it. However, I do see it as both stimulated and challenged by the writings of two previous authors in particular. One of these is of course Hayden White, whose work has set many people to thinking along rhetorically-inspired lines. The other is Paul Veyne, whose fundamental idea (in Writing History) that historians ought to engage in the task of "lengthening the questionnaire," that is, of making the corpus of possible questions richer, seems to me to involve a modern reinvention of the notion of topoi. The ancient rhetorician strove to prepare his mind by stocking it with the intellectual matrices that are the topoi; the modern historian, if she knows what she is doing, seeks both to exploit and to add to the store of such matrices. So that is the idea that the paper will try to develop.

Lilia Metodieva

L'influence de l'oeuvre de Jean Chrysostome et de Grands de Cappadocienne, sur le développement de la prose rhétorique bulgare du IX-ème et X-ème siècles

La patristique byzantine orientale atteint son point culminant dans l'oeuvre des Grands représentants du cercle Cappadoce et Basile de Grand, Grégoire de Nazianze, surnomme le Theologien, Grégoire de Nysse et de Jean Chrysostome Bouche - d'Or.

Ils exercèrent une très grande influence sur la naissance et le développement de la tradition culturelle orthodoxe slave.

Je parlerai de cette influence dans les directions suivantes:

1. La formation des genres dans la prose rhétorique bulgare ancienne. (a) Oeuvres polémiques -- "Des lettres" de Tchenorizetz Hrabar, qui datent de la fin du IX-ème s. et la "Polémique avec les Boqomils" de Prezviter Kozma du X-ème s. (b) Discours panégyrique et édifiants. Je me baserai sur les discours de Cyrill et Méthode, de Clément Ohridski, de Konstantin Preslavski, D'Ioan Exarch.

2. Le lien entre la structure byzantine et la structure bulgare ancienne dans les différents types de discours.

3. Les particularités stylistiques de la prose rhétorique de Jean Chrysostome et de Grands Cappadocienne et des érudits bulgares: structure expressive et emotionnelle des oeuvres rhétorique, métaphorique, et symbolistes; aspects herméneutique, du style.

De cette manière je voudrais montrer les points communs ainsi que les différences de ces deux cultures orthodoxes -- la culture byzantine et la culture slave.

Je voudrais accentuer non pas l'imitation, mais les particularités de la prose rhétorique bulgare ancienne qui atteint l'apogée de son développement durant cette période.

Carolyn R. Miller

RHETORIC AND COMMUNITY

One of the most pronounced themes in recent rhetorical thought has been the emphasis on the social aspects of language-use, as opposed to the formal or the cognitive. But the implications of that theme cannot be accepted in an easy academic way, for they lead directly to the political. What underlies any discussion of the political is a model of community. In this essay I want to explore the role that "community" has come to play in rhetorical theory, a role that is, it seems to me, not satisfactorily conceptualized. This essay will build on the work I am currently doing on the *polis* as a model of community in Greek rhetorics but will concentrate on the ways "community" is at work in twentieth-century rhetoric: in Perelman (the "community of minds"), Toulmin (the argument field and the forum), and Burke (identification and division), as well as in current composition studies.

The community basis for rhetoric raises problems for many, both philosophical and moral problems. If a community, a discourse community or an interpretive community, is definable at all, is it unrealistically monolithic? Can it permit change—principled change? Does "community" as a basis for rhetoric merely substitute facile ethnocentrism for self-righteous foundationalism? Does a focus on "community" encourage exclusion, repression, domination? Does it eclipse the individual? I will discuss the ways these problems have been raised in recent rhetorical studies (both theoretical and pedagogical); examine new models of community that have been proposed by Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, and William Corlett (and possibly others); and consider the question of what might constitute effective citizenship in a rhetorical community.

Celica Milovanovic

GENERA CAUSARUM AND THE LEVELS OF STYLE
IN EARLY MEDIEVAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
(AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS)

The Aristotelian tripartite classification of *genera causarum* (or *genera rhetorices*) into *genus iudiciale*, *genus deliberativum* and *genus demonstrativum*, survived well into the medieval, Byzantine era, despite the fact that political oratory was long since dead, and the only *genus* left was actually the *demonstrativum*. Moreover, that classification was not only to be found in theoretical treatises (e.g. Donatres, Sicelictes), but was also systematically applied by literary critics and commentators (e.g. Basilius Minimus, John Geometres, Nicetas of Heracleia etc.). Thus, it is not unusual to find the commentators arguing whether such and such of Gregory of Nazianzus' speeches is judicial or deliberative. For in their minds the three rhetorical *genera* represent something else: three different styles. Gregory himself, by the way, is likely to use a term like *ὑπερβατικόν* as a stylistic term, designating not the kind of speech (*genus iudiciale*), but a more passionate, expressive style of delivery. Therefore, it seems clear that at a certain time (the 4th c. being *terminus ante quem*) the theory of the *tria genera causarum* merged with the theory of the three styles (*genera dicendi* or *elocutionis*) – *genus submissum*, *genus temperatum* and *genus grande*. It is not easy to determine exactly when that happened. Therefore, the emphasis of this paper will be on the question not when, but how the two sets of *genera* merged, combined and corresponded to each other in early medieval theory and practice.

Another question also will be looked into, namely that of the parallel developments of rhetorical theory in the East and in the West. So far, all the evidence mentioned rests on the Greek side. However, it seems that supporting materials can be found on the Latin side, too. St. Augustine, for example, even though following Cicero's theory of the levels of style, nevertheless shows a different understanding of the relationship between the *genera causarum* and the *genera dicendi* (Book IV of *De doctrina Christiana*). A detailed analysis of Augustine's vs. Cicero's theory will show that clearly. In addition, further evidence will be found in the late Latin rhetoricians (*Rhetores Latini minores*); they seem to combine (or confuse) the two theories, too; as can well be seen from the following quote from Fortunatianus: *Genera civilium questionum quot sunt? Tria. Quae? Demonstrativum, deliberativum, iudiciale. Haec ab aliis quae appellantur? Genera dicendi.* (Halm, p.81)

John Monfasani

Aspects of Anti-Quintilianism in the Renaissance

It is virtually a cliché of modern scholarship to say that the discovery of the full text of Quintilian's Institutio oratoria early in the Renaissance opened up a new chapter in the history of Quintilian's influence on the development of European rhetoric and culture. But Quintilian did not invariably evoke admiration from his natural audience, the Renaissance humanists. Indeed, his understanding of the orator, his approach to the technical aspects of rhetoric, his attitude towards philosophy, and the intellectual stance of some of his enthusiasts, most notable Lorenzo Valla, provoked a backlash of criticism which one can trace from the fifteenth through the sixteenth centuries. I propose to analyze this current of Anti-Quintilianism from George of Trebizond to Peter Ramus. In the process, I shall deal with little-known works such as Mattheus Collatius' De fine oratoris in Quintilian pro M.T. Ciceronis and also a previously unknown comparison between Quintilian and Cicero which I found in a manuscript in the Escorial. In the end I hope to show that a major reason the criticism was the rivalry between conflicting visions of rhetoric which we can trace back to time of Plato's criticism of the Greek Sophists.

Lucia Calboli Montefusco

Quintilian and the function of the oratorical exercitatio

The importance of the exercitatio involves, in Quintilian's opinion, the whole education of students learning how to become oratores. Actually, together with a natural bent and the knowledge of the art, it helps in getting this firma facillitas which is essential to reach the necessary vis dicendi. So Quintilian not only shares with the preceding tradition the idea that the triad natura, ars, exercitatio is the foundation of the oratorical ability, but he also distinguishes very clearly the three aspects of an exercitatio which finds in the school and in the rhetorical practice of declamation its greatest room.

Jean Dietz Moss

Rhetoric in the Cause of Science: Kepler's Endorsement of Galileo's Sidereus nuncius

When Galileo published the Sidereus nuncius in 1610, his major objective was to describe the marvelous vista of the heavens, "never before seen by man," as it was revealed to him by the telescope. A subsidiary but important aim was to gain the patronage of the Medici family, and to that end he included an effusive dedication to the young Cosimo II. To accomplish both objectives he needed to establish the credibility of his discoveries, for the telescope was regarded suspiciously by many, and he was not at that time a well-known authority.

To gain support for his revelations he sent a copy of the book to Johannes Kepler, who was Imperial Mathematician to the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolph II, asking for his opinion. Kepler was delighted to endorse the work, since Galileo proclaims there that his observations provide evidence for the Copernican System, and Kepler had years before announced his own belief in that explanation of celestial movements. Kepler chose to convey his opinion of the book in the form of a letter, which he entitled for publication Dissertatio cum Nuncio sidereo or Conversation with the Heavenly Messenger, a play on the title of Galileo's work.

As a former teacher of rhetoric as well as of mathematics and astronomy, Kepler had a thorough understanding of rhetorical devices. He uses the conventions of the letter form expertly to impart his message that truth is his and Galileo's sole concern. Since Kepler knew that he and others did not possess instruments adequate to verify Galileo's account, he attempted to persuade his readers that Galileo was to be trusted, that his observations were accurate, and that the inferences offered were valid. This placed Kepler's task in the realms of both dialectics and rhetoric. Classical dialectical topoi and his own ethos were his primary methods of persuasion.

Wolfgang G. Müller

Simulation and Dissimulation in Renaissance Rhetoric
and Drama

A decisive development in the history of rhetoric in the Renaissance is a growing consciousness of the centrality of pretence and its various subtypes in the process of persuasion. My paper will focus on two basic types of pretence: simulation, in the words of Richard Steele, "a pretence of what is not", and dissimulation, "a concealment of what is". The distinction between these two terms has a long history, but except for Quintilian (Institutio oratoria, VI.3.85), it was not until the Renaissance that rhetoricians attempted to put this distinction on a clear theoretical basis. A case in point is C. G. Ittig's treatise De simulatione et dissimulatione olim et hodie usuali (1709).

Now the increasing sensitivity towards pretence and its various forms is paralleled in the drama of the Renaissance, which in its rise to its highest peak brought a multitude of ever more ingenious pretenders on the stage, among whom simulators like Shakespeare's Duke of Gloucester in Richard III and dissimulators like Iago in Othello can be distinguished, although it is obvious that simulation always involves some degree of dissimulation and vice versa. This theatrical phenomenon had its counterpart in political theory and was in some degree indebted to the latter, as the type of the Stage Machiavel shows. In Machiavellianism and Tacitism the need to distinguish between different forms of pretence became ever more imperative. Thus a political aphorism like Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare was changed to Qui nescit simulare, ac dissimulare, nescit regnare. My paper will illustrate this development towards a greater consciousness of the individual forms of pretence in the fields of rhetorical and political theory and in the history of drama. It will argue that the Renaissance is, in the history of rhetoric, to be regarded as a period in which the art of pretence is given greater weight than ever before or after.

James J. Murphy

A TWO-PAGE HISTORY OF RHETORIC:
PAGE ONE. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Most educated Americans, even those academics dealing with language uses of various kinds, are unfamiliar with the developments that have led up to the present state of affairs. In the absence of such knowledge, re-discoveries are treated as innovations, fairly recent institutions are regarded as fixed for all time, and any historical impulse is immediately rejected as arcane.

Modes of presentation create major problems in trying to rectify this situation. There is of course little difficulty in approaching the serious scholar accustomed to accepting various kinds of evidence, including the historical: for this fairly small class there is ample evidence to be found in such writers as Kennedy, Murphy, Horner, Conley, or Berlin. There is, however, a very much larger population unaccustomed to such intensive study. Moreover, they are typically unready even to begin a study for which they feel no motivation. For this larger group the task is not to provide apodictic or scientific demonstration (to use Aristotle's term), but to engage their attention enthymematically.

One possible way out of this dilemma is to explore modes of presentation other than the standard book-length expository history. For example, the attached one-page diagram shows the essential elements leading up to the present situation in America. If published in the appropriate journals--in literature, in speech communication, in English composition, in linguistics--such a one-page "history" could serve as a motivator to lead readers in search of the scholarly evidence already available in book form.

A similar one-page schematic could be drawn up for Europe.

Carlo Natali

Ars ed actus: il fine dell'arte retorica secondo Quintiliano

Un elemento caratteristico della nozione tradizionale greca di retorica era il collegamento costante dell'arte retorica con l'idea della forza, della lotta e dello scontro. Mentre chi propone oggi una rivalutazione della retorica insiste sulla sua "democraticità intrinseca" (Barilli), gli autori antichi non sembravano pensarla allo stesso modo. Per Diodoro Siciliano possedere il *logos* retorico è una caratteristica che distingue i Greci dai Barbari, ed equivale ad "essere più forte, vincere", il *logos* retorico è un'arma, uno strumento, che può essere utilizzato nei modi più diversi, è rivolto in tante direzioni. Anche Aristotele, elencando le motivazioni per cui la retorica è utile, afferma che sarebbe strano che fosse considerato vergognoso il non sapersi difendere con le mani, e non fosse considerato vergognoso il non sapersi difendere con le parole, mentre esse sono proprie dell'uomo più che l'uso delle mani. E su posizioni analoghe sono Gorgia, Isocrate, Platone.

Quasi tutti gli autori antichi hanno sostenuto concordemente questa posizione. L'eccezione principale è costituita da alcuni capitoli dell'*Institutio oratoria* di Quintiliano (II 17-18): la retorica, afferma Quintiliano, è un'arte 'pratica' nel senso aristotelico del termine, cioè un'arte il cui fine si realizza nell'attuazione stessa, attuazione che è fine a sé stessa e non necessariamente deve avere risultati pratici successivi; quindi se il retore ha parlato in maniera onesta, con stile adatto e contenuti moralmente positivi, ha realizzato il fine dell'arte, anche se non è riuscito a convincere (cfr. in specie II 17, 22-24). Quindi il realizzare una bella orazione è il fine principale della retorica. Ciò è più facile per gli uomini dabbene: il *vir bonus* è anche l'oratore più efficace (XII 1, 9-11). Tale posizione programmaticamente affermata da Quintiliano non è però mantenuta in modo coerente in tutta l'*Institutio oratoria*.

Thomas Newkirk

The Missing Voices: How Students Viewed Barrett
Wendell's Composition Class.

The histories of composition teaching at Harvard have typically ignored the perspectives of students. Scholars have, for example, concluded — without examining classroom practice — that Wendell's lectures on Force, Clarity, and Elegance were of little use to students. James Berlin, while giving no indication that he has read any of the daily themes in Wendell's course, concludes that they are ineffective in teaching writing. But these daily themes, themselves, provide an unparalleled window upon Wendell's composition course, and upon Wendell himself. Housed in the Harvard Archives are approximately 6000 daily themes written for Wendell, most of them written in 1896. Each student wrote approximately 200 themes of about 150 words each, and many of these, perhaps inevitably, comment on the writing course. For example, there are many complaints about the "blind" peer reviews that apparently were a key feature of Wendell's course. Drawing on this material I will attempt to add the students' perspectives to the commentary that, until recently, has been basically limited to examination of textbooks.

Lester Olson

Pictorial Rhetoric as Indices of Cultural and Personal Transformation: Benjamin Franklin's Representations of America

This presentation will focus on the pictorial images that Benjamin Franklin designed to represent those British colonies in America that became the United States. He invented at least one such image during each decade between 1754 and 1784. In 1754, "JOIN, or DIE" represented the colonies as a segmented snake in a woodcut designed to promote unity among the colonies during the French and Indian war. A decade later, "MAGNA BRITANNIA: her Colonies REDUC'd" portrayed the colonies as the severed arms and legs of Britannia in a political cartoon designed to advocate imperial unity during the Stamp Act controversy of 1765-66. Another decade later, in 1776, Franklin's "WE ARE ONE," a design on the continental currency, designated the United States as thirteen interlocked rings to suggest unity among the States during the initial war years. Finally, in 1783, "LIBERTAS AMERICANA"--a commemorative medal issued toward the conclusion of the Revolution--depicted the United States as the infant Hercules strangling two serpents.

I am investigating this pictorial rhetoric as elements in Franklin's visual communication about the nature of colonial union, not only because these images provide a vehicle to explore Franklin's evolving vision of America, but also because these images reflected and promoted changes in American culture throughout the Revolutionary era. Above all, I want to know the underlying reasons for the fundamental differences among these images considered as indices of the transformations in American culture and Franklin's vision of America.

This project investigates the hypothesis that pictorial rhetoric can provide a useful index for personal and cultural transformations. For example, the snake device on "JOIN, or DIE" was not initially a symbol of protest or rebellion within the British empire. Instead, it dramatically symbolized the need for well-orchestrated action against an outside threat from the French and Indians in 1754. Franklin's idea of union at the time of "JOIN, or DIE" was not radical; but rather was a practical, military necessity. Even so, a decade later, during the Stamp Act controversy of 1765-1766, American protestors appropriated this image in the Constitutional Courant to urge colonial opposition to the British law. Franklin sought to counter the radical use of the image by distributing "MAGNA BRITANNIA" among Americans to underscore the vital nature of imperial unity. Despite Franklin's efforts, the snake device took on a life of its own in American politics: Loyalists connected the image with the Judeo-Christian tradition wherein the serpent represented guile, deceit, and treachery, while Patriots countered those efforts by associating the image with eternity, vigilance, and prudence.

Kathryn & Sean Patrick O'Rourke

QUINTILIAN'S INFLUENCE ON OBADIAH WALKER

The lasting influence of classical rhetoric on subsequent ages has been the focus of much recent study. One important concern has been the influence of particular authors, especially Cicero and Quintilian, upon the rhetorical and educational theories of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the seventeenth century. John Ward, for example, has examined the glosses and commentaries on Cicero from antiquity through the Renaissance, and Wilbur Samuel Howell has traced Ciceronian rhetoric into the eighteenth century. As for Quintilian, F. H. Colson has described the relationship between Quintilian and early Christian thought, while Priscilla Boskoff has suggested that even the mutilated text of the Institutio oratoria had some effect on the development of rhetoric in the Late Middle Ages.

And yet a great deal of Quintilian's enduring legacy remains unknown. The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of Quintilian's influence into the seventeenth century. More specifically, our goal is to explore the relationship between Quintilian's Institutio oratoria and the two dominant works of Obadiah Walker (1616-1699): Of Education (1673) and Some Instructions Concerning the Art of Oratory (1659).

We investigate four questions concerning Quintilian's influence on Walker. First, concerning the importance of rhetoric, to what extent was rhetoric similarly situated in each author's educational system? Second, as regards the nature of rhetoric, in what ways did Walker maintain and/or alter the dominant tenets of Quintilian's rhetorical theory? Third, in regard to the uses of rhetoric, what did each see to be the functions of rhetoric in the world of public affairs? And finally, as regards the moral dimension, in what ways did Walker share Quintilian's concerns about the ethics of rhetoric, and how and to what extent did each believe moral training to be an important part of rhetorical training? We conclude that Walker was deeply indebted to Quintilian, and suggest that the influence derives in part from Walker's classical education and in part from a shared view of the nature of human society and the role of public discourse in that society.

The study, therefore, should be of interest to students of rhetoric. It adds to our knowledge of Quintilian's enduring influence, and also begins to explore the rhetoric of Obadiah Walker, a chapter of the history of rhetoric that to date has been virtually ignored.

Sean Patrick O'Rourke

THE DEMISE OF FORENSIC RHETORIC IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND

Of the three classical causae of rhetoric, forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, the first, forensic, exerted the strongest influence on the early development of rhetorical theory. Aristotle plays reluctant witness to this historical fact when he chastises writers of earlier treatises for paying too much attention to forensic rhetoric and for ignoring the deliberative branch. Nonetheless, Aristotle devotes much of his Rhetoric to the forensic, and Hellenistic and Roman rhetoricians from Hermagoras to Quintilian followed his lead.

In striking contrast to the vitality of classical forensic rhetoric stands the virtual mortality of its eighteenth century Scottish counterpart. The purpose of this paper is to chart the demise of forensic rhetoric in eighteenth century Scottish rhetorics, and to describe the historical consequences this demise held for the study and practice of both law and rhetoric.

The study is important because it provides much needed historical perspective to the current scholarship on law and rhetoric, and because our present understanding of eighteenth century Scottish rhetoric lacks a strong assessment of the nature and place of the forensic genre.

The rhetorics examined include the published and unpublished works of Archibald Arthur, James Beattie, Hugh Blair, James Burnett, George Campbell, Alexander Gerard, William Greenfield, Henry Home, David Hume, George Jardine, William Leechman, George Mackenzie, John Ogilvie, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, and Robert Watson. The argument advanced is that the more influential of these works evidence a reconstituted rhetoric which was part of a larger system of moral philosophy, subordinate to logic, literary rather than oral, critical instead of productive, and imbued with the empiricist concern for inartistic proofs. When it was discussed, forensic rhetoric was neither reconstituted to fit into this "new" rhetoric, nor revitalized to stand on its own. The result was a deformed and depleted forensic rhetoric, as useless to the theory of rhetoric it was a part of as it was to the legal community it was to serve.

Terry L. Papillon

Isocrates' Techné and its contributions to the History of Rhetoric

The paper seeks to add to the growing interest in Isocrates as an innovator in rhetorical theory as seen in the recent work of Gaines (Hermes 113.165-170) and Ford ("Isocrates on Writing and the Plastic Arts" forthcoming in T. Poulakos). It argues that a techné of Isocrates did exist, pace Barwick (Philologus 116.43-50) and Cahn (Rhetorica 7.121-144), but in a form different than heretofore thought.

After a brief introduction about Isocrates' attack in Against the Sophists and the Antidosis on those who write rigid technai, three sections discuss 1) the possibility that Barwick went too far in jettisoning all testimonia indicating a techné of Isocrates, basing his conclusions on the fact that discussions of stasis theory in the fragments reveal a post-Hermagorean date. Rather, a hint from Quintilian (3.6.3) shows that Isocrates may have played a part in the origins of stasis theory, which Hermagoras later organized. This being the case, there is no need to date the fragments late and attribute them to an "Isocrates Secundus".

The rejuvenated testimonia provide 2) evidence for a sense of the term techné, from Aristotelian sources, as artificiosae orationes (thus Bake), not as textbooks such the Ad Alexandrum. (This in turn has implications for the nature of the synagoge technon and other theorists like Theodectes, a point mentioned but not developed in the paper).

It will then be argued that 3) Isocrates' transitional position in rhetorical history (cf. Schiappa in Rhetorical Movement, forthcoming 1991) points to his use of precept, example, and philosophia (in the Isocratean sense) which unites the strands of rhetoric, as Kennedy tries to draw them (CRC+ST), into a unique type of educational system.

This method was then immensely successful in his own time, but was pressured by the approaches of Aristotle, leading to a less successful production of orators and oratory. Thus Isocrates' contribution, not only to education - which is everywhere agreed - but to innovations in rhetorical theory and training, i.e. with the creation of a novel form of techné, becomes possible. Future work on Isocrates, then, should seek to solidify Isocrates' place as a theorist as well as a teacher.

James G. Paradis

Samuel Butler, Charles Darwin, and the Rhetorical Construction of Evolution

For nearly twenty years, Samuel Butler engaged Charles Darwin in a series of skirmishes over the history and interpretation of evolutionary theory. This controversy, which had many participants including Darwin's sons and professional associates, centered on the role of purpose in the process of evolution, on which issue Butler revived the Lamarckian behavioral position that acquired characteristics could be inherited. Butler's differences with Darwin, however, were equally concerned with socio-rhetorical issues of how language and institutions collaborate to confer legitimacy on certain discourses, to the exclusion of individuals operating outside the institutions. Butler sought, in response, to test the limits of scientific discourse by satirically imitating the rhetorical mechanisms that helped to construct the literary technologies of normal science. In *Chapters in Erewhon* (1872) on "The Book of the Machines," for example, he explored the formative rhetorical conventions of evolutionary science by experimenting with formal propositions that were semantically absurd. In *Life and Habit* (1878), Butler acted out his expressed intention to write an imitation scientific treatise, integrating closely reasoned with nonsensical argument and adapting terms like "inherited habit" to evolutionary propositions that were often humorously absurd. Yet his treatise so painstakingly exploited the rhetorical conventions of scientific proposition and substantiation that it achieved a level of systematic discussion that caused great confusion in scientific circles. Alfred Wallace and others reviewed the work as an imaginative piece of speculative science. George Romanes dismissed it as an "unscientific" metaphorical exercise aimed at mocking serious evolutionary discourse. This controversy over Butler's rhetorical intentions was still unfolding years after his death in 1902. In this presentation, I explore Butler's attack on the conventions of nineteenth-century evolutionary rhetoric and his assertion that the discourse of Charles Darwin was privileged by institutionally empowered rhetorical conventions.

Isabel Paraiso

The Foundation of Prose Rhythm: Classical and Contemporary Solutions (Spanish)

Within the extensive problematic of the prose rhythm, we propose, in our communication, to study the rhythmic base that supports the other elements that generate rhythm in discourse ("rhythms"), according to certain classical authors and then according to certain Spanish speaking scholars of this century.

Our investigation discloses that the Greco-Roman conception is based on the presupposition that the rhythms of prose are the same of those of verse (Arist. Rhet., III, 8, Cicero: Orator, 90; Quin.: Inst. Orat., IX), although these authors point out that its use in one and another form of discourse is different. The focus which dominates those viewpoints is acoustic. Cicero also suggests that morphological and semantic elements of "compositio" may generate prose rhythm, a theory that he would later discard. In Quintilian we find a new syntactic consideration of rhythm, together with the well-known acoustic focus.

Contemporary Spanish and Latin American scholars (T. Navarro, S. Gili Gaya, A. Alonso, I. Paraiso, G. A. Toledo) study prose rhythm from an Experimental Phoentic's point of view and/or from a syntactic-semantic-acoustic one.

Mary Pardo

"Rhetoric and Figuration: Cennino Cennini and L. B. Alberti On Pictorial Composition"

Students of Italian Renaissance art are well aware of the central role played by Ciceronian models in L. B. Alberti's influential definition of the parts of painting (*De pictura*, Book II). As Michael Baxandall has shown, Alberti--who divided the art of painting into circumscription (contour drawing), composition, and the reception of light (modelling and coloring)--defined composition in terms drawn directly from the Ciceronian analysis of the periodic sentence. Since the discussion of ancient rhetoric already relied extensively on visual metaphor, the application of rhetorical categories to figurative art was easily justified. Alberti's brilliant exploitation of these categories effectively clarified the scope of fifteenth-century pictorial design, and--what is more important--had a continuing impact on subsequent artistic practice and its critical articulation.

Alberti's "rhetorical" analysis of painting was aimed at an already existing workshop definition of the art, such as Cennino Cennini codified in his *Libro del arte*. For Cennini, the art of painting had a double foundation in "science" and manual skill: "science" entailed the application of *fantasia*, while skill of hand specifically consisted in the practice of drawing and coloring tonally rendered, illusionistic forms. Under fantasy, Cennini placed composition, giving it an implied meaning very different from the Albertian, though one also derived from a literary context--in this case, the late medieval discussion of poetic structure and ornamentation.

The literary pedigree of Cennini's "composition"--which leads back again to ancient rhetorical theory, inasmuch as the latter was the foundation of medieval poetics--has received far less attention than Alberti's Ciceronian borrowings. And yet its study is no less rewarding, since Cennini's principle of "fantasy-composition" was not simply supplanted by Alberti's neoclassical *compositio*, but remained in fruitful interaction with it to the end of the fifteenth century, and played a part in Leonardo da Vinci's epochal rethinking of the subject.

It seems natural enough to explain the difference between Cennini's and Alberti's pioneering texts by contrasting the "artisanal"--and old-fashioned--approach of the one to the "humanist"--and innovative--outlook of the other. But if this distinction is correct in certain respects, it also fails to account for the persistence with which seemingly more archaic habits of thought nourished the modernity of Renaissance art. The Renaissance use of rhetorical models provides a better means for assessing the complexity of the historical issues.

Catherine Peadar

Condillac's Expressive Rhetoric

Histories of rhetoric have paid little attention to speculative theories of the origins of language in the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, such theories are pervasive and serve to ground views of language, knowledge, and human nature in many key texts, including the rhetorics of Hugh Blair, James Burnett (Lord Monboddo), and Adam Smith. Influencing the work of all these theorists was a mid-eighteenth-century French *philosophe* Etienne de Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (1714-1780).

This paper will introduce Condillac's expressive, aesthetic theories of rhetoric, which build on his theories of language origins. Condillac is little known in Anglo-American histories of rhetoric, although such figures as Hugh Blair were thoroughly grounded not only in Condillac's *Essay on the Origins of Human Knowledge*, but in contemporary French language theory in general. Condillac has, through assorted accidents of history, either been completely neglected, or, when treated at all, misread simplistically and condemned for having a sterile, mechanical view of language.

However, his treatise *De l'Art d'Ecrire*, part of a multivolume course of study written for the Prince of Parma in the 1760s, contains concepts of an aesthetic, expressive rhetoric. This view of rhetoric, conforming to Eric Skopec's description of expressive rhetorics (McKerrow 1982), departs from neoclassical mimetic-didactic theory to ground itself in expressive values usually identified with Romantic writers. When Condillac and other eighteenth-century philosophers and rhetoricians are characterized strictly as neoclassical, we miss the impact of the belletristic vanguard that signalled the end of "traditional" persuasive rhetoric and the beginning of the aesthetic expressionism that has had such influence on our own century's literary studies. Attention to the Romantic elements in belletristic rhetorics of the period can help us better understand the roots of romanticism as well as the complexity of eighteenth-century language study.

Adriano Pennacini

PAUPERTAS SERMONIS

Quintilian (VIII.3,33 paupertate sermonis laboramus) observed that Latin language was lacking - had been always lacking - in words fit to express scientific and philosophic concepts derived from Greek culture. Moreover, Quintilian said (VIII.6,31) that in his time Latin language employed by writers and cultivated people was no longer able to create words whose sound anyhow was similar to the indicated object, i.e. onomatopoeic words, *tamquam consummata sint omnia*. In face of this process of impoverishment of the language Quintilian suggests that the speaking people are responsible in general for using and keeping old words and in particular for creating new words.

William Pencak

FEAR, LOATHING, AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS

In the works of the men who led the American Revolution, three rhetorical features stand out: a) extreme language: not only Tom Paine speaking of England as a "monster" country and George III as a "royal brute" in Common Sense but even the supposedly conservative John Adams denouncing "ridiculous fancies of sanctified effluvia" in his Discourse on the Canon and Feudal Law and piling up terms such as "artifice, imposture, hypocrisy, and superstition" to describe other nations in later works. b) the tendency to create a sharp dichotomy between a positively denoted America and the negatively denoted rest of the world, evidenced in a shift in language and rhetorical style when describing them. "Enlightenment" "happiness" "productivity" etc. idealize the colonies in contrast to epithets such as those in (a) hurled at other places. c) Fear that America will become a two-class society in which the rich dominate the poor, and how the aristocracy can best be utilized and contained for the benefit of all. Such fear of class divisions is almost omnipresent (even among such supposed aristocrats as Gouverneur Morris and Alexander Hamilton) and both the Revolution and Constitution were designed to avoid them and preserve "American exceptionalism." Although one can find the germ of such thinking in the Puritans and Benjamin Franklin, among others, the paper argues that the Revolution created a propensity for looking at the rest of the world in terms of fear and loathing which still dominates much of our political discourse and effects policy. Examples from contemporary political speeches will be quoted to buttress this last point.

Mercedes Rodríguez Pequeno

La tradition réthorique dans le Zibaldone de Leopardi

Giuseppe Leopardi pense à la création littéraire dans son cahier de notes le Zibaldone. La critique littéraire a remarqué dans cet ouvrage leur rapport avec la poétique classiciste. Dans ce travail nous voulons mettre en relief les sources traditionnelles de la réthorique du settecento qui se trouvent dans ces notes du plus grand poète du romantisme italien.

Nous avons fait attention aux ressources de l'expression littéraire, aux aspects liés aux parties du discours et aux sources réthoriques de caractère argumentatif et persuasif.

Marcello Pera

Rhetoric and Scientific Truth

In this paper I shall focus on two questions: 1) Does a connection between rhetoric and scientific truth exist? 2) If it does, what sense can we attach to scientific truth?

I take rhetoric in a broad sense. It covers both «rhetoric» in the Platonic sense of art of persuading an audience, and «dialectic» in the Aristotelian sense of art of attacking and defending a claim in a debate. «Argumentation» or «persuasive argumentation» would be equivalent expressions.

A negative answer to the first question is typical of all the protagonists of the birth of modern science. According to philosophers and scientists such as Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, as well as Hooke, Locke, and Hobbes, in science there is no room for rhetoric (dialectic) because science has «to overcome, not an adversary in argument, but nature in action» and because while science «aims at truth, rhetoric aims at victory».

Underlying these objections, there was not only an anti-Aristotelian and anti-Scholastic reaction, but a model of scientific research as a game with two players: (1) the human mind, which asks questions by putting forward cognitive claims; (2) nature, which provides answers in the form of observational or experimental data; and a referee or a judge in the middle, that is, scientific method, which evaluates the positive or negative effects the answers have on the questions. According to this model a cognitive claim is true if it is a conclusion inferred from data by means of method (taken as «organon of discovery») or if it is a tentative hypothesis verified in terms of data thanks to method (taken as «canon of justification»).

I shall maintain that the crisis of methodology forces us to consider a model with *three* players: (1) the human mind, (2) nature, and (3) a community of experts. The community plays the role of debating both the presuppositions, pertinence, soundness of the questions, and the quality, reliability, efficiency of the answers. A cognitive claim is to be tested against data provided by nature and confronted with opinions supplied by the community. Therefore, according to this model, a cognitive claim can be said to be true when all the three players have reached an agreement, that is, when it resists the pressure of observations and experiments and convinces the community that this resistance is effective. As an answer to my first question, I shall then maintain that there is an essential link between rhetoric and truth: discussing the answers of nature in a debate within a scientific community is the only way open to us for ascertaining whether our claims are true.

But in what sense is a claim true? The crisis of methodology has challenged the rationality of science, depriving it of epistemic value or treating it as a form of culture as valid as any other. But science is not «routine conversation» or a mere «social construction». Scientific discussions and constructions are conducted and fabricated in terms of arguments relying on factors, both substantive and procedural, that are typical of it and of no other activity. Substantive factors are: facts, epistemic values, accepted theories, assumptions, presumptions, common loci. Procedural factors are: rules for opening, conducting and settling debates. We call these factors *the basis of scientific rhetoric*. As this basis contains facts, science is anchored to nature, but since it also includes other factors, science is embedded in history and culture, too.

Once we identify the basis of scientific rhetoric, we may try to answer our second question. Our proposal is to define rational acceptability in terms of the strength of the arguments put forward in debates, and to define scientific truth in terms of rational acceptability. Thus we say: an argument in a concrete debate is strong if there exist a winning rhetorical strategy that leads to its conclusions on the basis of conceded premises and the substantive and procedural factors obtaining in the situation in which that debate takes place. Then we say: a cognitive claim is rationally acceptable if the arguments supporting it are stronger than those opposing it. Finally we propose: a cognitive claim is true if it turns out to be rationally acceptable at the end of a debate relying on the substantive factors and regimented by the procedural factors of scientific rhetoric.

Laurent Pernot

RHÉTORIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE DANS LES DISCOURS PLATONICIENS D'ÆLIUS ARISTIDE

Dans les Discours platoniciens, le rhéteur grec Ælius Aristide (II^e s. ap. J.-C.) présente une défense de la rhétorique en réponse à l'accusation portée par Platon dans le Gorgias. Les spécialistes d'Aristide ont considéré cette défense comme anachronique, dans ses thèmes et dans son principe. Je me propose de souligner au contraire l'actualité des Discours platoniciens en leur temps :

- La conception de la rhétorique défendue par Aristide n'est pas valable seulement pour l'Athènes classique : elle s'applique à la pratique des sophistes du II^e s., et elle éclaire en particulier les discours épidiectiques d'Aristide lui-même (portrait de l'orateur idéal comme homme de bien et comme éducateur éthique; représentation de l'éloquence comme mission divine et inspirée).
- La réception des Discours platoniciens confirme leur actualité. Ils ont été commentés dans les milieux rhétoriques (scholies, Prolegomena) et ont suscité une vive polémique dans les milieux platoniciens (Capiton, Porphyre, Olympiodore).

Les Discours platoniciens ne se réduisent donc pas au développement d'un topos académique. Ils montrent que la confrontation entre rhétorique et philosophie restait une exigence pour les hommes de la Seconde Sophistique.

Christine Persak

Rhetoric, Science, and the Victorian Social Order

Science played an important role in shaping Victorian concepts of social order. The disciplines of psychology and physiology, which emerged during the period of England's economic transformation, provided compelling new theories of human nature. This paper examines how these theories were used in some popular treatises of the time in order to criticize or justify the emerging social hierarchy.

It begins by discussing the concept of "moral laws" which were frequently invoked in order to explain behavior. Faith in the design of the universe led to the belief that laws similar to those found in the physical sciences could be discovered and used to understand human action. This conflation of descriptive and prescriptive laws resulted in a blurring of the important distinction made by Kenneth Burke--that between human action and physical motion. The paper focuses on the attempt to combine faith in the predictive capacity of scientific law with a faith in free will and the need for moral responsibility.

For example, new theories of the brain were used to argue that the organization of the social body should correspond to the organization of the physical body--the mental faculties. In The Constitution of Man Considered in Relation to External Objects, one of the most popular of Victorian social treatises, phrenologist George Combe argued that governments and social relationships which did not promote the exercise and harmonious balance of the faculties ran the risk of infringing "moral laws." The punishment for this was suffering and social disorder.

Physiology provided public discourse with the concepts of organic growth and evolutionary development, both of which were easily applied to the body politic. In the highly controversial Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, Robert Chambers claimed that hierarchies in both the animal and social worlds demonstrated the laws of development. Intellectual powers and "moral dispositions" were due primarily to inherited traits, not education or circumstances.

This idea was used by Herbert Spencer to develop an evolutionary notion of society in works such as Social Statics, "The Social Organism," and "Transcendental Physiology." Spencer argued that government reform tampered with the development of the individual's faculties. He claimed that the organic principle of transformation (from homogeneity to heterogeneity) was relevant to homogenous organic aggregates of all types: "Social bodies illustrate the law with like constancy. Endow the members of a community with equal properties, positions, powers, and they will forthwith begin to slide into inequalities."

This paper argues that scientific explanations were powerful additions to the available means of persuasion for Victorians trying to make sense of their new social world. Science provided public discourse with rationalizations for social differences, the laws of competition, and the practice of self-help.

Takis Poulakos

The Construction of Civic Identities in Isocrates

Inspired by recent concerns over the constitutive role that current instruction in rhetoric (speaking and writing) plays in the formation of our students' identities, I examine in this essay the relation of Isocrates' rhetorical instruction to the discursive formation of his auditors' and readers' identities. Because Isocrates' educational program was unambiguously presented to the Athenians as a prerequisite to moral and political leadership, his works provide us with a unique opportunity to witness historically concrete and culturally specific ways of linking rhetorical instruction to the formation of civic identities. I examine Isocrates' works to identify what specific rhetorical strategies were mobilized to create a discursive space where individuals could be reconstituted as parts of a larger collectivity, as citizens of the Athenian polis. My essay focuses on identifying the precise process through which Isocrates' discourse inserts individuals into the public domain wherein they are constituted as ethical and political subjects--the process, in other words, through which individuals are constituted as human agents.

My inquiry into the process of constructing civic identities is grounded on a detailed examination of the manner in which Isocrates represented the key constituents of his educational program. I focus on representations of speaker, logos, and philosophy, especially when these representations are used in reference to what Isocrates considers to be an accomplished rhetorician, an effective piece of discourse, or a satisfactory educational program (for which he used the term philosophy). But because choices in linguistic representations emerge clearly only in the context of their uses, I place these representations within the context of their earlier use (especially by presocratic philosophers and Sophists). Such a procedure will help me distinguish linguistic choice from necessity in Isocrates' representations and defend the overall claim of this essay, namely, that Isocrates' discursive finessing repeatedly occurs at the intersection of self-interest and general welfare, private ambition and public responsibility.

Lawrence J. Prelli

Rhetorical Logic and the Problem of Incommensurability

This essay argues that the problem of incommensurability is conceived more fruitfully as a problem in rhetorical logic rather than as a problem in formal logic. Drawing upon the classical doctrine of stasis analysis, a heuristic procedure for addressing the problem of rhetorical incommensurability during scientific discursive controversy is then articulated. Special attention is paid to distinguishing between the methodological features of this rhetorical procedure and more formally logical methods of inquiry (exemplified by Aristotle's Analytics). The potential for settling the problem of rhetorical incommensurability is illustrated through application of the heuristic procedure in analysis of communication problems scientists experienced due to conflicting and incompatible orientations toward "learning" during an episode of the molecular memory-transfer controversy.

William M. Purcell

Eberhard the German and the Labyrinth of Learning:
Grammar, Poesy, Rhetoric, and Pedagogy in Laborintus

Douglas Kelly has argued that Eberhard the German's Laborintus and Matthew of Vendôme's Ars versificatoria differ in focus from their counterparts in the ars poetriae of the Twelfth and Thirteenth centuries, particularly Geoffrey of Vinsauf's Poetria nova and John of Garland's De arte prosayca, metrica, et rithmica. Kelly writes that the treatise focuses on the composition of individual lines of verse rather than the entire poem. Both he and James J. Murphy have noticed that the work conveys a pedagogical emphasis. Indeed, Murphy notes that 494 of the work's 1005 lines are dedicated to "pedagogical matters." Much of Murphy's brief analysis then addresses the apparent bitterness of an experienced teacher of grammar and rhetoric. There is no denying that Eberhard was a little bitter about his life as a master. Between the bitterness, however, are perceptive remarks on the practice of teaching that are still relevant today, such as the following:

If passion for study in a pupil cools, it will grow if you fan the flames. It is your task to stir up this fire of glowing desire. The strong student is to be refreshed in one way, the weak in another. The dull and the ingenious have different needs: the one finds pleasure in weighty problems, the other in simple ones. Poesy has something useful for both.

This essay demonstrates that Laborintus is not merely a manual for teachers of verse. Rather, the work is a delightful maze of verse, grammar, and rhetoric, a labyrinth of learning, containing an allegorical account of grammar, poesy, and rhetoric. The examples used in Eberhard's account of the rhetorical figures contain Christian homilies on faith and action that are exemplary primers for teachers. Moreover, the rhetorical figures are used as inventional schemes for the composition of verse in proper meter. The homilies underscore Eberhard's pedagogical theory, which is ultimately the key to his labyrinth.

Sharon Quiroz

ADAM SMITH'S ECONOMIC VERSION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC

The second half of Adam Smith's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* has generally been neglected as little more than a nod toward traditional rhetorical theory made for the sake of propriety. He is often quoted as saying that traditional rhetoric is mostly a "very silly set of rules." And yet the language used in the second half of the lectures draws extensively on methods Smith used elsewhere to explain "The Age of Commerce."

In my presentation I will argue that the second half of the lectures should be read as an effort to redefine the classical genres so as to make them suit the needs of the "middling man of commerce." Smith specifically takes up each genre and applies to it the method he was using at the same time for analysing society in the *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, and which he used later in *The Wealth of Nations*. This method historicizes institutions by dividing them into four stages: the age of hunting, of pasturage, of agriculture and of commerce. In the rhetoric lectures he accounts for demonstrative, deliberative and judicial rhetoric in the same way. Thus he makes the history of rhetoric an economic history: the "stages" of rhetoric are determined by the means of production and distribution; the characteristics of the genres in modern times he accounts for as functions of the division of labor. The final stage is a rhetoric for modern *economic man*. Historians agree that Smith revised the categories of rhetoric to include narrative or history. I am arguing further that the lectures demonstrate an attempt to revise the categories of demonstrative, deliberative and judicial rhetoric so as to redefine the central ethos, updating those categories as well, to serve the needs of economic man.

Brendan A. Rapple

THE EARLY GREEK SOPHISTS: A BROADER CONCEPTION OF THEIR RHETORICAL PEDAGOGY

The history of the various theories and practices of rhetorical education in the Greek and Roman world reveals that in the vast majority of cases anyone wishing to be trained as an orator was obliged to partake of a complementary, thorough liberal education, that is an education ranging over far more than a mere training in rhetorical techniques. For example, Isocrates stressed that the orator should always strive to be *καταδευμένος* or "truly cultivated," namely educated in a broad range of subjects. Similarly, for Cicero the orator was to have received a complete education in all the liberal arts; it was essential that he be imbued with *humanitas*. In like manner, Quintilian maintained that it was mandatory that a good orator be educated in the *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*.

In the case of the early Greek Sophists, however, it is frequently argued by critics that their method of education focused almost completely on rhetorical theories and techniques with little heed being paid to any broader liberal curriculum. The Sophists are invariably treated as eristics who believed that the sole aim of education was to teach such rhetorical ability as would win the argument; anything which did not lead to success in rhetorical debate was usually ignored. Now, my thesis is straightforward: assuredly, the art of disputation, more specifically the ability to win arguments, was stressed by the Sophists in their teaching; however, their neglect of other broader education is by no means as sure. It is acknowledged that the fragmentary remains of the Sophists' writings and of the evidence about their teaching preclude many categorical assertions about either their educational theories or practices. Scholarly caution in such cases is always essential. However, a thorough examination of all the relevant Sophistic material in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* of Diels and Kranz reveals that the Sophists had numerous intellectual interests besides those directly relating to oratory and that they taught many subjects which would later be considered as mandatory for any liberal education. At any rate, in this paper I present the results of a thorough analysis of all the fragments of the Sophists and I argue, while admitting the difficulty of relating their teaching of diverse curricula to their rhetorical pedagogy, that it is highly misleading to present the Sophists' educational theories and practices as being only concerned with oratory/eristics narrowly defined. While these teachers most certainly desired that their pupils be taught to win in debate there is abundant evidence that they by no means ignored those subjects later associated with Isocrates' *καταδευμένος*, Cicero's *humanitas*, and Quintilian's *ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*, all ideals which subsequent ages have lauded. It is now time to recognize that in an incipient manner the early Greek Sophists were already striving towards the later ideal of *artes liberales*.

Wayne A. Rebhorn

Petruchio's "Rope Tricks": The Taming of the Shrew
and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric

Early in the first act of Shakespeare's play, Petruchio's servant Grumio comments on his master's resolve to woo and win Katarina by praising his ability to "trick in his rope-tricks." On the basis of Grumio's references to "figures" in the next sentence, this phrase is usually glossed by editors as a garbled reference to Petruchio's rhetorics as well as a possible pun on hanging. This crux in the text is more than a passing joke, however, as it serves to invoke Renaissance rhetoric as a discourse operative in Shakespeare play, one that has great importance for our understanding of the issues the play embraces. The crux essentially identifies Petruchio as a master rhetorician, a role he embraces in many ways throughout the play, and it does so especially in the preferred ideological terms of the discourse of rhetoric in the period. Those terms are political, heavily gendered, and centered on power: they present the rhetor as a male ruler whose auditors are described in ways which make them both females and subjects and whose power over them is imaged insistently as a rope or chain which ties them to his will. Thus, relating The Taming of the Shrew to the Renaissance discourse of rhetoric allows the language of that text and the role Petruchio assumes in it to be illuminated by situating them within an extremely relevant context. However, that context should not be taken to be something entirely extrinsic to the play, but rather as being constructed at least in part by it. More important, the play should be seen as commenting on and critiquing its context--that is, the Renaissance discourse of rhetoric--in two different ways: first, it focuses the audience's attention on the issue of masculine dominance which is central to Renaissance rhetoric and which the play demystifies by identifying as rape; and second, the play reveals that the power of language, which is central to and consistently celebrated in the discourse of rhetoric, is profoundly limited, in fact an illusion, insofar as it is really based on other forms of power, particularly those of law and physical coercion.

Marilyn Reppa

Mnemonics and the Epistemology of Devotion in The Dream of the Rood

A great deal has been written about the importance of compunction (the desire to know God) in monastic devotional literature of the Middle Ages. Although this scholarship has enriched our understanding of the emotional state of the monk at prayer, it largely neglects how that emotional state was achieved and what that process meant epistemologically. Using The Dream of the Rood as an example, I argue that the rhetoric of monastic devotion enabled the monk to participate in both the theme and the composition of a devotional work. By privileging specific mnemonic cues within the work itself, the monk was encouraged to embark on a meditation that used memory to profigure the state of compunction as well as the method for achieving it. In a meditation on The Dream of the Rood, for example, a monk could internalize the cross, the crucifixion, and the acts of crucifying and being crucified by entering visually, aurally, and performatively into the experiences described in the poem as well as into the composition of those experiences. The cross, for example, serves as an object of devotion and as an example of the practice and as a cue to begin a meditation. I then argue that such a process of composition and internalization is analogous to conceptual models of the transubstantiation. During the sacrifice of communion, the priest is at once commemorating an event already past and participating in its re-creation and offering this re-creation as an object of devotion for the other participants in the Mass. By exploiting the rich epistemological framework of the transubstantiation as a rhetorical model for devotion, the monk is able to focus on a theme of holiness as well as imitate a physical model for achieving it in the ultimate imitatio Christi. From the point of view of epistemology, then, the mnemonic playing out of the process by which one attains compunction is the demonstration of the state.

William H. Riker

Rhetorical Interaction in the Campaigns over the Ratification of the United States Constitution, 1787-1788.

This paper is an attempt to describe the rhetorical interchange of one whole political campaign, namely the campaign for the ratification of the United States Constitution, 1787-88.

The basic data is my calculation of the volume of words nationally published on 177 themes by the Federalists and Antifederalists in the campaigns for and against the ratification of the United States Constitution, 1787-1788. Kaminski and Saladino have collected (Constitutional Commentaries, Vol 1-4, 1981 ff) all the relevant pamphlets and newspaper and magazine essays that were printed in more than one state. I have assigned the words of these items to 177 categories of meaning and calculated the volume of words in each category by multiplying the number of words times the number of printings.

Assuming editors chose to print and reprint items that they believed to be persuasive, I can thus estimate the relative importance that they, as a group, attached to particular arguments. Also, since I have divided the volume in each category into three time periods, I can also estimate increases and decreases in volume and attention to the issues. From these estimates I find that Federalists emphasized the danger of anarchy from the national crisis and Antifederalists emphasized the threat to liberty from the proposed Constitution. The Antifederalists wrote almost nothing about crisis and the Federalists wrote relatively little in response to the charge that the Constitution would destroy liberty. I subsume this discovery under the Preemption Principle, which is described in the next paragraph, and a similar analysis of disputed themes leads to the Scattering Principle, also described in the next paragraph.

In an effort to explain why the two sides in a political campaign do not, typically, discuss the same issues I have derived two principles: (1) the Preemption Principle, namely that, when one side has an advantage on an issue, the other side abandons the discussion of it, thus allowing the advantaged side to preempt; and (2) the Scattering Principle, namely that, when both sides are equally matched on an issue, both abandon the discussion of it in order to find an issue to preempt.

The paper includes a theory of rhetorical interaction by rational actors. In this theory the two principles appear as inferences. I conclude with a detailed demonstration that the two principles describe much of the debate of 1787-1788.

Vernon K. Robbins

Greek Rhetorical Patterns of Argumentation in the Gospels

Recent studies of writing exercises recommended by rhetoricians for the initial stages of rhetorical composition during the Roman period have begun to shed remarkable new light on the composition of the New Testament Gospels. These exercises equipped people with the ability to begin arguments with a saying or action attributed to a specific person (a rhetorical chreia) and to expand that beginning point into a complete argument.

First, this paper will describe the present state of the research and point to recent publications that make previously unaccessible documents from late antiquity available to the interested researcher. Second, this paper will discuss a few examples of the application of this new approach to rhetorical units in the New Testament, showing how passages in the Procrv-nasmata ("Preliminary Exercises") of Aelius Theon of Alexandria and of Hermogenes, and passages in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, have led interpreters to quite new insights into argumentation among early Christians.

The overall goal of the paper will be to explain how early Christians who wrote the Gospels were participating in widespread modes and strategies of argumentation in Greco-Roman society and culture. Argumentative use of stories and sayings represented one major means for Christians to bring traditions with a Jewish heritage into a Greco-Roman cultural heritage filled with authoritative personages and to compete successfully for a place within that powerful Mediterranean heritage.

Phyllis B. Roberts

Artes Predicandi and the Art of Preaching in the Middle Ages

Changes in the orientation of medieval preaching by the high middle ages: from preaching that was largely clerical to an increased emphasis on the needs of popular audiences required new techniques in the formulation of the sermon. The fresh emphasis on popular preaching gave impetus to the growth of a substantial didactic literature, the artes predicandi.

To the masters of the high middle ages, the art of preaching was modern and therefore required up-to-date techniques. Preachers needed a forma predicandi which outlined the choice of theme and various subdivisions of the sermon according to certain conventional rules. Their needs were met by the development of the preaching manual, whose numbers steadily increased in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to become indispensable guides to the art of preaching.

The aim of this paper is to examine this ars predicandi: to survey the historical development of the art of preaching and preaching techniques and to assess the increasingly complex sermon of the high and late middle ages. The paper will include examples from various artes predicandi which describe the construction of the medieval sermon and the elaborate didactic techniques that were a feature of preaching in this era.

Dennis Rohatyn

Bohr contra Einstein: Dialogue, Dignity, and Death

The great debate between Bohr and Einstein took place at the Solvay Congresses of 1927 and 1930. Einstein devised a thought experiment to prove that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle was no obstacle to a complete description of (the laws of) nature. Bohr refuted Einstein by showing that the uncertainty principle was involved in the apparatus required for that description, even to calculate relativistic effects. Thus Bohr refuted Einstein on the latter's own terms, which is Aristotle's preferred strategy (in the Topics) for defeating an opponent. It was the only time Einstein ever lost an argument, except to proponents of "Aryan science."

The physics community was astounded by Bohr's victory, and the Copenhagen school became dominant for decades. Why wasn't Einstein convinced? We show that his lingering objections to quantum mechanics (including the EPR paradox of 1935) were not based on obstinacy or refusal to concede Bohr's claim. Instead they stemmed from his own axioms of scientific method. To be sure, Einstein's approach begged the question against Bohr; but as we shall show, the converse is also true. Thus both giants missed each other's point, because they were too wrapped up in their own assumptions and the disguised rhetoric that supported them to understand each other. Yet on another level they understood each other only too well; Bohr continued arguing with his rival's ghost for seven years after Einstein's death, until he died himself. Thus the debate between Bohr and Einstein teaches us, not how to win an argument but how to conduct it (and oneself) with grace and decorum. As Aristotle knew, rhetoric belongs not to (demonstrative) science but to ethics and politics. And ethics belongs to those who honor it.

David Rochnik

Talking About Everything: Quintilian on the Materia of Rhetoric

At least since Plato's Gorgias, rhetoric has repeatedly been attacked on the grounds that it is not a techne, an ars, a stable body of knowledge capable of being mastered and then taught. One way of advancing this accusation is to assume that a techne/ars must have a determinate subject matter. Since rhetoric studies no specific object, i.e., has no definite subject matter, it is not a techne/ars. Socrates employs this tactic against Gorgias by persistently asking him, peri ti? "about what" is your putative techne? He assumes that the ti, the "what," is determinate and analogous to the kind of object studied by mathematics.

Isocrates, in Against the Sophists XII-XVIII, is the first to provide a detailed response to this kind of attack. The present paper analyzes Quintilian's response to the Socratic attack in Institutio II.21. It argues that Quintilian essentially follows Isocrates on this issue.

The materia of rhetoric, Quintilian asserts, is "everything that may be placed before it as a subject for speech." Rhetoric talks about everything. But how can it then be an ars? One who possesses an ars is, in some sense, an expert, and no one can be an expert in everything.

Quintilian responds: the materia of rhetoric is not infinita, it is multiplex. The subject matter of rhetoric is everything that can be brought to the orator to be discussed. This is not to imply, however, that rhetoric knows every thing, i.e., every possible object of every possible ars. If that were the case, then the subject matter of rhetoric would be infinita and the orator would be God. Instead, Quintilian says, "I regard it as sufficient that an orator should not be actually ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak." The orator need not know the causes of a given subject; that is, he need not have mastered the subject itself. He is only required to be able to speak about it "as occasion may demand."

The last phrase from above is the key to Quintilian's solution. It is a necessary condition of the doctor, qua doctor, to know everything knowable about medicine. What is required of the orator is only that he be able to respond to the contingencies of a given circumstance. If, for example, he is required to defend the proposition that the city support the training of doctors, then he must be able to master enough about medicine to be able to speak about it effectively. In short, Quintilian's assertion that the materia of rhetoric is multiplex, and not infinita, is essentially the same as Isocrates' identification of orator's fluid ability to respond appropriately to the kairos, the contingencies of the moment.

Through a careful analysis of II.21, the present paper attempts to untangle this potentially complicated set of claims.

Eduardo Saccone

Figures of Silence in Ariosto's Orlando Furioso

While far from laconic, Ariosto's eminently ironic style does not shy from allusivity and implicitness, from sottinteso, precisely what is under-standing and is perhaps to be understood

Obviously not all instances of semantic density or concentration can be reduced to semantic ellipsis or brevitas, to figurae per detractionem. This paper however deals particularly with those figures that could be broadly called figures of silence in the text of the Orlando Furioso. The few examples to be analyzed are taken from different textual levels and areas first of all from the margins of the text itself, the title and the motto, Pro bono malum, that seals and signs it off. In both cases the unsaid works through the apparent utterance, constituting it as an allegory, where obliquitas may give way to the obscuritas of aenigma. Other examples given deal mainly with narrative interruptions and specific instances of reticentia (e.g. St John's speech in canto XXXV). In both cases dissimulatio, as it relates to Ariosto's more general ironic praxis, is considered, and possible links are discussed with contemporary texts and notions, such as Celio Calcagnini's Descriptio Silentii and Castiglione's sprezzatura.

Philippe-Joseph Salazar

LE MONARQUE ORATEUR: HENRI III

Mirela Saim

A CASE OF NORMATIVE RHETORIC: THE SOCIALIST CATECHISMS

Our understanding of literary writing depends as much on its historical appropriation through fixed forms and genres, or models of discourse, as its explicit aesthetic program. In this respect, the argumentative dialogue - a genre traditionally on the border of both literature and philosophy - becomes increasingly representative for the development of the modern idea of democracy. As a written text representing an oral exchange between two or more persons dialogue evolves as an argumentation tool that thoroughly controls its semantics. That is why the catechisms, rhetorically formulated series of queries and answers presenting an argument in a prescriptive mode, are able to mediate between ^{the} separate levels of ideology and individual practice and to function as a propaganda device.

In this perspective, it is the social performative turn in the evolution of a traditional religious form of propaganda discourse that I find significant for the new relation between discourse and persuasion that characterizes modernity. The purpose of my paper is to identify the main transformations in the dialogue forms that allow for the appearance of the socialist catechisms in France and Italy during the XIXth century. I hope to prove that the big number of such catechisms indicates not only their relevance to a new ethical discourse, but also their major contribution to the normative turn in the ideology of modern democracy.

Cette intervention reprend les grandes lignes de ma préface au *Projet de l'éloquence royale* de Jacques Amyot (à paraître, fin 1991, aux Belles Lettres). Le texte d'Amyot est un discours, prononcé avec deux autres (dont un par J. Davy du Perron), lors de la dernière séance de l'Académie du Palais (1579). J'analyserai successivement: la distinction proposée par Amyot entre éloquence royale et éloquence vulgaire - sa méditation sur l'entendement et la parole - sa conception des parties de la rhétorique. Je reprendrai alors les grands discours laissés par Henri III et je proposerai une critique de sa carrière oratoire qui me conduira, en conclusion, à expliquer les éléments "pneumatologiques" de cette vision de l'éloquence comme royauté de la parole. En filigrane je proposerai une opposition entre deux modèles de la parole monarchique: le style Valois et le style Bourbon.

Phillips Salman

William Harvey and Art Misplaced

William Harvey's *De generatione animalium* (1651), much of which was composed during the time Harvey was working on *De motu cordis*, uses a quotation from Seneca on Plato's theory of imitation together with material from Aristotle to oppose the cognitive processes and methods of the artist to those Harvey wishes to require for the anatomist. This contribution studies ways that Harvey, as a deliberate writer, makes rhetorical use of that opposition to show how previous anatomists have acted inappropriately as artists rather than true anatomists. Although the *De generatione* makes serious points about the way animals reproduce, Harvey's handling of his material makes the work a kind of manifesto for proper science as well as a scientific discourse.

John D. Schaeffer

A Vichian Approach to St. Thomas More: Rhetoric, Orality and Sensus Communis in the Dialogue Concerning Heresies (Abstract)

Since the publication of the Yale edition of More's complete works, many critics have pointed out that in the Dialogue Concerning Heresies More seeks to defend Catholic orthodoxy on grounds of a consensus fidelium, and, further, that as the narrator he presents his own persona as somehow embodying that consensus. The depth of More's rhetorical strategy, however, is seldom attended to. The DCH is a work of persuasive rhetoric that carries its own epistemology with it. More manipulates both narration and dialogue, playing off the permanence of writing against the immediacy and personality of oral speech, to create what is essentially a paradox: a Socratic dialogue about revealed truth. More's argument reaches beyond a mere consensus fidelium to what Giambattista Vico called sensus communis.

Consensus fidelium merely refers to the traditional belief of Catholic people. By sensus communis Giambattista Vico meant a community-creating "sense" that is embodied in language, learned with it and reflected in the fundamental institutions of the community, one of which is religion. By analyzing the complex structure of the DCH (a dialogue within a narrative) and by analyzing the arguments More uses, one sees how the DCH uses dialogue, not only to embody the oral component of Catholic tradition, but also to induce a recommitment, not merely to a creed, but to sensus communis as an understanding of language and community that transcends religious adherence and whose orality "underwrites" More's religious claims.

Helmut Schanze
Goethe und Quintilian

Die Auseinandersetzung Goethes mit Quintilian stellt rhetorisch-, literatur- und methoden-geschichtlich ein komplexes "Ereignis" dar, das alle drei beteiligten Bereiche in eine neue gegenseitig sich definierende "Konstellation" bringt. Goethe liest Quintilian gegen den Strich, konstituiert eine neue poetische Produktions-Theorie, (die den Unterschied von Prosa und Poesie auflöst) und bringt damit das bisherige sich auf Quintilian berufene Lehrgebäude und seine Definitionen "scheinbar" zum Verschwinden. Es kann jedoch gezeigt werden, daß im Rahmen der Diskussion "Welt-literatur" die quintilianische Lehrfigur "System-Mustertexte" wieder aufgegriffen wird im Sinne einer universalisierten und modernisierten rhetorischen Theorie.

Sandra J. Sarkela

"Moderation, Religion and Public Discourse: The Debates Over Occasional Conformity in Eighteenth-Century England."

In this era of massive, global social change, world leaders struggle to build consensus. More conscious of the world's diversity than ever before, we are sometimes granting, sometimes refusing political and economic power to traditionally disenfranchised groups. I wonder, as a student of public discourse, if it is possible for citizens of a shrinking world to define our subsystems without endangering the whole? Can we maintain pluralistic identities while acknowledging universal truths?

One example of the attempt to acknowledge diversity within community are the debates over occasional conformity which occurred in England at the turn of the 17th-century. The key term in these debates was "Moderation." In the 18th-century sense, moderation was not the same as finding the middle ground. It was a philosophy which involved understanding differences and transcending the diversity to discover universal truths in a rational way. The word implied both tolerance and reason, in keeping with the scientific impulse of the century. It was also a response to the horrors of Civil War and religious persecution just experienced in England. In a very real, concrete and specific way, Moderation--the avoidance of extremes, party, factions--was valued by Britons at the turn of the 17th-century.

There was, however, considerable dispute about the limits to toleration, especially religious toleration. For England, the Toleration Act set off an immediate and long-lasting controversy about how to operationalize freedom of religion. What it finally came down to was separation of church and state. The first disputes arose in 1702 when a bill against Occasional conformity was introduced to Parliament by Queen Anne. This became a debate over "Moderation" in a specific 18th-century sense.

Occasional Conformity was the compromise route for granting dissenters from the Church of England the opportunity to hold government office. In order to hold government office in England, it was necessary to take communion in the Church of England. Those who were not members of that Church would, therefore, take communion on the occasion of their taking oaths of office, but return to their other, dissenting church afterward. Thus, they "conformed" to the Church of England on the "occasion" of their oath of office.

This dispute is especially interesting for the rhetorical critic because it was not the Occasional Conformists, the compromisers, those holding the middle ground who most aggressively defended Moderation. It was the radical dissenters. In a brilliant maneuver, the radical dissenters captured the God-term of the century in behalf of their cause, and it was linked to beliefs in religious toleration and separation of church and state for the next 150 years.

William Penn made the position explicit in his pamphlet "A Persuasive to Moderation (1686). He wrote "MODERATION is a Christian Duty, and it has ever been the Prudent MAN'S Practice. For those GOVERNMENTS that have used it in their Conduct, have succeeded best in all Ages. . . . MODERATION, the Subject of this Discourse, is in plainer English, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE TO CHURCH DISSENTERS: A Cause I have, with all humility undertaken to plead, against the Prejudices of the times." By identifying their cause with "Moderation," the radical dissenters were able to claim the high moral ground in the dispute.

The rhetoric and debates had impact throughout Europe, but even more in America. For Americans such as John Dickinson and James Madison, Moderation meant religious toleration and separation of church and state as reflected in their state documents.

Edward Schiappa

D. M. Schenkeveld

Plutarch, Table Talks I.i: A 'thesis' in disguise

The Table Talks (Quaestiones convivales) of Plutarch reflect by his own account the discussions he and his friends had after dinner at drinking parties. In these discussions philosophical and philological subjects were tackled in a genial manner and the issues themselves were not too difficult, all this in keeping with the rules of a 'symposion'.

The very first Talk is concerned with the question whether philosophy -- this includes philology -- is a fitting topic for this kind of gathering, and, if so, to what extent.

Notwithstanding evident pointers in the text itself scholars have failed to see that Plutarch arranged this Talk by the rules of a 'thesis' (quaestio infinita), a method of argumentation well-known from rhetoric and philosophy. But in its presentation the 'thesis' has been adapted to the circumstances of the 'symposion'. At the same time this Talk shows the type of discussion to be held at drinking parties and the manner in which to conduct these.

At the end of my paper I shall briefly go into the wider subject of Plutarch's stance on rhetoric.

What's in a Name?

Toward a Revised History of Early Greek Rhetorical Theory

The coining of the Greek word for rhetoric (ῥητορικὴ) was a watershed event in the history of rhetorical theory in ancient Greece which has been overlooked by most classical rhetoric scholars. This omission often has resulted in a distorted understanding of the Sophists and "rhetoric." Prior to the coining of *rhētorikē*, *logos* was the key term thematized in the texts and fragments we generally assign to the fifth-century BCE history of rhetorical theory. The texts and fragments concerning *logos* suggest important differences between the way the art of discourse was conceptualized before and after the coining of *rhētorikē*. Prior to the coining of *rhētorikē*, the verbal arts were understood as less differentiated and more holistic in scope than they were in the fourth century BCE, and the teaching associated with *logos* shows considerably less tension between the goals of seeking success and seeking truth than is the case once Rhetoric and Philosophy were defined as distinct disciplines.

Melinda Schlitt

"Una Maraviglia Stupenda: Style and Rhetoric in 16th-century History Painting."

In writing to Benedetto Varchi about the rhetorical efficacy of history painting during his own generation, Giorgio Vasari observed that artists often used the "dolci tratti di poesia sotto varie forme" to help persuade the viewer into accepting a painted illusion, which first led the eyes and then the mind to "una maraviglia stupenda." Vasari was particularly referring to frescoes conceived following the generic conventions appropriate to the ornamented, high style of which his own works and those of Francesco Salviati (1510-1563) are among the most powerful examples. Traditional discussions of "mannerism" in the visual arts (in which Vasari and Salviati are inevitably prominent figures) have tended to separate form and content, whereby style becomes a topic of formalist analysis distinct from the subject it may represent. This perspective however, is part of a contemporary rather than renaissance critical aesthetic.

While there has been considerable interest in art and its relationship to politics in 16th-century Florence, there has been little study of the relationship between the language of art and the language of politics. Salviati's frescoes depicting the deeds of the Roman republican hero Marcus Furius Camillus in the Sala dell'Udienza of the Palazzo Vecchio (1543-48) is one of the earliest and largest commissions awarded by Cosimo I de' Medici after he began transforming the Palazzo della Signoria into a ducal residence in 1540. They provide an ideal forum for such a study. Based on issues raised in 16th-century primary sources and critical texts, I will argue that Salviati consciously manipulated his visual style in accordance with the generic conventions appropriate to the subject, and that style itself could therefore be seen to carry expressive meaning and rhetorical efficacy as an intrinsic rather than separate part of the subject. In response to the conditions of patronage at the new court of Cosimo, where projecting the image of a 16th-century court and providing historical legitimacy for the duke's authority were paramount, Salviati accordingly rendered the frescoes in an ornamented high style in which the histories of Camillus serves as *exempla* of the ideal virtues that would inform Cosimo's actions in a new political arena. This high style, based on a Ciceronian ideal inspired by Livy (the principal source for the life of Camillus), was not only appropriate to the epic historical subject, but was also conceived in a decidedly "Roman" idiom. This Roman idiom effectively underscored the ancient theme, and succeeded in creating the visual trappings of ceremonial splendor befitting a courtly ambient in a manner more compelling than that which indigenous Florentine artists could provide. In addressing the great diversity of stylistic alternatives in Salviati's art as a whole, and his ability to acknowledge the generic (and therefore rhetorical) conventions appropriate to a given subject through the conscious manipulation of style, style can be seen to carry meaning in a reciprocal relationship to the contents it conveys.

In creating a visual analogue to the elevated style in the Camillus frescoes, (which can stand as a model for a study of Salviati's other historical frescoes), we may see how not only the literary subject, but also style effected an ideological accommodation. By examining the conceit and language of Salviati's invention, we will be able to interpret the imagery and function of this work with greater cogency, and will come to see the artist not simply as a talented illustrator, but as an active participant in the articulation of an historical consciousness.

Joseph Schmidt

THE RHETORIC OF DEHUMANIZING. On the Genealogy of Nazi Antisemitic Jargon.

As in ideology, the German fascist movement was not innovative but rather eclectic when it came to developing hostile jargon directed against Jews.

A look at the genealogy of the antisemitic terminology whose main rhetorical aim was to de-humanize Jews reveals that a vital component was established by Christian antisemites in the German speaking countries during the 19th century. During that period, modern antisemitism added to the traditional hostile images in that Jews were perceived as social, political, and economic rivals. Nazi jargon of our century fused the various anti-Jewish currents into a comprehensive verbal stream whose ultimate aim was the final solution.

Peter L. Schmidt

Petrarca und Quintilian

Die Behandlung des Themas 'Petrarca und Quintilian' wird naturgemäß seinen Ausgang von dem Brief nehmen, den Petrarca seiner Sammlung von Schreiben an die antiken, insbesondere römischen Klassiker eingelegt hat (fam. 24, 7). Aus ihm ergibt sich 1) daß der Florentiner Humanist den lateinischen Rhetoriklehrer in der im Mittelalter verbreiteten lückenhaften Fassung entdeckt hat. 2) Quintilian wird mit Cicero verglichen, an den fam. 24, 3 und 4 gerichtet waren, und als Ergänzung verstanden. Was dem späteren an Beredsamkeit abgehe, habe er durch Vollständigkeit und Genauigkeit wettgemacht. 3) Unerwartet kommt der Vergleich mit Seneca, der nur durch eine Verwechslung des in in Contr. 10, praef 2 des älteren Seneca attackierten Quintilian und d.h. auf der Basis der mittelalterlichen Identifikation der beiden Senecae möglich wird.

Weiterhin wird die Art der Quintilian-Lektüre in dem erhaltenen Codex Petrarcae, Par. Lat. 7720, sowie die Bewertung und Benutzung in Petrarcae Werken allgemein diskutiert werden.

Karen Rossi Schnakenberg

Ong's Orality and Literacy: An Invitation to Extrapolation

By synthesizing previous work on the effects of media on individuals and cultures (Havelock, 1962; Clanchy, 1979; Cole & Scribner, 1973; Goody & Watt, 1968; Eisenstein, 1979), Ong's (1982) *Orality and Literacy* encouraged media-centered speculation and promoted the consideration of media effects from the status of a specialty to that of a standard perspective.

Ironically, the elements that give Ong's work the power of a general perspective -- his easy movement from specific claims and contexts to broader generalizations, his positioning of the orality / literacy debate on a continuum of progress from oral to literate to typographic to electronic media, and his forceful and easily paraphrased prose -- have also made it subject to both overly narrow and overly broad extrapolations.

This presentation will examine the problems that occur when Ong's retrospective analysis of media effects is applied prospectively and used to predict potential effects of emerging media. Six related problem areas will be explored:

1. An almost total concentration on media and their characteristics coupled with a virtual disregard of individual and contextual factors
2. A tendency to see media as an active agent of change and individuals as passive receivers of fixed and determinable effects
3. Conflation of individual cognitive responses to specific media with broad patterns of cultural and social change
4. Confusion of immediate, short-term responses with changes that take place through extended interaction over long periods of time
5. Adoption of a view that change is always in the direction of progress and increasing complexity
6. A tendency to look for and predict only positive changes and to ignore the possibility that problems or losses may occur as a part of the interaction

B. Schouler

La définition de la rhétorique dans l'enseignement byzantin

C'est plus particulièrement dans les introductions à leurs traités de rhétorique (les *Prolégomènes* que H. Rabe a réunis en 1931 dans son volume 14 des *Rhetores Graeci*) que les Byzantins ont été amenés à poser la question de la définition de la rhétorique. Le cadre péripatéticien de l'enseignement imposait cette recherche fondamentale sur l'essence de la rhétorique et sur ses rapports qu'elle entretenait avec les autres disciplines. Les rhéteurs byzantins rapportent et critiquent une série de définitions, parmi lesquelles cinq sont l'objet d'une attention soutenue : celles de Platon, d'Aristote, des stoiciens, d'Hermagoras, de Denys d'Halicarnasse. De nombreuses autres formules, entre autres d'Alkidamas, de Démosthène, d'Hermogène et d'autres orateurs sont aussi examinées. Une définition canonique, anonyme, est proposée. Cette réflexion sur la nature de la rhétorique permet de suivre le développement historique du concept, mais aussi d'en cerner les implications philosophiques. La rhétorique a-t-elle un pouvoir sur l'âme humaine ? Est-elle une véritable science ou une simple capacité ? Où se situe-t-elle dans les différentes classifications des sciences que les philosophes ont établies ? Reprendre une à une toutes ces définitions révèle à quel point les conceptions antiques et médiévales sur la rhétorique sont différentes des vues actuelles. Là où les auteurs contemporains qui ont proposé une définition de la rhétorique (Barthes et O. Genette entre autres) ont vu essentiellement un écart stylistique entre deux modes d'expression (réduisant ainsi la rhétorique à l'usage des figures), les anciens voyaient dans la rhétorique une relation triangulaire, régie par une technique, entre le Logos, aptitude à la parole et compréhension du monde, un Orateur, doté par la nature et l'éducation d'un talent limité de persuasion, et un Sujet, dont il s'agit d'exploiter toutes les particularités.

Gary S. Selby

"United in Blessing: The Rhetorical Function of Ephesians 1:4-13"

Allen Scult

HERMENEUTICAL PRACTICE AND RHETORICAL POWER: TRUTH ASPIRING DISCOURSE IN THE HEBREW BIBLE

Alasdair MacIntyre speaks of narratives with the power to constitute communities as "stories which aspire to truth," suggesting that there is some connection between their rhetorical power and their hermeneutical aspirations. In order to investigate this connection, this essay traces the hermeneutical performance of the core story of the Pentateuch. The essay argues that the core of this performance lies in the author's response to a gradual recognition that the very "inventedness" of stories limits their capacity as truth aspiring discourse; and so in order to complete its hermeneutical task a way must be found to move the discourse beyond the control of narrative invention.

Biblical scholars have long recognized Eph. 1:4-13 as a "Christianized" *berakah*, a traditional Jewish blessing, whose liturgical language and hymn-like structure are, in some vague way, related to the content of the rest of the epistle. Beyond these points of obvious agreement, however, this "monstrous sentence conglomeration" as one scholar described it, presents an enduring problem. Writers in the commentary tradition, focusing on the content of the text with slight regard to its structure, have viewed the blessing as little more than a topical summary of Pauline theology. Those who have attempted to describe the text's structure, on the other hand, have met with little success in relating that structure to the blessing's content. Most importantly, neither group has been able to describe with any precision the function of the blessing within the argument of the epistle as a whole.

In this paper, I describe the blessing's form and content and offer an account of the contribution made by both to the epistle's overall purpose. First, I describe the blessing's structure, which is built around a series of strophic units parallel in their grammatical, syntactical, and lexical features. Second, I show that this structure evidences a clearly discernable flow of thought, an extended expression of praise to God. That expression begins with praise to God for the salvation in which all Christians have shared and it culminates in praise to God for the cosmic unity in which God's plan will find its ultimate fulfillment--a unity in which Jewish and Gentile Christians now participate. Third, proceeding from the assumption that the epistle itself was written with a rhetorical intention, that of bringing Jewish and Gentile Christian factions together into one united community, I demonstrate the contribution of this expression of praise to that overall rhetorical aim. For my analysis, I draw upon Kenneth Burke's theoretical conceptions of artistic form, language as symbolic action, and rhetoric as identification. Using these concepts, I argue that the blessing was written in a liturgical form which readily invited participation and assent, so that in effect, the audience praises God for the values which later in the epistle they will be explicitly urged to accept and act on. Having symbolically enacted their unity through their participation in the blessing of Eph. 1, the audience is thus prepared to accept the more explicit doctrinal exposition and moral exhortation centered on Christian unity which follow.

Laurie A. Shepard

TRUTH AND PROBABILITY IN THE ARTES DICTAMINIS

Barbara Shapiro

Classical Rhetoric and the Anglo-American Criminal Law of Evidence

Given the traditional connections between law and rhetoric there has been surprising little study of the impact of rhetoric on the Anglo-American legal tradition. R.J. Schoeck and D.S. Bland have discussed the problem in a general way and Alessandro Giuliani has explored the influence of rhetoric on the law of evidence and pleading.

I propose to take these early efforts one step further by focusing on some elements in the Anglo-American criminal law of evidence. I will attempt to show that the ancient distinction between artificial and inartificial proofs first influenced the Romano-canon tradition and that these medieval distinctions in turn had considerable impact on various features of the English legal system. The significance of the Renaissance revival of rhetoric will also be discussed.

Unlike most historians interested in the question of rhetorical and Romano-canon influence on Anglo American law, my paper will extend beyond the jury trial to that of arrest, preliminary examination by the the justice of the peace, grand jury indictment and of course to the trial itself. I will also attempt to show how the concepts of "suspicion" and "probable cause," "circumstantial evidence," and "presumption" are linked to classical rhetorical sources. I will argue that this influence can be traced largely through the mediating influence of the Romano-canon tradition and partly through the influence of the classical texts themselves.

This paper surveys the importance of truth in narration in the artes dictaminis of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Although such philosophical questions were generally kept at bay in the pragmatic, preceptive guides to epistolography, the issue of whether an epistolary appeal should be based on a truthful account or merely a probable one surfaces in the discussions of the narratio. The question serves as an index of the dictator's concept of dictaminal doctrine. In the conscious rejection of the probable argument, the precepts of the artes dictaminis are reduced to establishing the prestige and correct form of a document, as Adalbert states in the first extant Bolognese ars. On the other hand, the instruction of probable argument in the narration and other parts of the petitionary epistle promotes the persuasive function of language and places the dictaminal texts in the most vital tradition of rhetoric. Brunetto Latini makes much of this point in his gloss of Cicero's De Inventione. The question of truth and probability represents an articulation of the increasing sophistication and complexity of modes of interpreting experiential data in the period.

The importance of truth to the orator has been debated throughout the history of rhetoric. Plato denounces masters who teach oratory but not dialectic. Augustine conceived of Christian rhetoric as necessarily true, which makes its way into monastic rhetorical instruction in the Origines of Isidore. Pope Innocent III repeats that the rhetoric of the Apostolic See is necessarily true. Aristotle limits the scope for the dialectic to the demonstration of what is probable and hence his rhetoric, the counterpart of dialectic, becomes the art of persuasion of the probable. This definition is transmitted to Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages in the Ciceronian rhetorical texts.

In the artes dictaminis both positions are found. Alberic of Monte Cassino defines the narration in the same terms as Isidore, but his apologist Hugh of Bologna follows Cicero. The treatment of the issue is somewhat different in the texts emanating from France. In the Ars dictandi aurelianensis, the narratio is described an exposition of the facts or like the facts. The author glosses, "Prout gestarum dixi, quia in epistola licet nos quandoque mentiri." Rhetoric is being defined in the context of diplomacy, where the ability to lie is an obvious necessity. A similar definition turns up in Boncompagno's Rhetorica Novissima, written in Bologna in the third decade of the century.

Truth and probability in the artes dictaminis has been largely overlooked by scholars and it merits further exploration.

Sue Carter Simmons

The Other Harvardization of English Studies:
Wendell as Writing Program Administrator

Examining the institutional structures of the Harvard English Department in the late nineteenth century will help historians of rhetoric and writing instruction better understand why certain approaches to writing instruction developed there, as well as how and why such practices were adopted at many other colleges and universities across the country.

Although Barrett Wendell never held Harvard's title of Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory, during the 1880's and 1890's he was primarily responsible for designing and administering the writing courses and for training the growing staff of part-time and temporary teachers. He also served as Chair of the English Department from 1896-1901, when chief among his duties was persuading University President Charles Eliot to hire additional staff to teach the freshman writing course and grade the student papers.

Many materials relevant to Wendell's role as writing program administrator are available at Harvard--though they have been referred to rarely if at all in the published histories of Berlin, Kitzhaber, and Stewart. Gradebooks and graded student papers indicate who actually read the student papers and how many students and papers they routinely handled. Course syllabi and lecture notes indicate the rhetorical and pedagogical theories guiding the courses--theories which are not always evident in textbooks published by Wendell and A. S. Hill. Formal reports by the Harvard Board of Overseers evaluating Wendell's performance as a composition teacher illustrate the ways in which writing courses may be constrained by institutional structures which teachers have little control over. Correspondence between Wendell and President Eliot reveals Wendell's commitment to providing quality writing instruction despite his lack of administrative power and the limitations of his staff's training and interest in teaching composition, as well as his own.

Phillip Sipiora &
James Kinneavy

Isocrates and the Art of Rhetoric: *New Perspectives*

"Isocrates' Rhetoric and the Art of Cultural Philosophy." Phillip Sipiora, University of South Florida

Isocrates' educational system, as articulated in *Against the Sophists*, *Antidosis*, and other treatises, promotes the concept of a "rhetoric of understanding," a process that grows out of a synergistic weave of subject matter, invention, context, "timing," and style. Isocrates advocates a specific kind of internal dialectic that promotes critical cognitive abilities, a skill that serves public, interpersonal, and intrapersonal needs. The relationship between public rhetoric and private thought is particularly important in Isocrates' program. Isocrates' system of education, his theories of rhetoric, and his school provide a model for the education of the whole person. In Isocrates' rhetorical scheme, the conflation of rhetoric and philosophy promotes rhetoric as a discipline of social epistemology based on *doxa*, which serves "community-determined" standards of justice. Isocrates expands this use of rhetoric to include political discourse. More specifically, in *Panegyricus*, *On the Peace*, and *Panathenaicus*, Isocrates illustrates how his notion of rhetoric becomes cultural philosophy in working toward the goal of establishing Pan-Hellenic unity.

"The Concept of *Pistis* in the Work of Isocrates." James L. Kinneavy, The University of Texas at Austin

At a critical stage in the formation of rhetoric as a discipline, Isocrates insisted that most of the material about which rhetorical decisions are made have to do with at best a degree of probability, and clearly not with epistemological certainty. The certainty position had been that of Plato and the early Aristotle. Both of them had denigrated probability (*pistis*). But in a war situation (*On the Peace*), Isocrates made clear to all of Athens that neither side in the war had possession of all of the justice or of all of the truth. As a result of Isocrates' rhetoric, both Plato and Aristotle revised their epistemologies to make room for a practical kind of decision making involving probabilities. And this epistemological shift toward probability is the direction which rhetoric subsequently took, both in Greece and in Rome. It is the arena of rhetoric still today--a fact which some rhetoricians today have forgotten, if they ever knew it.

Paul J. Smith

Rabelais cicéronien?

En 1532, l'année où paraît son premier livre, Pantagruel, Rabelais se mêle à la Querelle des Cicéroniens: il écrit une lettre à Erasme pour le renseigner sur l'identité de J.C. Scaliger, l'auteur d'une réaction violente contre le Ciceronianus d'Erasme (1528), intitulée Oratio pro [...] Cicerone contra [...] Erasmum (1531). Ce faisant, Rabelais se range du parti des Érasmiens contre les Cicéroniens. Or, les spécialistes rabelaisiens ont tort de sous-estimer l'importance de cette prise de position: non seulement celle-ci invite à problématiser le prétendu sérieux de certaines affirmations ("tu forces ton stile [...] quand à la Latine, à Cicéron", Pantagruel, ch.8) ou à réinterpréter le comique de telle allusion à Cicéron ("Ce n'est [...] que pour orner mon langage. Ce sont couleurs de rhétorique Cicéroniane", Gargantua, ch.39), mais elle permet encore de jeter une lumière nouvelle sur certains passages déjà fort glosés, comme par exemple les Prologues des deux premiers livres, la lettre de Gargantua à Pantagruel et le mythe des paroles gelées. En outre, sa prise de position dans la Querelle des Cicéroniens donne aussi lieu de reconsidérer les idées de Rabelais sur l'imitation, l'inspiration et l'improvisation. Néanmoins, sa position reste nuancée: parfois même il semble se distancer des idées d'Erasme, son maître à penser, -ce dont témoigne son attitude moins érasmiennne que cicéronienne envers l'utilisation de la langue vulgaire.

Marijke Spies

From Disputation to Argumentation: the Morality Play in the 16th Century

The morality play is a moral (religious, political, social) proposition put forward by means of characters who are personified abstractions. The interrelation between these personifications constitutes the argumental structure of the play text.

Given this fact one may expect that 16th century developments in the field of argumentation influenced the development of the morality play. To investigate the tenability of this hypothesis, I will analyze a selection of 16th century French, German and English plays against the background of scholastic disputation and the new rhetorico-dialectical method of argumentation.

Literature:

Werner Helmich, Die Allegorie im französischen Theater des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. I. Tübingen 1976. Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie. Beiheft 156.

Joel B. Altman, The Tudor Play of Mind. Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama. Berkeley etc. 1978.

Stephen A. Stertz

Rhetoric and Political Theory in Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana

The Life of Apollonius of Tyana of Philostratus is generally discussed by scholars as an attempt to popularize aspects of Neo-Pythagorean philosophy under the third-century Severan empress Julia Domna. Recent scholarly work, e. g. Graham Anderson, Philostratus (London 1986) generally continues this tradition. Relatively little has been done on the topic of rhetoric and political theory in this work, although Anderson and other scholars occasionally touch on Philostratus' attitude to the empire and emperors in his Lives of the Sophists as inferred from his treatment of sophists, such as Favorinus and Herodes Atticus, who had relations, good or otherwise, with emperors.

In Book 5 of the Life of Apollonius there is a debate between Apollonius and the negatively-depicted philosopher Euphrates of Tyre on the subject of the restoration of the Roman Republic, in the setting of political strife in the first century. This debate has occasionally been compared by scholars with a somewhat similar debate, the much more famous one between Agrippa and Maecenas on the future government of the Roman state, set in 29 B. C., in book 52 of the History of Cassius Dio, but the comparison by modern scholars has generally been limited to discussion of sources and historical accuracy; the latter has of course been generally doubted (cf. F. Lenz, Das Altertum 10 (1964), 95-110).

I propose to discuss the debate in Philostratus with respect to its place in the history of rhetoric and political theory. It is well-known (cf. Vit. Soph. 2. 32) that both Philostratus and Dio were prominent figures in the court of Julia Domna. There is clearly mutual influence between the two debates; that in Dio is commonly believed (cf. F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford 1964), 107) to be a political pamphlet addressing the problems of the early third century. The debate in Philostratus is less practical in orientation; its implication is that the main defect of a proposed restoration of the republic is its impracticality rather than the theoretical superiority of monarchy. In this way it shows resemblances with themes in the To Rome and Panathenaica of Aelius Aristides as well as material in the later Latin set of biographies known as the Historia Augusta. Aristocratic attitudes in the debate are reminiscent of those found in Tacitus and, later, in Julian, Libanius, and Synesius. The influence of Plato and the Platonic theme of tyrannicide, also found in other passages in the Life of Apollonius, as well as, to a lesser extent, that of Demosthenes, are also present. The monarchy and, by implication, Roman rule, are seen as lesser evils than the anarchy that might accompany an attempt at Republican restoration. The rhetors of the second sophistic, being rhetors rather than philosophers, doubted the practicability of the establishment of a Platonic republic such as the one Plotinus tried to found later in the third century.

Dale Sullivan

Establishing Orthodoxy: The Letters of Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, as Epideictic Rhetoric

A martyr early in the second century, Ignatius wrote seven letters after his arrest and before his execution. These letters, early as they are in the Christian tradition, represent the Bishop's attempt to establish orthodoxy, his primary concerns being false teachers, unity and structure within the church, and his impending death.

In this paper, these letters will be viewed as epideictic rhetoric, the rhetoric traditionally associated with the creation and preservation of cultural values. The theoretical perspective will be that of modern epideictic theory, specifically a theory that has recently been put forward which characterizes epideictic as the "rhetoric of orthodoxies." As the rhetoric of orthodoxies, epideictic draws boundaries by creating ego ideologies (definitions of who we are) and alter ideologies (definitions of who we are not). These images are created through praise, blame, and heightening, rhetorical techniques associated with epideictic.

Ignatius accomplishes the first of these functions (creating ego ideologies) by citing Scripture as authority, by setting up authorities within the church, by presenting examples worthy of imitation, and by adopting stylistic conventions which imitate New Testament epistles. These might be called the stance of the orthodox in relation to authority, the discipline of the orthodox in relation to leadership and precedent, and the style of the orthodox in relation to expression. He creates alter ideologies, and hence boundaries, by warning his readers about certain practices (eating strange foods), false teachings (Judaism), and attitudes (contentiousness). Finally, to specify where the boundaries of orthodoxy are to be drawn, Ignatius presents formulas that help his readers distinguish the orthodox from the heretical.

The analysis of these letters will serve three ends. First, it will provide a better understanding of early conceptions of Christian orthodoxy. Second, it will contribute to our understanding of the the cultural functions of epideictic. Third, it will extend the territory of rhetorical scholarship into an historic period that has received little attention to date.

Lewis A. Sussman

The Figure of the Adulescens in the Major Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian

The nineteen Major Declamations, falsely attributed to Quintilian and dating probably to the 3rd century AD, contain the only fully extant controversiae that have survived from antiquity. These were practice judicial speeches whose composition and delivery formed the mainstay of the higher education system for Roman teenagers who studied in private schools presided over by a rhetor, a professional teacher of public speaking. This particular collection came from the pens of several different rhetors. The individual speeches served as display pieces to advertise their skills, attract students, and to function as models for their charges to emulate. The competition for students in part explains the rather racy, lurid, and romantic nature of the controversiae themes, censured by Quintilian (e.g. 2.10.3-5) and other critics during the Empire, and the object of detailed study (along with the declamatory laws) by recent scholars such as Bonner, Parks, and Clarke.

The contents of the Major Declamations' themes were purposely intended to appeal to youths in their teens by portraying characters of approximately the same age (or slightly older) in situations which especially reflected their concerns in the period before assuming the independence and full responsibilities of adulthood. Thus, of the 19 speeches 14 have an adulescens as a major figure, three as a minor character, while only two fail to include one at all (MD 12,13). A disproportionately larger number, 13, focus almost exclusively on the relationships between sons and parents (or step-parents), with the father-son bond receiving the most attention since it had the most potential for dramatic conflict. Of the ten declamations concerning fathers and sons, in six instances the relationships are very bad. (In an additional two cases the son has already been charged with his father's murder.) The bonds between mothers and sons tend to be marked generally by affection and understanding (three of four cases; two others deal with too close a tie--incest between mother and son). Step-mothers and step-sons, naturally, get on very poorly (MD 1 & 2). Usually the adulescentes are portrayed as virtuous, noble, devoted to friends and family, and innocent (MD 1,2,3,4,6,7,9,10,16); at times, however, they appear colorless, pathetic, and passive (MD 1,2,8,10,11,17; cf. 18). This was, on the other hand, an approved pattern of behavior for that age. Only twice does an adulescens appear in a totally unfavorable light (MD 5;19), while in two other instances (MD 14,15) he appears, I think amusingly, as the conventionalized young lover of elegy and comedy in a one-sided affair with a meretrix.

The Major Declamations were composed expressly for and in sympathy with their intended audience of young men who were at that very time struggling with the tensions and problems of growing up in a society and in families which were relatively rigid, serious-minded, and authoritarian, and in which fathers legally and emotionally dominated their sons, chose their careers, and even selected their wives. In the composition and delivery of practice speeches similar to the ones in this collection, youths could escape this world, and if only briefly, discharge some of their repressed, pent-up emotions.

Jane Sutton &
Takís Poulakos

The Scope of Legal Discourse in
Late Fifth-century Athens

In this essay, we will focus on representations of logos as agon in dicastic speeches by Antiphon and Gorgias. While the overall context in which this construct appears re-enforces the conventional understanding of agonis logos as legal contest, the linguistic context of the phrase does not always exclude the possibility of a deliberative (i.e. political) function. Indeed, in several passages in Antiphon and in Gorgias, the coinjoining of logos and agon makes up a construct whose referent may be legal but also political contests. This suggests that the concept of agonistic discourse, as employed by Antiphon and Gorgias, is a concept used to designate contests that take place not only in the courts but also in the assembly.

Our close study of representations of logos and agon in Antiphon and Gorgias gives us a discursive angle from which we may raise broader questions about the political function of dicastic discourses during that time. Our larger objective is to show that, at least to some degree, dicastic speeches by the Sophists did have political overtones. Even though their status as foreigners prevented them from participating in the governing of the polis, the Sophists produced legal discourses whose implications extended well beyond the scope of the dicastic realm proper.

Another major strand in the essay examines critically scholarly efforts to tell the story of legal discourse in the fifth-century from a generic perspective, a perspective that treats legal discourse as an autonomous entity. Our own suggestion is that any account of the history of legal discourse in the fifth-century needs to consider the inter-relationship of the dicastic and the political. A part of a book-length study on the history of legal discourse from Antiphon to Demosthenes, the essay ends with a brief historical account based on that inter-relationship.

Takeshi Suzuki

Akihito's Apology and Roh's Reply:
Can Rhetoric Wipe the Slate Clean?

In 1990, the question of clearing negative legacies of Japan's military expansion before and during World War II became the most contested issue in South Korea and Japan. As South Korean President Roh Tae-woo decided to make an official visit to Japan, he requested an imperial apology toward Korea for Japan's 35-year colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula until 1945. Although Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu decided to give such an apology, Roh's request created a heated debate among Japanese government officials. There was a serious separation of opinion as to whether or not Japanese Emperor Akihito should apologize or how far he should go in apologizing, since the postwar constitution of Japan limits the emperor to a symbolic role separate from a political one. Hence this paper is an attempt to analyze Akihito's apology and Roh's response at a dinner conference on May 24, 1990 in terms of healing the nation's wound. Especially, central to the discussion is how Roh responded to this rhetorical situation instigated by Akihito's apology.

C. Jan Swearingen

"Aspasia's Epitaphios: Satire, Allegory, or Masterpiece?"

Aspasia's speech in Plato's *Menexenus* has been analysed by Mary Ellen Waithe in comparison with Pericles' Funeral Oration as reported in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*. Waithe compares the historical events, reported with some differences in each of these epitaphia, the primary one being that Aspasia reports the battle of Mytilene, which occurred after Pericles delivered his oration, presumably in 431 B. C. Drawing on Bloedow, Waithe goes on to review the literature concerning Aspasia's historicity, her role as a teacher of both Socrates and Plato, and the long-held view that Socrates' rendition of her speech in the *Menexenus* has little more than satirical import. Waithe defends Aspasia's speech as seriously recounted by Socrates, and not as a satire, on the grounds that Plato is using this portrayal to illustrate the dangers of sophistic rhetoric to encourage the Athenians' growing willingness to believe that their history is something other than they well knew it was. Aspasia, Waithe proposes, is being given due recognition by Plato as a dangerous perpetrator of sophistic rhetoric. An important part of Aspasia's speech is her defense of the superiority of the Athenians. According to Bloedow, Waithe asserts, the import of Aspasia's speech is to condemn the Athenians out of their own mouths, just as the democracy is condemned in the *Gorgias* for its willingness, aided and abetted by the sophists, to deceive itself.

I propose to defend and extend Waithe's analysis of Aspasia's speech, emphasizing the following points. Aspasia deserves retrieval and recognition as a rhetorician and as a teacher of rhetoric. The speech reported in the *Menexenus* exemplifies and enacts her skill. Aspasia, a foreigner and a woman, is doubly excluded from the category of "citizen-Athenian" that she defends in the speech. This renders the speech not so much satiric--of Aspasia or of her speech--as deeply ironic concerning the uses and practitioners of rhetoric in this period. The ties to blood, earth, and birth that Aspasia emphasizes harken back to pre-Olympian ethnic rites and dietics that would have appealed to the non-aristocratic constituency of Athens, the new demos inaugurated by Solon's reforms and by Pericles' campaigns. The new soldier-citizenry, not all of them Athenians by birth or parentage, were promised soil--land ownership, for blood--shed in battle. Of additional interest is Aspasia's use of these ethnic allusions, including persistent reference to Athens as mother earth, in her roles as a woman and as a non-Athenian and in a time when priestesses were still summoned to perform oracles in times of war and plague. I will conclude with a methodological review of the philological literature that has long assumed that Aspasia, along with Diotima, are allegorical figures, literary inventions with little basis in historical fact. Waithe provides an initial review of this literature, but attends little to rhetoric per se. I shall propose that in the retrieval of women figures in antiquity that has been advanced within recent classical literature and philosophy too little attention has been paid to the rhetoric of women, as reported in the dramas, and to women rhetoricians who so far have been lumped with philosophers.

John F. Tinkler

Hayden White on Misunderstanding the Rhetoric of Historiography

Elza C. Tiner

"The Integration of Reading, Writing, and Speaking: Quintilian's Legacy in the Medieval English Schools"

Although the manuscripts of Quintilian's Institutiones Oratoriae which circulated prior to the fifteenth century were incomplete, his concept of memory as the basis for an integrated rhetorical process was handed down to successive generations of teachers of composition in the medieval schools. According to Quintilian, natural ability in rhetoric is of no value unless cultivated by persistent study and practice in writing, reading and speaking. In the third chapter of Book 3, which was available to the Middle Ages, citing Cicero's Partitiones Oratoriae and Orator, he stresses the interdependence of the five parts of Rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. He also points out how invention, arrangement, and style, stages in the process of composition, all depend on the memory. Quintilian also recommends developing the memory by reading aloud from written texts.

In the Middle Ages, teachers of rhetoric had available to them the classical theory of memory through the works of Cicero and the Rhetorica ad Herennium, as well as sections of Quintilian's text. Moreover, the rhetorical handbooks and documents of the period also make it clear that medieval classroom techniques for teaching composition made use of memory for reading and speaking, as well as writing, and that all three were treated as interdependent skills. Evidence from medieval sources collected for my licentiate research report, a survey of rhetorical texts in the city of York prior to 1500, (M.S.L., Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984) suggests that an integrated method of teaching composition which involved reading, writing, speaking, and memory was being used in the schools of medieval England. Continuing the work of Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (1966) and Janet Coleman, Medieval Readers and Writers (1981), this paper will examine the medieval tradition which develops Quintilian's system in relation to 1) the parts of rhetoric and 2) the use of memory in the integration of oral and written discourse.

Though White occasionally refers to his interpretive approach as a "rhetoric," its concerns with emplotment, tropes, and representation belong more to Aristotelian poetics than to rhetoric. In White's Aristotelian poetics, the aim of historiography is representation, and the means are metaphor and narrative emplotment. In rhetoric, by contrast, the aim is persuasion, and the means include topical invention, and the dynamics of contention. White's approach, therefore, does not preclude the different project of a rhetoric of historiography.

What would be different, I think, is that where White analyzes the literary form of histories, a rhetoric would analyze historiography as a collective discursive practice. It would therefore focus on the multiple dispositions, strategies, deployments of topics--the whole strategic play--of the practice of historiography. By corollary, it would also focus on the way historians pursue debate and argument in the present, rather than concentrating on the question whether their representations of the past are factual or fictional, driven by content or by form.

Which is a more appropriate approach is a different question. I shall argue that there has been an historical shift in historiography from the epideictic genre favored in Antiquity to the judicial genre of modern academic history--a shift that has tended to push historiography away from ceremonial poetics, and toward the traditional mainstream of rhetorical argument.

Jay Tribby

"Playing with Oneself (or, Razing the Dead) in the Seventeenth-Century Museum"

"Conversable Spaces: Eloquence and the Politics of Inquiry
in Early Modern Europe"

Introduction to the panel

Our understanding of early modern modes of inquiry has been enriched in recent years by a revived interest in early modern rhetorical culture. Rhetorically-informed historical investigation has not only re-emphasized inquiry's status as an activity of human construction, but, more particularly, it has focussed attention on the discursive environment in which that activity takes place, reminding us that inquiry proceeds in specific locales with specific rules of engagement and comportment. The four papers (by Professors Findlen, Goodman, Klein, and Tribby) in "Conversable Spaces" explore the rhetorical codes that shaped and constrained early modern investigative practice in several national settings: in court-based laboratories in Italy, in French and Italian collections of curiosities, in English coffee-houses, and in French salons.

"Playing with Oneself (or, Razing the Dead) in the Seventeenth-Century Museum"

Abstract

For many Renaissance writers, the work of inquiry was worthwhile and potentially edifying to the extent that it possessed the rhetorical engagements and analytic rhythms of a conversation between ancient and modern interlocutors. This conversation-based epistemology was invoked, contested, co-opted, and problematized throughout early modernity as it was translated to a wide range of activities, cultural practices, and venues. By the later decades of the seventeenth century, nearly everyone, it seems, was talking with the ancients and trafficking in literary allusion, albeit for very different and often opposing reasons.

What happened in the museum as "thinking aloud" and "philosophizing" became something of a cultural fashion for nobles and noble wanna bes over the course of the seventeenth century? In what ways was "curiosity" produced, packaged, and rehearsed in the collection space? This paper examines the process by which the museum came to function as a privileged setting for the rehearsal of "curiosity" in the seventeenth century. A comparative study of handbooks of conversation and catalogues of curiosities suggests that these spaces housed the visual catalysts for the verbal displays of intellectual property and rhetorical capacity that host and visitor alike regarded as the distinguishing mark of their status as civil interlocutors. Through their conversational interaction in the museum--as elsewhere--they transferred to themselves the site of all that was "curious" and "marvellous."

Rossana Valenti

TRA 'STILE' E 'ARGOMENTAZIONE': IL CONCETTO DI FIGURA
RETORICA IN QUINTILIANO.

Al centro della retorica classica si colloca la teoria delle figure, cioè delle particolari forme espressive considerate in rapporto di 'deviazione' o scarto dal linguaggio normale: l'identificazione ed il catalogo delle figure costituisce appunto uno dei problemi fondamentali della retorica, dall'antichità sino al Settecento. Si deve a Quintiliano l'elaborazione più approfondita del concetto di "figura retorica", nell'ambito di una trattazione, sviluppata soprattutto nell'ultima parte del libro VIII e nel libro IX dell'Institutio oratoria, che da un lato rappresenta una discussione riassuntiva di teorie precedenti, dall'altro diventa la base per le successive ricerche sull'argomento. In particolare, assumono forte rilievo il riconoscimento delle "modalità linguistiche" sottese al concetto di figura, che ha la capacità di "modalizzare" il discorso dichiarativo sfumandone o variandone il senso, e la distinzione, teorizzata ed esemplificata da Quintiliano, tra valore probatorio-argomentativo e valore esornativo della figura.

Paolo Valesio

INTERRUPTION AND LISTENING:
THE KEY PHENOMENA IN THE RHETORIC OF SILENCE

In this paper, on the basis of my own past and ongoing work (Valesio 1986, Valesio in progress) as well as on some recent work (Blodgett and Coward 1989, Corradi Fiumara 1990, etc.), I assess the contemporary situation in the analysis of silence from a general, mostly philosophical, point of view; I then delineate a general strategy for literary analysis based on this assessment.

Rhetoric is the indispensable instrument for the production and analysis of philosophical and literary discourse; but rhetoric today risks becoming paralyzed by its traditional taxonomic apparatus, whose usefulness has by now considerably diminished. On the other hand, a consideration of silence is ultimately indispensable, if one wants to identify the basic nourishing ground of philosophy and literature; yet the unilateral exaltation of silence as a perfectly fulfilling state of plenitude (an attitude that still dominates most of the studies of the subject) dull the cutting edge of this idea as a philosophical and literary tool.

How to avoid this impasse, and thus develop what I term (retrieving an older English word) a silentary philosophy? First of all, rhetoric should not be viewed as something complementary or alternative to philosophy: rhetoric realizes itself as philosophy at the very moment when it reaches its culmination and transcends itself as rhetoric. This is accomplished when the protagonist of the rhetorical enterprise (thinker, writer, or simply "man in the street") moves from the realm of the word into that of silence.

But the crucial question is: What kind of silence? (Here rhetoric is confirmed as the indispensable component in man's discursive experience: silence is not a monolithic, undifferentiated phenomenon--but rather a complex of different possibilities which must be articulated in rhetorical terms.)

The basic experience is that of silence manifesting itself as an interruption. This is the subtextual, animating presence in literary production: silence as the interruption or gap that generates pauses, citational parentheses, cuts, lacunae, hesitations, textual transitions, and so forth--in short, most of what makes the literary text articulate and dramatic.

In philosophical terms, the silentary interruption is the most serious grouping for dialogue. Without it, dialogue remains a too vague and weak concept. If I interrupt myself in the midst of my discourse (with an interruption that, as noted, can take many forms), then I am really prepared to listen to others, and to the other by the dramaticity of this interruption as well as by its inner motivation. This listening attitude can orient the whole experience of reading, interpreting, criticizing texts. Some selected examples of literary readings according to these principles conclude the paper.

W. van den Berg

The Popularity of Public Eloquence

In the first half of the nineteenth century Rhetoric still took a prominent position in Dutch culture. Taught at the latin schools and the universities it derived its dominant place mainly from the specific way the literary culture in Holland was organized: in societies and associations divers in character. In all these institutions of literary sociability much attention was payed to the declamation of poetry. The oral performance was highly esteemed and led to a torrent of treatises on rhetoric in general and on public eloquence in particular.

In the second half of the nineteenth century this cultus of orality created a new type of society, exclusively dedicated to the declamation of poetry and prose, the so-called 'Rederijkerskamers voor uiterlijke welsprekendheid' (Chambers of of public eloquence). They shot up like mushrooms both in towns as well as in the country. Hundreds of them lost their high ideals after a few years and transformed into drama clubs, others continued their training in public eloquence untill now.

In my paper I propose to explain in greater detail how in the Dutch literary societies of the nineteenth century one aspect of the Rhetoric, the Public Eloquence (both the actio as well as the pronunciatio) continued to play a prominent part.

Ferdinand van Ingen

Rhetorische und poetische Inventio

Ein Beitrag zur Rolle der Polyhistorie
im 17. Jahrhundert

In dichtungstheoretischen Bemerkungen des 17. Jahrhunderts stößt man auf das Phänomen, daß Eigenschaften und Tugenden des Redners, des Philosophen und des Historikers auf den Dichter übertragen werden, dieser sich aber dadurch unterscheidet, daß ihm in stofflichen Bereichen wie in der Anwendung der Redefiguren eine größere Freiheit zugesprochen wird. Zur Begründung wird in der Regel auf die besondere emotionelle Wirkung der dichterischen Arbeit verwiesen (J. Dyck: "Philosoph, Historiker, Dichter und Poet", 1909).

Neben dieses Modell einer Schriftsteller-Hierarchie, das sich aus Elementen der Tradition zusammensetzt, tritt ein anderes. Es setzt bei dem für den Dichter aktuellen Bezugspunkt des Gelehrten an (W. Mühlmann: Gelehrtenrepublik und Fürstenstaat, 1982; G. Grimm: Literatur und Gelehrtentum in Deutschland, 1963) und begründet das traditionelle Element des "Vielwissers" neu, indem es das gelehrte Wissen selbst in eine poetologische Funktion überführt und als eine über die erlernbare ars hinausgehende Besonderheit der dichterischen inventio darstellt. Der poeta doctus finiert damit eine Legitimierung für seinen Platz in der Gelehrtenrepublik, zugleich artikuliert sich eine neue Auffassung von der Arbeitsweise des Dichters - in Unterschied von der Tätigkeit des Redners wie des "Reimeschmieds". In Klopstocks Kategorien "Entdeckung" und "Erfindung" läßt sich im 18. Jahrhundert ein Echo dieser Entwicklung feststellen.

Cristina Viano

Quintiliano e la storia della filosofia: Il concetto di *status causae* e l'uso delle *quaestiones philosopho convenientes*.

Quintiliano si rivolge alla tradizione filosofica per riappropriarsi delle armi legittime dell'oratore, ovvero di strutture argomentative e di contenuti dottrinali che, dopo la separazione della retorica dalla filosofia, sono rimaste soprattutto monopolio di quest'ultima.

Il concetto di *status causae*, che consiste nella definizione propria e concisa del termini di una questione, e l'uso delle *generales quaestiones* dette anche *quaestiones philosopho convenientes*, sono nell'opera di Quintiliano l'aspetto più interessante del legame tra filosofia e retorica.

In particolare, la scelta di alcuni temi di controversie, soprattutto di ordine fisico e cosmologico, come modelli di ragionamento, fa luce sull'orientamento dottrinale di Quintiliano e mostra l'uso retorico del materiale dossografico dei *Placita*.

Victor J. Vitanza

Lalangue, "excluded thirds," and differends of Rhetorics"

What I am going to attempt to do is discuss the existence and importance of "counter-views" to what is referred to as "the language of rhetoric," specifically, the "c-vs" of J. Lacan (his lalangue vs. Saussure's la langue), M. Serres ("excluded third" as opposed to Platonic/Socratic dialectic), and J-F. Lyotard (the differend vs. litigation). I will discuss each in relation to the historiography of rhetoric.

These "counter-views" are not accounted for in or by any traditional model of rhetoric or pragmatics. When viewed as being outside the model, these "c-vs" are described as neurotic/psychotic, as noise, or as threats to the rule of law and order. These "c-vs" are counter to the traditional model of communication such as the Aristotelian model of logos, ethos, pathos, or the neo-Aristotelian (Jacobsonian, Kenneavian) model of encoder, decoder, reality, signal (or code). Quite simply, these "c-vs" point to the existence of a displaced/deflected irrationality within language itself, an irrationality that when deflected/suppressed, threatens to overwhelm rationality itself.

For my research/scholarly purposes, one importance of these "counter-views" is that they challenge the prevailing conception of language: (la langue and le parole) and its place in the polis and (more importantly) the history of the polis as opposed to the pagus (the savage, "counter"-place, that which is apolis but which is, nonetheless, very much a part of human being). Because modern historians have exclusively favored the Aristotelian model of language (or more generally, the onto-theological-genetic model), we consequently have "the history of rhetoric," or a history which has become the history--the one represented semiotically across an impoverished monological view of language (cf. Vickers' response to Nietzsche and deMan in The Defense of Rhetoric (over the issue of topology/typology); or Kennedy's response to Vitanza in "Some reflections on Neomodernism" (over the issue of "letteraturizzazione").

Traditional historians have represented this monological view of language and rhetoric as a grand narrative of emancipation, when (instead) it is a narrative of oppression. The history of the polis has been solely represented at the expense of histories/hysterics of the polis and pagus. What is wanted, therefore, is a history/hysterics of Desire and Possibilities, not just the history of Necessity and Probability, or Ideality or Actuality. What is wanted are histories/hysterics of rhetorics told across, e.g., Foucault's concept of "counter-memory," or Lyotard's "Sign of History" (as discussed in The Differend: Phrases in Dispute). For Lyotard, the differend (as opposed to a litigation) would be a case of conflict, between two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments. (The genre, e.g., of forensic discourse fails to provide the rule, and in its failure silences, further victimizes, one of the parties by ruling the other party "out of court." It is not a simple matter of relying on Aristotelian "prudence" or of changing the rules, because any change only introduces new differends.) The genre of traditional history-writing further silences "counter-histories," e.g., that rely not on cause-effect (metonymy) but on radical contingencies or reversals (metalepses); or rely on such "outlaw" rhetors as the Wolf-Man or Dora or Judge Schreiber--all whom are represented in and by the genres of traditional history-writing as being rhetorical, but all of whom are the very embodiments of differends (or Lacanian lalangue) by virtue of the exclusionary rules of the court of rhetoric (or

Arthur E. Walzer

Jane Austen's Philosophy of Persuasion and Eighteenth Century Rhetoric

While critics, most prominently Wayne Booth, have shown how Jane Austen's art is consummately rhetorical, no one has examined rhetoric as an idea in Austen's novels. This is surprising for a number of reasons, not the least that the title of Austen's last novel is Persuasion. This title is not only Austen's signal to her readers of the importance of persuasion as a theme in the novel, but also an invitation to us to examine the novels from the perspective of eighteenth-century rhetorical theory. Doing so brings to the fore Austen's sophisticated and detailed philosophy of persuasion.

It is not an exaggeration to characterize Austen's use of "persuasion" as a technical term in her developed philosophy of rhetoric. Although efforts by characters to persuade others appear throughout the novels, crucial to Austen's philosophy of rhetoric are those encounters that she identifies as archetypal persuasive situations. Such situations occur in Persuasion, Emma, and Pride and Prejudice. In Emma, Emma attempts to bring Harriet completely under her control, as she persuades Harriet that she should cease her interest in Robert Martin and pursue Elton. In Persuasion, the action evolves out of Lady Russell's successful effort to persuade Anne Elliot to refuse a marriage proposal from Captain Wentworth and reaches a climax in Lady Russell's unsuccessful effort to persuade Anne to marry her cousin, Mr Elliot. In Pride and Prejudice, Darcy persuades Bingley against pursuing Jane Bennet. In each of these classic persuasive situations, a rhetor attempts to influence a vulnerable hearer to act against her or his inclination. In these situations, the rhetor does not merely give advice, but, to use George Campbell's description of the persuasive intent, gains ascendancy over the hearer in effort to control the "latent movements of the soul."

Through these archetypal persuasive situations, Austen's systematically depicts a psychology of persuasion that fleshes out the abstractions that characterize the description of persuasive discourse in George Campbell and other eighteenth-century rhetoricians. In Austen, the theoretician's claim that persuasive discourse appeals to all faculties--imagination, passions, and understanding in effort to move the will--is manifest as a dramatic and stylistic achievement. Furthermore, through these classic persuasive situations, Austen implies an epistemology for rhetoric that addresses contemporary controversies concerning the relationship of language to reality. Finally, in portraying the dilemmas her characters face, Austen indicates if not a complete ethic of persuasion, at least the ethical tensions inherent in situations in which powerful personalities feel compelled to influence the impressionable and vulnerable.

It is clear not only that eighteenth-century rhetorical theory illuminates an important facet of Austen's art but that Austen's novels can make vivid the generalizations and abstractions that characterize eighteenth-century rhetorical theory. While this is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the history of rhetoric, whether Austen's ideas on persuasion are sufficiently distinct from those more systematically developed in the theories of her contemporaries to claim for her a creative contribution to the history of rhetorical theory is, at least for me at this time, problematic and will be the focus of my study between now and our meeting in September.

John O. Ward

QUINTILIAN AND THE RHETORICAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES

The argument of this paper is (1) that crucial adjustments had to be made before the rhetorical theory and practice of Graeco-Roman antiquity could be adapted to the purposes and contexts of subsequent European society; (2) that these crucial adjustments were made in the middle ages rather than in the Renaissance; (3) that the use of and attitude towards Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory forms a yardstick of the extent and scope of medieval interest in and adaptation of the classical rhetorical past.

Detailed elaboration of these arguments will suggest the significance of Quintilian's Institutes as a text for medieval usage patterns, examine the role played by the Institutes in the context of the Rhetores Latini Minores and assess the significance of some early fragments of the Institutes in the light of the early history of the text of Quintilian. The florilegia tradition will be discussed, in particular the innovative florilegium of Stephen of Rouen and the pattern of Stephen's rhetorical interests and practices.

A major portion of the paper will be allocated to the story of the incorporation of the technical aspects of Quintilian's Institutes into the formal teaching of classical rhetorical theory in the middle ages. An attempt will be made to evaluate the nature of this incorporation and its function. The paradigm of Renaissance utilization of Quintilian will be kept in mind and a brief comparison will be offered between the role played by Quintilian in the Ad Herennium commentary of Guarino da Verona and in some important Ad Herennium commentaries from the twelfth century.

Brief reference will be made to the development of medieval interest in the pseudo-Quintilian declamations to suggest the ramifications of medieval adaptations of Roman courtroom oratory.

Barbara Warnick

Bernard Lamy's L'Art de parler and the Eclipse of Aristotelian Inventional Theory

The late seventeenth-century belletristic rhetorics of Fénelon, Lamy, Bouhours, and Rollin ignore or disparage the commonplaces and emphasize instead such discursive features as vraisemblance, appropriateness, vivacity, and sublimity. They are less concerned with rational processes than they are with imagination in influence and persuasion. Lamy's L'Art de parler is particularly representative of this trend. Lamy followed Cartesian psychology in locating emotive responses in imprints left by past impressions in the soul and imagination. In his view, figures and tropes are significant because they act as triggers exciting sensate impressions which, when transmitted to the brain, call up associations and images leading to acceptance of the speaker's message. Lamy was interested in how discourse is correlated with auditors' predispositions, mental habits, expectations, and cultural experience. The themes introduced by Lamy--propriety, vivacity, and verisimilitude--proved pervasively influential in the eighteenth-century rhetorics of Rollin, Smith, Blair, and Campbell.

Elizabeth Watson

The Literature of Paradox and Women as Paradox
in Renaissance Literature

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both paradoxical encomia and collections of arguments against received opinion included paradoxes on the physical, social, and moral state of women. This paper will first survey the English and Continental traditions of paradox, especially the collections of paradoxes by Cicero, Ortensio Lando, John Donne, and John Hall and the seventeenth century compilations of paradoxical encomia. Secondly, some typical themes will be developed: for example, marriage in More's *Utopia* and later encomia; the paradox of ugliness and Shakespeare's "Dark Lady"; and the theme of women's inconstancy in love, a topic John Donne included in his *Paradoxes and Problems* and in his poems. Finally, the paper will discuss the question of whether the paradox, however facetious its intention, contains within it the inherent possibility, like Isocrates' paradoxical praise of Helen of Troy, of changing received opinion, as Jean-Claude Margolin has suggested in his essay in *La Paradoxe au temps de la Renaissance*, edited by M.T. Jones-Davies (1982). Or, as Shakespeare's Hamlet said of beauty and honesty in women, "This was sometime a paradox, but now the time gives it proof" (3.1.113-4).

William E. Weithoff

NEOCLASSICAL RHETORIC IN EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICAN LAW REPORTS OF SLAVERY CASES

Widely believed to have arisen amid legal dispute, the art of rhetoric continued to flourish in forensic practice over the centuries. In early eighteenth-century America—especially in that society known as the Old South—neoclassical rhetorical training manifested itself clearly in judicial opinions on race and slavery. Judges were among the best educated members of Southern society in the early American republic, and they justified their legal opinions by resorting to deliberative *loci* (Aristotelian doctrine) and epideictic *amplificatio* (Hellenistic doctrine as outlined in the *Rhetoric to Herennius*), as well as properly forensic devices such as *insinuatio* (Hellenistic doctrine as outlined in Cicero's *On Invention*).

These implicit traces of the judges' training are valuable as supplements to explicit evidence of reading lists and course plans in the general and professional education of the period. Moreover, the judges' use of deliberative and epideictic techniques, as well as forensic rhetoric, underscores the complexity of the slavery issue.

Kathleen E. Welch

Isocrates' "Antidosis" and Its Relationship to
Fourth-Century B.C. Orality and Literacy

This paper proposes a rereading of Isocrates' "Antidosis," an autobiographical tract in the genre of the apology, through the orality-literacy thesis developed by Eric A. Havelock (particularly in *Preface to Plato* and *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*) and Walter J. Ong (particularly in *The Presence of the Word* and *Orality and Literacy*).

The first section of the paper analyzes two schools of response to the Ong/Havelock orality-literacy thesis: 1) the appropriation by Deborah Brandt in *Literacy as Involvement: The Acts of Writers, Readers, and Texts* and by Patricia Bizzell in "Arguing about Literacy" (*College English*, 1988), both of whom dichotomize orality and literacy in their analysis of the thesis as a "great divide;" and 2) the appropriation by Henry Sussman in *High Resolution*, where he explicates the Ong-Havelock thesis according to epistemology.

The next section of the paper analyzes Isocrates' "Antidosis" according to these two readings and shows why the "great divide" theory does not work with Isocrates' text (and, by implication, with other texts as well). Sussman's explication of the Ong-Havelock thesis is shown to account for Isocrates' dependence on writing and his simultaneous use of oral genres. In other words, Isocrates' "Antidosis" is shown to be a product of an increasingly literate culture that continues to depend heavily on oral discourse and the processes of thinking that accompany it.

The decline of the syllogism in the eighteenth century did not happen overnight, but was the result of special arguments leveled against it. This paper will focus on the arguments put forward by Lord Kames, Thomas Reid, and George Campbell. They attacked the syllogism according to four main lines of argument: (1) arguments directed against Aristotle as a person, especially his motives for developing syllogistic logic; (2) arguments directed against the syllogism as a means by which to train students to reason better; (3) arguments directed against the syllogism as a tool by which to investigate nature; and (4) technical arguments directed to some feature internal to syllogistic theory. My presentation will give examples of what Kames, Reid, and Campbell actually said.

Michael Winterbottom

Abstract of IN DEFENCE OF QUINTILIAN

Quintilian might justifiably have felt proud of the Institutio: not least because of two major innovations as compared with the ordinary ars rhetorica. The innovations are interlinked:

- 1) One is the treatment of the orator from cradle to retirement. This gives forward impetus to the book, and enables Quintilian to press his moral point for young children and practicing orators alike.

Such a wide scope does cause problems. Who exactly is Quintilian writing for? His addressee seems to vary; and there is a sense in which he is writing for his own pleasure, with occasional passages of almost parodically elaborate research.
- 2) The second innovation is the extension into the field of philosophy. Quintilian hoped to win back territory lost to rhetoric by laying an Isocratean stress on moral values. The Ciceronian vision of the perfect orator is less important than the concept of the bonus vir, Quintilian's answer to Plato's criticisms in the Gorgias. Hence the importance of Quintilian's familiarity with the real life of the bar. He is writing a sort of De officiis, especially in xi.1. His is a Roman ideal, and his vir bonus is a Roman man of action, who is perhaps not quite so out of place in Domitian's Rome as has been thought.

J. Wisse

Cicero's Ideal Orator in Context

Cicero's *De oratore*, which is one of the landmarks in the history of the conflict between rhetoric and philosophy, needs a reassessment. For despite the renewed interest in this conflict, and despite the large amount of work done on classical rhetoric during the past five decades, both its content and its historical position are still often misrepresented. My research on the third book, which contains the final formulation of Cicero's ideal, is part of the Amsterdam project, led by Leeman and Pinkster, of writing a full-scale commentary that gives such a reassessment on all levels.

At the 1989 conference in Göttingen the emphasis of my contribution was on the question what Cicero says: paying attention to the literary and persuasive character of the work itself enables us to grasp the nuances of Cicero's position, and to distinguish between his minimal demand that a good orator should acquaint himself with the branch of philosophy that treats ethics and politics, and his ideal, which implies knowledge of the whole of philosophy. My present research concentrates on the cultural background of these ideas.

It is clear, contrary to what some scholars think, that Cicero, writing in 55 B.C., is not answering Plato, who wrote three centuries before him, and that he is not just echoing debates of the second century B.C., but addresses issues still relevant and debated in his own day. Also, the solutions of those working in the tradition of *Quellenforschung* are unacceptable, even though they are still influential. They supposed Cicero to be completely dependent on Greek writers, such as the Academic philosophers Philo of Larissa (Von Arnim) and Antiochus of Ascalon (Kroll), the Stoic Posidonius (Schulte), or even Greek rhetoricians (Barwick). But although such dependence cannot be assumed, these figures do deserve attention as making up an important part of the cultural and intellectual context in which Cicero wrote his *De oratore*. Though the material is rather scanty, my aim is to describe the relationship between Cicero's ideas and this context, and answer such questions as what Cicero is reacting to, and where he may have found inspiration. My contribution at this conference will report on my findings.

Marjorie Curry Woods

HANDBOOK RHETORIC IN THE
LATE MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY

In this paper I wish to explore a group of late medieval compendia of the *Poetria nova* (ca. 1215) by Geoffrey of Vinsauf that were used by students at various universities in central Europe.

These compendia emphasize the the aspects of the *Poetria nova* that university students were expected to know: the definitions of rhetorical terms and, especially, the figures. The important aspect of these definitions (and the examples that sometimes accompanied them) is that they are not quoted from or in any way unique to the *Poetria nova* itself; rather, they are common to almost all medieval rhetorical treatises as well as to the classical rhetorical treatises widely used during the Middle Ages.

From the existence and contents of these compendia I argue that that, while the *Poetria nova* itself was the subject of extensive lecturing and analysis in some European universities during the fifteenth century, the *Compendia Poetrie nove* performed the function of what are called today "college handbooks" in the United States: quick reference lists of important rhetorical tools that all students were expected to have learned.

Wilhelm Wuellner

Death and Rebirth of Rhetoric in Biblical Interpretation

Following a brief survey of the symptoms and causes of rhetoric's steady decline in use and value for the interpretation of biblical literature during the 17th through 19th centuries, the unforeseen and unexpected rebirth of rhetoric in biblical exegesis during the last quarter of the 20th century will be explored for its plights and promises in challenging old paradigms of scholarship.

In the conclusion of the paper special attention will be given to two areas of research: (1) a comparative critical approach to sacred rhetorics in Western and nonWestern traditions, and (2) a critical approach to the rhetorical nature not only of the sacred texts, but also of the critical scholarship(s) in the service of the proper interpretation of the texts. Scientific critical exegesis can only argue for, but never conclusively demonstrate, the truth claims made, in the name of theological or hermeneutical science, for either its subject matter (the sacred text), or the propositions generated by scholarship.

Peter Wülfing

On Orality and Literacy in Early Rhetoric

Rhetoric, in the course of its development through the centuries, has become the art of speaking and of writing. But it was not like that from the start. The primary interest of those who created the system was to win a cause or to enable others to win their cause. So all these non-stylistic, non-verbal and non-literary parts are to be considered as the very basis of the system, though we tend to treat them as side work. I mean the following elements of the system: non-artificial proof (witnesses, written documents, oaths, signs etc.), techniques of memory, of pronunciation (with gesture, facial expression and deportment of the body).

Beside these items there are the many allusions to contemporary law procedure.

My paper tries to give an interpretation and evaluation to this underlying quality of Rhetoric. It is not only an art born from an essentially oral situation but also an art which has to be understood as bridging theory and practice: rhetoric and oratory. Some modern interpretations that make it an overall system of stylistic devices seem to forget too readily about its original impact.

Wulf Wülfing

ZU STRUKTUR, GESCHICHTE UND FUNKTION DER PARONOMASIE BEI THEODOR FONTANE

1. ZUR STRUKTUR

1.1 Fontane verwendet beide Arten von Paronomasie, die die Rhetorik kennt: die "organische" und die "unorganische" (Lausberg, Handbuch, S. 324 f.).

1.2 Fontane vermischt beide Arten miteinander.

2. Zur Geschichte

Fontane hat das paronomastische Spiel in der Berliner Sonntagsgesellschaft "Tunnel über der Spree" kennengelernt, deren Gründer Moritz Gottlieb Saphir um 1830 eines bösen Wortwitzes wegen Wien hatte verlassen müssen. Beispiel für eine der - von Heinrich Meine sehr geschätzten - Paronomasien Saphirs: "Bei dem großen Erdbeben in Bogota hat die dortige Zensur mehrere Berge, die einfielen, ganz gestrichen, weil jeder Einfall ein Verbrechen ist. So wurde auch die Magdalena [der Magdalenenfluß] bestraft, weil sie gegen alle Sitte aus ihrem Bett getreten ist."

Fontane übernimmt das paronomastische Verfahren sofort, so z.B. wenn er in seinem dritten "Tunnel"-Protokoll schreibt: "Immermanns Terzinen beschrieben den letzten Moment des sterbenden Papstes. Ein trefflicher Vorwurf, aber an die Ausführung knüpfen sich Vorwürfe."

3. Zur Funktion

Ein erster Effekt paronomastischen Sprechens kann sein, daß der Blick von der 'Message' weg auf die Sprache selbst gelenkt und der Leser auf diese Weise z.B. auf ein Phänomen gestoßen wird, das de Saussure unter dem Stichwort "Beliebigkeit des Zeichens" abhandelt. Eine Folge davon ist u.a., daß ein und dieselbe Bezeichnung mit zwei Bezeichneten verknüpft werden kann, so daß Homonymie vorliegt: 'Vorwurf': a) 'Gegenstand', b) 'Tadel'.

Ein zweiter Effekt kann sein, daß der Leser die 'Souveränität' bemerkt, mit der hier jemand die Möglichkeiten der Sprache nutzt; dieser Effekt ist für den Textproduzenten nicht ganz ungefährlich, weil er zum Boomerang werden kann: Man macht dem Schreiber den Vorwurf, er nehme den Gegenstand, von dem er redet, nicht 'ernst'. Handelt es sich bei einem solchen dem 'Witz' ausgesetzten Gegenstand z.B. um im Vormärz 'heilige' Güter, wie z.B. Staat, Moral und Religion, kann das zum Berufsverbot führen.

4. Zur Problematik

Die Paronomasie hat heutzutage unter dem Namen *Kalauer* einen schlechten Ruf. Das tut ihrer Beliebtheit keinen Abbruch; jedenfalls überall dort nicht, wo 'Witz' am Platze ist. Befremdend wirkt jedoch, wenn 'Ernstes' paronomastisch präsentiert wird. Insofern ist die Tatsache für den heutigen Leser erklärungsbedürftig, daß in Fontanes Romanen - z.B. in "Unwiederbringlich" und im "Stechlin" - gerade an denjenigen Stellen Paronomasien anzutreffen sind, an denen die Protagonisten ihre zentralen 'Bekanntnisse' ablegen.

Harvey Yunis

Thucydides vs. Plato on Periclean Rhetoric

Thucydides views Pericles as the ideal *rhêtôr* and far superior to his successors. In the *Gorgias*, Plato views Pericles as no better than any other Athenian *rhêtôr* and unequivocally rejects Pericles as an ideal. Although Plato does not mention or quote Thucydides anywhere in his work, in his discussions of Pericles Plato was reacting not simply to the historical figure, but to Thucydides' account of Periclean rhetoric. (This is quickly confirmed by a brief reference to the *Menexenus*.) Plato had no other choice. The entire record of Pericles' rhetoric was supplanted by the Periclean speeches in Thucydides from the time of the publication of Thucydides' work; questions concerning the actual rhetoric of the historical Pericles dissolve themselves in the mist of history for Plato as they do for us. What remains worthy of discussion (as opposed to speculation), for Plato as for us, are theoretical questions based on the Thucydidean account of Pericles as *rhêtôr*. In this paper (part of a larger investigation) I consider how Thucydides' account of Periclean rhetoric measures up to the "true rhetoric" propounded in the *Gorgias*.

Thucydides asserted that Pericles' virtue as *rhêtôr* lay in the fact that through his rhetoric he instructed the demos. To support this assertion, in addition to Pericles' speeches which illustrate this rhetoric, Thucydides claimed that Pericles did not flatter the demos, wielded authority over the demos like a monarch, enjoyed authority based on his intelligence, and aimed strictly at the common good. As argued centuries later by Aelius Aristides, there is a rough, prima facie correspondence with the account of the expert *rhêtôr* advocated in the *Gorgias*.

Plato claims to assess Periclean rhetoric with regard to a single criterion: did Pericles succeed in "making the Athenians better" by means of his speeches to them? Plato conscientiously excludes contemporary political controversy. Plato revises several aspects of Thucydides' account of Pericles: flattery, political success, political expediency and, above all, the notions of instruction and persuasion. The different aims assigned to rhetoric by the historian and philosopher are reflected in their respective accounts of Pericles' conviction: Thucydides places the volatility of the citizenry beyond the reach of rhetoric; Plato distorts the historical record of the conviction while asserting the elimination of that volatility as the prime task of rhetoric. But Plato shows how even on Thucydides' own terms the educational effectiveness of Pericles' rhetoric is less than the historian claims. Finally, I end the paper with a glance at Plato's revision in the *Phaedrus* of his assessment of Periclean rhetoric in the *Gorgias*.

James P. Zappen

John Dewey and Sophistic Rhetoric

Philosophers have noted the centrality of a reconstructed Aristotelian logic in Dewey's attempt to redirect philosophy and science away from the quest for certainty and toward the vicissitudes of life. I suggest that the deeper roots of Dewey's attempt to develop a logic that joins the problems of philosophy and science and the problems of life lie in his version of sophistic rhetoric, which he apparently learned from Hegel's History of Philosophy, passed along to him through Morris's translation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy. Hegel and, more emphatically, Ueberweg isolate distinct periods and divisions in Greek philosophy and point to Plato's and then Aristotle's separation of the various branches of knowledge, in particular the theoretical from the practical.

Dewey admired the sophists' interest in practical logic as a process of coming to know through public discussion, applicable to all subjects worthy of discussion (Democracy and Education, Reconstruction in Philosophy, "Logic," "Philosophy"). He deplored the quest for certainty in philosophy and science since Plato and Aristotle, the displacement of the logic of discovery and invention by formal logic, the separation of certain from probable logic and of philosophy and science from morality and human affairs, and the use of language to name things within a restricted universe of discourse rather than to create meanings through indefinitely extended and varied discourse ("The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Experience and Nature, The Quest for Certainty, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry).

In his attempt to reconstruct Aristotelian logic along the lines suggested by his version of sophistic rhetoric, Dewey sought to extend the method of the physical sciences to human affairs generally, first, by adopting that method as a method of inquiry in education applicable to all subjects and, second, by adopting that method within the social sciences with the hope of achieving progress in the knowledge of human affairs comparable to that in the physical sciences (Democracy and Education, The Public and Its Problems, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry). Though overtly scientific in its method, Dewey's vision was nonetheless revolutionary and far reaching, extending even, and necessarily, to the method of science itself.

Heping Zhao

RHETORICAL INVENTION IN WEN XIN DIAO LONG

In this paper I would like to attempt an investigation of the intentional acts represented in a fifth-century Chinese rhetorical treatise of written discourse. Entitled Wen Xin Diao Long or The Cultivating of the Mind and the Carving of Dragons, this 50-chapter treatise, written by Liu Xie of Qi Dynasty, consists of three major canons: patterns of writing, intentional acts, and organizational strategies. Focusing on the second canon, I will show that invention, like other components of rhetoric, was already developed as a systematic theory in medieval China.

In Liu Xie's theory, invention is both content-oriented and form-oriented. Shensi or "spiritual thinking" provides acts of the content-oriented invention. During these acts, internal factors (feeling and mind) interact with external ones (language and situation) to generate thoughts and ideas for writing. Ti or "appropriate genre" deals with acts of form-oriented invention. A wide spectrum of genre patterns, endorsed by convention and authority and chosen according to the needs of changing exigencies, further enable the writer to explore the subject matter in consideration of such related rhetorical elements as purpose and readership. Although some of its characteristics bear resemblance, quite coincidentally, to the silent meditation and argument from religious authority in medieval European rhetoric, Liu Xie's theory of rhetorical invention, with its pronounced integration between content and form, represents a uniquely Chinese approach to thought formation and discourse initiation.

Margaret D. Zulick

Title: Orality, Literacy and Prophetic Argument.

Walter Ong (Orality and Literacy) and Eric Havelock (e.g. The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences) have constructed a developmental theory of the relationship between oral and literate discourse which in effect links the origins of Western rationality to the Greek adaptation of the phonetic alphabet. This essay draws upon another important ancient tradition, the classical Hebrew prophets. Using examples from the hybrid oral and literate discourse of the 8th century prophets Hosea and Amos, I will describe how, during and after the 8th cent. innovation of written prophetic discourse, new forms of argument were necessary in order to establish the authority of prophetic speech in the written medium. Contrasting the genre of Hebrew prophecy to Albert Lord's study of oral composition in the epic genres of Greece and Yugoslavia (The Singer of Tales), I will seek to show that the cultural relations between oral and written discourse, and the characteristic marks of each, are heterogeneous. While some basic patterns recur, others are specific to particular genres and cultural sites. This finding, in the context of a study of hybrid literate and oral elements in a mythopoetic tradition, raises questions about Ong's and Havelock's Hellenocentric thesis as described above, particularly in regard to 1) the presumption of necessary and unitary development from oral to written discourse, whereby oral forms after a designated point in history can be labelled "secondary" or "residual;" and 2) the implicit association of orality with pre-rational thought or *mythos*, and literacy with rationality or *logos*.